Polyphibianism: Evolving Transdisciplinarity into an Imaginary Organism of Living Knowledge by Ljubec, Ziva
Copyright statement 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood 
to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no 
information derived from it may be published without the author's prior consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Polyphibianism 
 
Evolving Transdisciplinarity into an  
Imaginary Organism of Living Knowledge 
 
 
by 
 
 
Živa Ljubec  
 
 
a thesis submitted to Plymouth University 
in partial fulfilment for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
April 2014 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Abstract 
Živa Ljubec 
Polyphibianism  
Evolving Transdisciplinarity into an Imaginary Organism of Living Knowledge 
Transdisciplinarity emerged from the urge to grasp the elusive knowledge in the 
most fertile zone in between and beyond disciplines that escapes even the most 
elaborate interdisciplinary operations.  While interdisciplinary protocol enables 
experts to operate within foreign disciplines, in the extreme case as diverse as art 
and science (by inviting artists into scientific departments and vice versa), the 
production of knowledge remains confined to particular domains. To transcend 
these confinements and access the knowledge that evades institutionalisation 
Basarab Nicolescu’s Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity sets up conditions for an 
open structure to be grown outside the current compartmentalisation into a 
living knowledge.  
This thesis imagines a possible evolution of transdisciplinarity into knowledge to 
be lived internally rather than learnt externally in order to overcome the anxiety 
in transcending the established culture of disciplinary research. By entering the 
transdisciplinary zone, the identity of experts-specialists dissolves, even the 
crudest separation into artists and scientists becomes obsolete. From the illusion 
of losing control over knowledge arises the fear of a return to archaic, mystic or 
even shamanic ways of knowing. Far from proposing a return to shamanism in 
its ancient forms this thesis imagines the way of polyphibianism – an imaginary 
solution to navigate efficiently the protoplasmic state of knowledge that would 
be indigenous to culture of disciplinary researchers.  
With every significant discovery the disciplinary researchers already intuitively 
trespass into the very zone that the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity invites them 
to enter intentionally. From examination of documented introspective inquiries 
into their act of discovery the thesis infers the necessary sensibilities and 
adaptabilities of the individuals to cross the borders of their disciplines. Their 
seemingly lost identity is temporarily restored with the term polyphibian 
(analogous to amphibian) designating their ability to survive and explore 
multiple environments. With each change of circumstances in research a 
polyphibian adapts by swiftly reinventing its instinctive instruments, mutating 
its organs of knowing, indifferently to conventional habits of thought. 
Through their introspective writings this thesis investigates the polyphibic 
aptitude of Henri Poincaré, Henri Bergson and Marcel Duchamp to scout at the 
periphery of physics, metaphysics and ‘pataphysics, to intuitively anticipate the 
role of chance, chaos and complexity in both arts and sciences. A threshold of 
complexity has to be surpassed in order to bring the current apparatus of 
knowledge to life.  Bergson’s insight on laughter and dreams suggests how 
intellect could transcend itself. The thesis proposes to consider laughter as faculty 
that could induce self-awareness in the intellectual apparatus while dreams are 
considered to facilitate self-organisation of intellect on higher orders of 
awareness. In Deleuzian manner of mutating Bergson’s work into Bergsonism, 
polyphibianism is a mutation in transcribing the code of Creative Evolution 
where Bergson insisted on interdependency between the theory of knowledge 
and the theory of evolution.  
The scholarly dispute on Bergsonian and anti-Bergsonian tendencies present in 
Marcel Duchamp’s work is revisited in the thesis by interpreting the higher 
dimensional Bride as a polyphibic organism of living knowledge with access to 
higher orders of awareness, able to guide the Bachelor’s apparatus of mechanical 
production and preservation of knowledge out of its predicament. Informed by 
peculiar Duchampian experiments that challenged both the domain of art and 
science the research projects in this thesis consist of an intervention at CERN that 
tested the impenetrability of institutionalised art-science collaborations and 
installation of the Interval of Suspended Judgement with high mathematical 
precision at the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics. With these projects 
the problems of categorising researchers into artists and scientists are revealed. 
As Deleuze suggested, to effectively formulate the problem, to realize it in 
multiplicity of contexts, a new concept must be invented, a new organism must 
be conceived. This thesis gave birth to an imaginary organism of living 
knowledge in order to relieve the unnecessary anxieties and to fully engage in 
transdisciplinary research.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. A note on temporary terminology 
Invention of auxiliary, provisional concepts is rather indispensable in resolving 
the issues encountered in transition from disciplinary to transdisciplinarity 
research, as outlined in this thesis. For this reason the reader is kindly advised to 
consult the appendixi with a provisional dictionary of terms introduced for the 
purpose of this thesis and terms borrowed from referential literature. Besides the 
notice on the temporary terms - the neologisms such as polyphibian, 
polyphibianism, protoplasmagora, etc., that can be safely discarded after use - a 
note must be taken on terminology of categories and concepts that are considered 
by the author to be obsolete in the context of transdisciplinarity, but are 
nonetheless cautiously used in combination with neologisms for a gradual 
transition into a territory of transdisciplinary knowledge, independent of 
categories and concepts.  
With intermittent demonstrations of obsoleteness of specific terms throughout 
the thesis, the reader is invited to reflect upon the purpose and consequences of 
exact categorisation of research activities or “creative acts”ii into arts, sciences, 
scientific disciplines, etc., as encountered in the thesis. Considering a discovery 
                                                 
i see appendix A 
ii see chapter 4.2.  
4 
 
or an invention as essentially a transdisciplinary event the role of these 
categorical terms appertaining to disciplinary domains is to be amended. This 
thesis takes account of such alterations, and attempts to grasp the most pertinent 
aspects of these obsolete terms, before provisionally substituting them with 
suggested neologisms - the always renewed neologisms, that are mutating with 
every usage.  
The term aesthetics, for instance, is used in this thesis according to its most 
rudimental, original definition by Alexander Baumgarten (Hammermeister, 
2002, p. 4), as a theory of sensibility, where sensibility is considered as a 
gnoseological faculty, that is, a faculty that produces a certain type of knowledge. 
In considering the aesthetic sensibility of the artist this thesis further focuses on 
the sensibility of the “serious artist” defined by Marshall McLuhan (1994, p. 18) 
as the “expert aware of the changes in sense perception.” Marcel Duchamp’s 
practice broadens the category of artist with the complementary anti-artist and 
an-artist, as well as by introducing the scientist into the arts (Molderings, 2010). 
The evolution of these categories trespassing the disciplinary is covered under 
the term polyphibianism. 
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1.2. Formulating the thesis: why polyphibianism?  
1.2.1. The context of two culturesi and transculturesii  
 “As a cultural anxiety, concern about the divide between the ‘two cultures’ 
essentially dates from the nineteenth century,” begins S. Collini (Snow, 2012, p. 
ix) in his introduction to the C. P. Snow’s widely known book “The Two 
Cultures.” Before seventeenth century and the advent of “the scientific 
revolution” that was to establish criteria for “genuine knowledge” production, 
knowing nature was undertaken by the “all-embracing enterprise of 
philosophy,” yet even with the raising standards and introducing the 
“experimental method” in the eighteen century, Collini (Snow, 2012, p. x) does 
not observe a significant separation: “the great cultural map provided by the 
Enlightenment’s great intellectual monument, L’Encyclopédie, did not represent 
human knowledge as structured around a division corresponding to the later 
divide between ‘the sciences’ and ‘the humanities.’” 
It is therefore only relatively recently that division of knowledge and know-how 
divided categorically not only arts, philosophy and science, but science itself 
underwent disintegration into increasingly specialised scientific disciplines. In 
seventeenth century the “method of experiment” was shared among craftsmen, 
                                                 
i term borrowed from 1959 Rede Lecture, Two Cultures (Snow, 2012) 
ii term borrowed from 1994 Charter of Transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2002) 
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artisans, alchemists, metalworkers, etc. It was only in the nineteenth century that 
the science went through the process of isolation externally, from the “non-
scientific” practices of research, and furthermore internally among sciences 
themselves, by disabling the communication of knowledge across disciplines. 
Since 1959, when  C. P. Snow warned about the ostensibly irreconcilable division 
of researchers in two cultures, dividing and multiplying of disciplines only 
accelerated, but surprisingly, new hybrid cross cultures emerged.  
As will be shown, with the advancement of chaos theory and theory of 
complexity the specialisation and separation of disciplines proliferated, while the 
ubiquity of complexity provided that collective protoplasmic background from 
which emerged the idea of transdisciplinarity - the idea of a non-empty set of 
knowledge in between and beyond disciplines (Nicolescu, 2002). The theory of 
complexity therefore reverses its effect and reintegrates in an intricate way the 
highly specialised disciplines into which it disintegrated science. This thesis is set 
in the hybrid heterogeneous cultural background where cultures of researchers 
as overly alienated and overly generalized as those of artists and scientists meet 
again in the transdisciplinary zone. 
The concept of transdisciplinarity as it first occurred contemporaneously in the 
1970’s writings of academic researchers from dissimilar fields, such as Jean Piaget 
(developmental psychology and genetic epistemology), Erich Jantsch 
(astrophysics and cosmology), and Edgar Morin (philosophy and sociology), is 
recovered again in the 1990’s when a Charter of Transdisciplinarity is signed by 
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Edgar Morin, Lima de Freitas and Basarab Nicolescu. A decade later the charter 
is extended by Nicolescu (2002) into a Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, setting 
up conditions for transdisciplinary research to cope with increasing complexity 
of world problems. The evolution of transdisciplinarity into an imaginary 
organism of living knowledge, as proposed in this thesis, is derived from the 
premises of this manifesto.  
1.2.2. The challenges of transdisciplinary practice  
While scientific disciplines form closed structures, Nicolescu’s (2002) Manifesto 
of Transdisciplinarity opens up the structure of knowledge to the unknown 
territories holistically. Even though in theory the manifesto resolves the problem 
of constriction and reduction of knowledge to one or few particular disciplinary 
domains by inviting researchers to deliberately move beyond these domains, 
transdisciplinary research is rarely intentionally achieved in practice. But even 
with the best intentions of steering a transdisciplinary project – the research is 
frequently reduced to inter- or multi- disciplinary project, therefore conducted 
within a, to some extent expanded, but nonetheless disciplinary framework.  
The research questions within this thesis revolve around the problem of 
practicing transdisciplinarity. Although every major breakthrough discovery 
results from spontaneous transgression, breaking of constrictions of scientific 
disciplines, and is therefore, in essence, born within the transdisciplinary zone, a 
deliberate practice of transdisciplinary research has not yet developed. Could 
such practice evolve by imagining a solution? Establishing any alternative 
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framework would obstruct the transdisciplinary flow, segregating the 
transdisciplinary knowledge back into disciplines. To evolve transdisciplinary 
practice, this thesis instead proposes a movement of polyphibianism.  
The open structure of transdisciplinarity leaves the researcher trained in 
disciplines disoriented. Trespassing the borders of the safe and solid framework 
of the known into the vague and unknown reinstates the fear of archaic, abstruse, 
mystic or esoteric knowledge. To avoid anxiety from transforming the area of 
disciplinary research environment to that of an ancient or alien culture, the 
purpose of this thesis is to imagine research environment indigenous to 
disciplinary researchers. Through study cases of introspection into processes of 
invention and discovery such environment can be reimagined to be recognized 
by researchers as their own -  an environment they already inhabit spontaneously 
and unintentionally when the drive of curiosity is too strong to resist, and the 
disciplinary conventions are transgressed.  
Confronting the seemingly disorienting, disorganised open structure of 
transdisciplinary zone poses a challenge for the disciplinary researcher. The 
choice to exit the safely bounded and carefully compartmentalised disciplinary 
structure is accompanied with anxiety. The researcher must break the habits of 
reasoning from a fixed standpoint and within a firm framework, resist the urge 
for repetition of results, and refrain from abstraction, from categorising and 
archiving the knowledge. Most of all, the researcher must resist representation – 
by suspending the reflex to model a representational system for transdisciplinary 
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experience only the traces are left behind the trespasser of disciplinary borders, 
traces without any imposing or enclosing structure, open traces inviting fellow 
researchers to follow in the footsteps, but to live the experience on their own 
terms, before returning to their disciplines.  
The search for exemplary transdisciplinary practice in this thesis begins with a 
visual artist’s refusal of visual manifestation. Marcel Duchamp, trained as 
“retinal” artist refused to succumb to the hegemony of the retina, of the visually 
dominated culture and explored what he termed the “non-retinal” art.  This 
exploration lead to transdisciplinary practice of pseudo-artistic and pseudo-
scientific experiments avoiding repetitive results of experiments – that is 
according to McLuhan (Picnic in Space, 1967) again the consequence of 
dominance of visual culture. The challenges of human sense organs, such as the 
all-pervading habits of visual sense based culture, obstruct the flow of 
transdisciplinary practice. For this reason invention of new organs of sensing and 
knowing in transdisciplinarity is proposed in this thesis.    
Institutionalisation of disciplinary structures presents another challenge for 
trespassing into transdisciplinarity. Following the example of Marcel Duchamp, 
that submitted a readymade art anonymously under the pseudonym of R. Mutt 
in order to test the assertions of an art institution, another readymade was 
submitted under the same pseudonym licence for the purposes of this thesis to 
test the transdisciplinary openness to collaboration between institutions of art 
and science. A strong presence of institutions inhibits the incessant questioning 
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of categories and concepts – replacing of obsolete categories is postponed 
indefinitely at the cost of posing the wrong questions. Without the rigour and 
discipline maintained by institutions there is allegedly no exactitude in 
knowledge production. The aim of this thesis is to show the opposite and to 
introduce a mode of precision that is not limited to quantitative analysis but 
develops into a qualitative accuracy. Transdisciplinarity evolves organs to 
proficiently navigate elusive knowledge, knowledge in creation that is 
ceaselessly changing and evades any attempt of institutions to capture it.   
To tackle the problem of engagement with the ineffable and indefinable this 
thesis returns to the least disciplined of disciplines – to art and its attempts to 
infiltrate itself in between disciplinary sciences. Marcel Duchamp, as an artist that 
transcended the limitations of arts, sets up the environment for transdisciplinary 
research by inviting the spectator to participate in his creative act, where “the 
spectator experiences the phenomenon of transmutation,” (Duchamp, 1989, p. 
139).   With this invitation Duchamp is already contemplating the main inhibitor 
in transdisciplinary practice – the reluctance to transcend one’s limitations, the 
aversion to one’s spontaneous transmutation.  
Without transmutation of the researchers into transdisciplinarians there is no 
transformation of disciplinary knowledge. Institutional pretension of practicing 
transdisciplinarity without allowing the transmutation yields inadequate results, 
and therefore, only strengthens the impenetrable disciplinary fortress.  Whilst 
transmutation is effortless, Bergson (1914, p. 47) claims effort and energy is 
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invested in keeping the common sense, the conventions, the habits and the 
“discipline” of mind in place. This thesis follows Bergson’s suggestions to 
investigate trough introspection other faculties of mind in order to liberate the 
intellect from its constrains, to evolve the instruments of knowing, to reintegrate 
the way of knowing with the environment, to eliminate the unnecessary 
scaffolding obstructing the direct experience of knowledge.    
1.2.3. Supplanting frameworks of disciplinary research 
The term polyphibian is introduced in order to substitute the classification of 
researchers within the context of scientific or artistic disciplines that become 
obsolete in the transdisciplinary territory. The neologism polyphibian, as a new 
term, is avoiding any connotation with the human species-specific research. 
Polyphibians, as researchers, are not confined to the faculty of human intellect, 
to the current reach of human reasoning. Rather, polyphibians relate to that 
faculty of research emerging from the mutual dependence between the animal 
and its ambient – polyphibians are the animating agent of the ambient that is 
driven by pure curiosity. The term polyphibian is derived from the term 
amphibian, denoting an animal adapted to two media, able to inhabit both 
aquatic and non-aquatic environments. A polyphibian is therefore apt to explore 
more than two environments as a transdisciplinarian, trespassing between 
multiple media, unconstricted by conventions of a specific artistic or scientific 
discipline. 
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Polyphibianism is the evolutionary movement of transdisciplinarity, of 
disciplinary knowledge transcending its boundaries by becoming self-aware, by 
introspectively correcting itself, by mutating and evolving into living organisms 
of knowledge. Polyphibianism is an imaginary solution of living the knowledge 
internally, through invention of organs of knowing, rather than through learning 
externally, extracting the knowledge via preconceived frameworks.   
Polyphibianism therefore does not replace the inter-, multi-, cross- or trans- 
disciplinary frameworks with a new theoretical framework, but offers an interval 
of suspended judgementi, where research is to be imagined as a spontaneously 
self-organising process, as a creative actii, inviting disciplinary trespassers to co-
create new organs of knowing, to become newborn organisms of living 
knowledge. In such immediate knowing no external guidance is needed - 
navigation is spontaneous. 
The aim of this thesis is to study the prototypes for transdisciplinary zone, how 
to set up the intervals of suspended judgement, what is the setting of a creative 
act, etc.  Transdisciplinarity does not require a rigid architecture or an apparatus 
if transmutation into polyphibianism is effortless. All that is required for 
prosperous transdisciplinary practice is to reverse the effort of scientific 
disciplines invested in preventing such transmutation. To release the pressure of 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. on the interval of suspended judgement  
ii see chapter 4.2. on participation in creative act 
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conventional science the creative act is set up by Duchamp, whose presence in 
public is more often in a role of a curator than in a role of an exhibiting artist. This 
thesis suggests to reconsider curatorship as that crucial catalytic ingredient that 
accelerates the creative chain reactions – the transmutations of researchers.  
Suspension of judgement, participation in creative act, transmutation into 
polyphibians, the movement of polyphibianism - these are all effortless, 
spontaneous reactions, independent of any framework - activities resisting the 
existing framework, or working in spite of it. Proposing such effortless solution, 
this thesis therefore does not try to replace the closed disciplinary structure but 
rather carefully studies how to open it further.  
The opening is initiated by removing obstructions, such as obsolete terms, that 
are to be supplanted by catalytic substances, such as a provisional terminology, 
that induces growth and expansion of imaginary solutions.  With advancement 
of the thesis the intricacy of incisions into disciplinary structure gradually 
increases. The thesis is an effort to comply with the standards of disciplinary 
research, while concurrently emerging from transdisciplinarity, communicating 
the uncommunicable - the indirect immediate knowledge, demonstrating a 
complex complementary relation between disciplinary domain and 
transdisciplinarity.  
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1.3. Thesis Outline: a guide to polyphibianism  
Polyphibianism was invented as an imaginary solution by participating in 
creative acts of researchers creating new knowledge on the periphery of their 
respective research domains and by trespassing into the transdisciplinary zone. 
This brief guide serves to orient the reader within the process of imagining a 
solution for the outlined problems of transdisciplinarity, the process of 
experimenting with this imaginary solution and exploring through it the 
transdisciplinary territory. Divided in three sections (from manifestos to methods 
and actions undertaken in this research) the content of each of the three chapters 
of the main body of the thesis is presented as a short summary of key ideas.  
1.3.1. The manifestos – introduction to the second chapter  
Chapter 2. Literature review is more than a basic review of existing writings on the 
theme of transdisciplinarity. Rather than an extensive summary of numerous 
papers published in journals and conference proceedings, resulting from 
collaborations between researchers based in most disparate disciplinary 
domains,  attempting to apply transdisciplinarity to a variety of specific 
problems, this literature review focuses thoroughly on the most fundamental 
ideas of transdisciplinarity, as established in the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, 
composed by Basarab Nicolescu.  
While subchapter 2.2. Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity reviews and opens up new 
views by imagining possible evolutionary trajectories for transdisciplinarity, the 
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subchapter 2.1. Across disciplines: from meta- to ‘pata- begins by returning to the 
disciplinary divisions and unconventional attempts to reach beyond and to 
overcome the separation. Just as metaphysics was established as a science beyond 
physics, ‘pataphysics, notwithstanding serious humour, was inaugurated as 
science of sciences, that “lies as far beyond metaphysics as metaphysics lies 
beyond physics” (Shattuck, 1960, p. 29).  
Although based on humour, the ‘pataphysical method is not unknown to the 
most “serious” scientists. Even Basarab Nicolescu, as a quantum physicist, for 
instance, is “well acquainted with pataphysical literature” (Hugill, 2012, p. 227), 
and his Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity demonstrates open-mindedness to 
unique approaches in research. Since ‘pataphysics offers valuable insights to 
knowledge production outside disciplinary compartments and their respective 
conventions, ‘pataphysical literature and literature on ‘pataphysics are studied 
as an important resource in imagining possible evolutionary trajectories for 
transdisciplinarity. The opportunity is taken in this chapter to compare the 
strategies of ‘pataphysics and transdisciplinarity, side by side, as a significant 
reference of the context in which the research herein was conducted.   
Special attention is paid to laughter, a method of comical corrective, as defined 
by Henri Bergson in his Essay on Laughter.  The metaphysicist Bergson, namely, 
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is said to have influenced Alfred Jarryi, the official originator of ‘pataphysics, 
while other indications point to Bergson’s influence on the artist and 
‘pataphysicist Marcel Duchamp and his method of serious humour. As is shown 
later in the thesis, of all physical sciences ‘pataphysics comes closest to quantum 
physics, as well as to the theory of complexity and chaos theory.  Bergson brings 
the faculty of laughter in connection with the faculty of imagination and dreams. 
Both his essay on laughter and dreams are not reviewed in the second chapter, 
since they are thoroughly examined in the fourth chapter.    
Extensive search for transdisciplinary-inspired research across various 
disciplines uncovered many interesting authors, some of them listed in the first 
subchapter of the second chapter, whose books do not necessarily belong on a 
particular disciplinary shelf, but rather contribute to and borrow from many 
disciplines. Such would be the studies of second order cybernetic systems, 
natural and technological ecosystems, introspective inquiries in nature of 
invention and various approaches to the mystery of life and the difficulties in 
determining the meaning of term “living.”  These themes were pertinent in 
forecasting a possible evolution of transdisciplinarity into the imaginary 
organism of living knowledge – where systems of knowledge could become self-
aware, awaken into life by self-correcting its limitations through humour. 
                                                 
i Alfred Jarry was Henri Bergson’s student at the Lycée Henry IV in Paris. 
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The second subchapter begins by examining the articles of the Charter of 
Transdisciplinarity signed in 1994 and putting in comparison the motivation 
behind transdisciplinarity as envisioned in the charter and its imagined 
evolution. What charter outlines is then elaborated upon in the manifesto: the 
break of modern science from ancient ways of knowing, and consequently the 
separation of the observer and the observed. While the modern researcher 
observes from outside, the ancient researcher takes a stance within the object of 
knowledge - the ancient way of knowing is living the mythological knowledge 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 9).  Polyphibianism reinvents the myth within the 
transdisciplinary zone. Polyphibians transgress the conventions of research from 
an “objective” point of view and move through “subjective” points of beingi that 
through the movement of polyphibianism resonate into a coherent mythological 
organism of living knowledge.  
By imagining a coherent organism of knowledge, knowing becomes immediate - 
the researcher is immersed in the knowledge that changes and experiences the 
changes by living them. Living the knowledge through points of being facilitates 
the most challenging requirement of transdisciplinarity – the leap from one level 
of reality to another – to abruptly change the point of view. Instead of considering 
the levels of reality as separate parallel planes with separate points of view and 
separate rules of reasoning, polyphibianism reintegrates the points of being into 
                                                 
i “point of being” is a term introduced by Derrick de Kerckhove (1997, p. 187), see appendix A 
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an organism. Whereas there is no hint in the manifesto how to switch from one 
viewpoint to another or from one to many, leaving the disciplinary researcher in 
front of an insurmountable gap between the levels, polyphibianism has an 
imaginary solution already incorporated: all points of being become attainable 
by inventing new organs of knowing with every change in the organism.  
With every transdisciplinary leap new organs are invented. If organs do not 
mutate, the living knowledge is experienced with old organs – the polyphibian 
experiences abstraction of knowledge even though the living knowledge is 
rooted in concreteness. An example of unease at such inadequate experience is 
given by Nicolescu (2002, p. 19) in the case of a leap from classical to quantum 
mechanics: in abstract terms it is comprehensible by human intelligence, whilst 
in the concrete it is inaccessible to human experience as long as organs of 
knowing do not mutate and adapt to a different level.  
By opening new levels of reality old concepts gain new values: precision on the 
level of quantum mechanics, for instance, is, in a sense, incomparable to that of 
classical mechanics. Polyphibianism takes old concepts, or even concepts 
becoming obsolete with the transition into transdisciplinarity, carefully into 
account. The concept of precision is reconsidered for the purposes of this thesis 
by practicing polyphibianism and precisely determining the threshold between 
physics and ‘pataphysics. In this case the precision within the interval between 
the two levels of reality needs to be set up so as to satisfy both physical and 
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‘pataphysical expectation and open up new insights. At this threshold the old 
concepts are to be replaced with the new organs of knowing.  
Intellect, rules of reasoning, and logic are context specific. In the manifesto the 
relation between the environment and logic is examined – the experiential 
component is crucial in determining the logic (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 27). 
Transdisciplinarity is advised to readjust the classical logic to the logic of the 
included middle. ‘Pataphysically, the logic that does not fit the empirical 
evidence can be corrected by a comical element. Again, these correctives are 
already built into polyphibianism. Polyphibianism and the environment are 
interdependent: if the medium changes the rules of reasoning change; the 
knowing is interrupted until the organs of knowing adapt by mutation to recent 
changes.  The logic is immanent in the organs moving through the environment 
– the logic is part of what animates the environment.  
In transition to quantum mechanics the “one true value” monovalent 
monophibic logic opened up to versions of multivalent polyphibic logic.  This 
transition does not switch between true values or true viewpoints – all points of 
being are experienced in a coherent way – the polyphibian sets all the organs of 
knowing to a state of readiness, of awareness in which dichotomies, or rather, 
polychotomiesi coexist. To the emerging versions of multivalent logic Nicolescu 
                                                 
i see Appendix A: temporary terminology, for more on polychotomies 
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(2002, p. 28) adds the Lupasco’s logic of the included middle, or the logic of the 
included third, that enables all three terms of a trichotomy to exist 
simultaneously.  
Lupasco’s logic that Nicolescu assumes as suitable for transdisciplinary 
operations is already a significant corrective of two thirds of axioms of the 
classical logic. The third axiom, the axiom of identity, is corrected by 
polyphibianism. A monophibian transmuting into a polyphibian cannot 
experience a single identity through multiple points of being – A is not only A - 
but a multiplicity of values. The dynamics of dichotomies and polychotomies in 
general is what informs the invention of new instruments for new levels, or 
rather, new organs of knowing.  
Invention of instinctive organs of knowing is problem dependent – in contrast to 
intellectual instruments that are generalised and therefore imperfect to serve 
multiple purposes, to be reused for many problems, the instinctive organs of 
knowing adapt immediately to a unique experience of a unique problem 
solution. No organ of knowing is to be transferred to another experience neither 
of this or another problem. This requirement is added to transdisciplinarity in its 
evolution into polyphibianism.  The disciplinary sciences are already sensing the 
need for these highly specialised inventions. The reintegration of sciences within 
the transdisciplinary zone is to happen through accelerated hyper specialisation.  
Surpassing the speed of intellect brings the instrument in the immediate reach of 
the organism that knows itself. The instruments become the instinctive organs 
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that specialise for the unique rather than generalise. In the economy of 
knowledge where the exceptional is cheaper than the general in the long run, the 
physics of invention is becoming ‘pataphysical. 
As was explained before, complexity increased the specialisation and the exit is 
on the other side – specialisation and customisation of techno scientific solution 
needs to increase to a critical point where it comically corrects itself into a 
coherent resonating cramps of laughter. Transdisciplinary goes against 
simplification – polyphibianism evolves transdisciplinarity by multiplication of 
organs of knowing and points of being into a system so complex that a form of 
organisation emerges – an organism comes to life. The living knowledge is not 
about clarifying everything within a few laws – the knowledge is not to be 
comprehended by lesser number of laws – to know more directly and 
immediately is to experience the entirety of the knowledge by becoming the 
organism of knowledge.   
It is important to highlight that the disciplines are reintegrating within the 
transdisciplinary zone due to theory of complexity that caused disciplinary 
specialisation in the first place. Like laughter, complexity caused a burst of the 
disciplinary apparatus into even more disciplines that are now so interdependent 
that the reintegration within transdisciplinarity becomes inevitable. But for this 
only one factor is missing – it is the adaptability of the human intellect that must 
just as well correct itself by bursting into laughter and then recollect itself on 
emerging orders of organisation – in other words the human reasoning and 
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judgement needs to be halted – suspended for a moment to be able to reorganise 
and adapt to different orders of awareness.  
The manifesto (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 54) proposes to resist the manifestation, the 
representation, preservation and the intermediary interfaces between the 
observer and the observed. Immediate knowledge must resist these interfaces, 
these instruments and categories of knowing, resist the convenience of old habits, 
old sense, old organs and invent new organs. The manifesto finds resistance in 
the interior knowledge, the introspective, internalised speculation. This is taken 
as the entry point into polyphibianism. Polyphibianism comes from resisting 
representation, suspending judgement, avoiding translation, working through 
silence, accepting the noise, chance, chaos, complexity.  
1.3.2. The methods – introduction to the third chapter  
Chapter 3. Research Methodology is divided into three subchapters, each of which 
presents a different aspect of methodology applied in this research: the method 
of introspection, the method of indifference and an attempt not to invent concepts 
but conceive organisms of knowledge. In this attempt an auxiliary method of 
infradifferentiation is applied through which dichotomies, trichotomies and even 
polychotomies are resolved into new organs of knowing. The methods are 
studied within the historical context of this thesis as practiced by the three 
individuals – the three case studies of this research – Marcel Duchamp, Henri 
Bergson and Henri Poincaré. This chapter therefore serves as methodological as 
well as a historical and theoretical background for this research. The methods 
23 
 
described herein are applied by participating in creative act as described in the 
fourth chapter.  
Subchapter 3.1. Anticipating chaos: method of introspection describes the impact of   
discovering chance, serendipity and unpredictability within deterministic 
systems on scientific, philosophic and artistic research. Chance only occurs in a 
contained, isolated, deterministically-sterile, chance–free system, if the system 
develops a sensitivity to certain initial conditions. To anticipate chaos one needs 
to develop a sensitivity to sense such sensitivity.  It is shown how Poincaré not 
only anticipates chaos, but invents unprecedented tools of knowing such 
chaotically behaving dynamical systems by introducing qualitative analysis in 
science of physics that until then relied on quantitative analysis.    
In order to cause such a paradigm shift in science the scientist must be willing to 
inspect thoroughly the scientific method, and this inspection includes the 
introspection in one’s own method of thinking. Poincaré, in his extensive 
writings on scientific method, expands on the reach of sensitivity required to 
detect chance in deterministic systems to detect “chance” in the way science 
proceeds – concluding that science is founded on “conventions” (Poincaré, 1913). 
Transdisciplinarity enables the shifting of paradigms by finding the inconvenient 
convention within contained and sterile disciplines. While containment is 
convenient in ordinary conditions, facilitating disciplined research, for certain 
initial conditions, inconvenience might arise and cause disciplinary chaos – 
which only a trained transdisciplinarian can manage.  
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Poincaré, faced with a problem where an unattainable amount of information is 
required to determine the behaviour of a deterministic system, did not surrender. 
Instead, he faced the problem differently, from different points of being. Poincaré 
switched from a quantifiable analysis to a new kind of analysis of qualities of the 
system for which the instruments yet needed to be invented. Poincaré’s 
sensibility to detect chaos and his ability to invent tools for further detection and 
description of chaotic behaviour comes from his critical approach to existent 
research methods. Namely Poincaré introspectively questioned why, as a 
scientist, one seeks to know a system in a certain way, examining whether the 
choice is simply one of convenience, and if there are even more convenient 
choices, imagining how one could know the system in another unconventional 
way that would uncover even more pertinent information about it.  
While Poincaré was formalising qualitative analysis in physics, Bergson was 
struggling to express his preference over qualitative way of knowing in 
metaphysics. It takes almost half a century and invention of computers for the 
chaos theory to be established, for state space to supplement classical space, for 
fractal dimension to enrich integer spatial dimensions, etc. Chaos theory informs 
and influences most diverse disciplines. In philosophy, suddenly, the 
irreconcilable dichotomies can be imagined as mapped on diagrams and resolved 
as a system of tensions that operate in proximity and yet diverge far apart. Paul 
Harris (2004) shows how difficulties encountered by Bergson in representing his 
metaphysical ideas can be resolved diagrammatically, analogous to diagrams of 
chaotic systems. 
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The complexity of nature that Bergson discerned through intuition is hardly 
conveyable in linear language of intellect. These difficulties are comparable to 
Poincaré’s frustrations in describing the complexity of a seemingly simple 
deterministic system with available mathematical tools, leading to invention of 
new instruments. Harris (2004) proposes to apply these instruments to Bergson’s 
metaphysics by “reverse- translating” Bergson’s intuition from linear language 
to nonlinear diagrams.  
In so doing the term of movement, for instance, that Bergson tries to differentiate 
from projection of trajectory onto a homogeneous space, becomes presentable in 
a phase space, as envisioned by Poincaré.  This new kind of space, in which 
movement is to be comprehended, is not anymore homogeneously articulated 
but follows the articulation of the movement. A mutual dependence between a 
movement and the phase space, in which it is represented, is in fact an 
interdependence between a phenomenon and the instrument. 
The most important thing that Duchamp learned from Poincaré is that scientific 
methods are guided by convenience and not by “truth” and that with every new 
intuition new instruments must be invented. Duchamp, in his most “iconic” art-
science experiment, the 3 Standard Stoppages, questions the conventions and 
gains an insight into problems of the unit of length, problems of Euclidian 
geometry, and humorously devises new instruments to form new kind of non-
Euclidian, heterogeneous spaces. Duchamp gradually becomes aware of the 
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extent of implications the 3 standard stoppages, as a chance operation based 
work, had on his entire oeuvre.  
Transdisciplinarity emerges when chance operations are introduced into a sterile 
disciplinary methodology. The search for transdisciplinarity niches within the 
disciplinary compartments is based on finding the sensitivity of disciplinary 
methodology to initial conditions. The role of the artist entering the scientific 
department is to test what happens if conditions in reasoning slightly change. If 
a long term divergence into multiple trajectories of research is imaginable, the 
disciplinary scientist transmutes into a transdisciplinarian – a polyphibian able 
to imagine a diagram of all trajectories of the system in a state space.  
Dependence of methodology on initial conditions is dependence on conventions, 
on scientific apparatus. The independence is regained in the transdisciplinary 
zone. If introducing chance in regulated disciplinary departments causes chaos 
that only transdisciplinarians can handle, it is worth remembering that chaos has 
windows of periodicity and that order can be re-established. Transdisciplinarity 
accommodates windows of disciplined standardised research. Bergson, Poincaré 
and even Duchamp to some extent recognise and benefit from such windows of 
orderly experience. The organism of living knowledge is precisely such self-
organising system in which ever new patterns of order appear and disappear 
again.  
Subchapter 3.2. Aesthetic Anaesthesia: method of indifference confronts the role of 
aesthetics in a scientific discovery, as presented by Poincaré, with Duchamp’s 
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proposal of complete aesthetic indifference. Dichotomous tension between 
Poincaré’s and Duchamp’s approach to aesthetics intensifies with the concept of 
a “sieve,” used by both as a selectively permeable membrane. The term aesthetics 
is reconsidered within its original definition as the faculty of sensitivity 
(Hammermeister, 2002), and compared to the specific sensitivity in a “serious 
artists,” as identified by McLuhan.  
To understand the sensibility of the artist one needs to reconsider the use of the 
sense organs. Marshall McLuhan (1994) studies artist’s recognition of changes in 
sensing caused by changes in the technological media landscape. It is shown 
through the theories of sense perception that human senses, as they are formally 
categorised, like any other category questioned in this thesis, might become 
obsolete. It was James Jerome Gibson (1983) who first proposed obsoleteness of 
such categorisation in his study of system of perception. Gibson proposes uniting 
the observer and the observed instead of isolating the senses of perception from 
the environment that is being perceived.  
On the other hand, Georg von Békésy (1960), researching the sense of hearing, 
suggests that the auditory perception differs from the visual, as a mosaic image 
differs from an image drawn in perspective. From Békésy’s comparison of the 
ubiquitous multidimensional space of acoustic information to the visual 
information trapped in the perspectival space reduced to a vanishing point, 
McLuhan has adopted the mosaic model as the model of ubiquitous 
multidimensional electronic culture. By associating the space of electronic culture 
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to the space of acoustic tribal culture, where sounds and meanings come into 
resonance, McLuhan develops further the model of the mosaic way of knowing.   
Gibson (1983) ponders upon how the information is picked up by, what he terms, 
perceptual systems, wondering whether the perceptual system of what animates 
the environment evolved so as to resonate with the information from the 
environment. Following this proposition the polyphibic organs of knowledge are 
imagined so as to pick up information that resonates with them. The organism of 
knowledge must invent the organs of knowing so that the observer and the 
observed come into resonance. The environment introspects itself through the 
perception systems of the observers; the transdisciplinary organism of 
knowledge knows itself through its organs. 
Gibson (1983) discussing the shifting of the eye in relation to shifting of attention 
elaborates on a dichotomous tension in attention, that can be simultaneously 
“selective” as well as “integrative,” “distributed” as well as “concentrated,” thus 
providing a mosaic model of a shifting viewpoint from which a polyphibic 
awareness emerges. Polyphibic awareness is awareness in a mosaic mode where 
illusion of a single point of view dissolves into multiple points of being, 
integrating multiplicity of experiences. A coherent experience arising from 
multiple points of being constitutes a polyphibian. Borrowing Gibson’s terms, 
transdisciplinarity evolves into a polyphibic “act of scanning,” where 
polyphibianism is a movement of knowledge with “no pure fixation,” no 
categorisation, no conceptualisation. 
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Subchapter 3.3. Inventing concepts - conceiving organisms takes the Deleuzian 
philosophical method of inventing concepts within classical format of knowledge 
to a different order of conceiving organisms of living knowledge. The subchapter 
begins by “reiterating” Deleuze’s “rewriting” of Bergson into Bergsonism until 
Polyphibianism is obtained.  Deleuze (1991, p. 16) in Bergsonism already implies 
the connection between inventing a concept and imagining a solution as a living 
organism: “Life is essentially determined in the act of avoiding obstacles, stating 
and solving a problem. The construction of the organism is both the stating of a 
problem and a solution.”  
Bergsonism follows Bergson’s criteria of accuracy when stating problems to 
avoid creation of “false problems.” Bergson’s examples of false problems include 
the problem of dis-order. Bergson claims there is no such thing as an absence of 
order. By trespassing the order of disciplinary domain one does not come across 
disorder, but rather a different order of knowledge. Transdisciplinarity enables 
new insights to qualify as a new kind of knowledge, just as intellectual external 
order of knowing differs in kind from intuitive internalised knowing.  
The anxiety of engaging with transdisciplinarity is partially rooted in the false 
premise that if knowledge is produced by disciplinary science, then anything 
outside this production line cannot be considered knowledge. The third chapter 
attempts to distinguish the order of transdisciplinary production or rather 
growth of living knowledge as complementary to disciplinary methodology, 
uncovering their intricate interpenetration. Within the transdisciplinary “chaos,” 
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that is not “dis-order” but different kind of unexpected order, there are windows 
of expected disciplinary order. Transdisciplinary practice is challenged by the 
inability of disciplinary research to recognise new kinds of orders. 
Polyphibianism, as a solution, must thus provide the ability to recognise and 
move in between particular orders of knowing. 
Avoiding falsely stated problems, and being versatile in reformulating problems 
with precision yields precise instruments or organs of knowing. From attempts 
to restate these problems accurately, by trial and error, polyphibianism evolves 
as an imaginary solution at the threshold between disciplinary and 
transdisciplinary research. Precision in transdisciplinarity is achieved by self-
awareness of the critical points at which the organism of knowledge changes in 
kind – it is newborn. Disciplinary knowledge changes only to a degree, it 
increases in quantity but it does not mutate in quality. Unaware of its critical 
points, the disciplinary knowledge is arbitrarily divided into a conveniently 
homogeneous lifeless structure.  
Transdisciplinarity relies on multiplicity of orders. Multiplicity, as proposed by 
Deleuze (1991), is not numerical, not reducible to difference in degree, but 
heterogeneous. Polyphibian, as a multiplicity of points of being, each of them 
irreplaceable and irreducible to the other, complies with this Deleuzian 
requirement. After examining Deleuze’s encounter with Bergson and 
reinterpreting Bergson through Bergsonism into Polyphibianism, further 
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encounters are set up in which dichotomies, trichotomies and polychotomies are 
resolved by recognising new orders with new organs of knowing.  
The encounter of Bergson and McLuhan touches a problem in science. Both 
Bergson and McLuhan independently assert that science relies on continuity and 
therefore attribute this tendency to the intellect, while instinct, in contrast, 
according to Bergson and McLuhan, prefers discontinuity. In search for an 
analogy describing the relation between these two faculties both Bergson and 
McLuhan turn to senses. Bergson compares vision to instinct and touch to 
intellect. McLuhan, on the contrary, compares visual culture to intellect, while a 
cluster of acoustic–tactile–kinetic senses is compared to instinctive, tribal culture. 
Although both claim the same fact about science, their analogies are exactly the 
opposite, thus forming a dichotomy.  
Unless this dichotomy is taken beyond closed categories, it is meaningless. 
Examining more closely Bergson’s line of thought it becomes clear that vision, as 
knowing at a distance, and touch, as knowing in continuity, refer to the knowing 
through senses prior to cultural interpretation of sense data. Namely, visual 
culture interprets discrete visual information into a more convenient continuous 
form. It is in this context, of a different order, that McLuhan compares the visual 
to continuous. From this simple example it is not difficult to see how discerning 
dichotomies can yield differentiation of existing and growth of new knowledge. 
The tension in imagining the visual as at once continuous and discontinuous 
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differentiates the visual knowledge in two different orders, or rather in two 
different organs of knowing.   
The encounter of Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré is investigated within a 
detailed historical perspective on the state of affairs in sciences of physics, 
metaphysics and ‘pataphysics. This example shows the complex tension in the 
much disputed question whether Duchamp was Bergsonist or anti-Bergsonist, 
whether he was a devoted admirer of Poincaré or just joking about it. The 
complexity of this debate far surpasses the simple question of the previous 
example.  Rather than trying to finally determine the tendencies of either of these 
three individuals, this research follows how they trespassed the boundaries of 
their respective domains from physics to metaphysics into ‘pataphysics.  
The historical dispute occurring among French intellectuals, documented in the 
journal “Revue de métaphysique et de morale,” questions deeply the values and 
principles of science (Molderings, 2010). This journal published article after 
article of Éduard Le Roy, the mathematician, philosopher and proponent of 
Bergson, and of his opponents. Le Roy was criticising what came to be known as 
the “conventionalist” science – term appropriated from Poincaré’s remark that 
most of the principles and laws of science were nothing but conventions. The 
dispute escalated from a critique of the quantitative approach to knowledge vs. 
qualitative – the only approach Le Roy claimed to be able to access the real source 
of knowledge. His “antiscientific” views exaggerated Poincaré’s remark to the 
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point that Poincaré himself had to intervene, responding to the same journal by 
labelling the Bergsonist Le Roy’s writings as “anti-intellectual.”  
As is shown at the beginning of the third chapter both Bergson and Poincaré 
move beyond quantitative analysis. While Bergson merely prefers the qualitative 
and heterogeneous experience of knowledge over the homogenised and 
quantifiable scientific knowledge, Poincaré, confronted with chaos, immediately 
makes a breakthrough by inventing instruments of qualitative analysis. Without 
expressing it, Bergson and Poincaré were both fundamentally in accordance with 
the science of the unique, the science that does not follow conventions but only 
exceptions, the science of ‘pataphysics.  
Namely, this historical dispute originates from Poincaré’s questioning of the 
science of the general in his introspective inquiry into scientific method that 
uncovers the motives and the necessity for generalisation. If one considers the 
generalisation into laws as a matter of convention, then one could consider 
physics as no less arbitrary than ‘pataphysics. In their introspective investigation 
of scientific way of knowing, Bergson and Poincaré cross the fields of physics and 
metaphysics to reach ‘pataphysics; both return to their respective domains with 
analogies of diffusion or random motions of molecules through membranes or 
filters, in order to describe the process of coming into knowing. For this purpose 
Bergson mostly applies the term osmosis, Poincaré focuses on the term sieve, and 
Duchamp puts both terms into practice – the sieves are physically present in the 
Large Glass, while metaphysically, in the invitation to participate in the creative 
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act of the Large Glass, the “transference from the artist to the spectator in the 
form of an aesthetic osmosis [is] taking place through the inert matter” 
(Duchamp, 1989, p. 139). 
Another term used by all three participants in this encounter is “readymade,” the 
use of which is examined separately for Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré. While 
Bergson considers readymades in his study on laughter and Poincaré in the form 
of ideas, Duchamp makes a limited number of readymades per year. 
Differentiation of the meaning of each such term must be done accurately. For 
the purposes of this research the method of such precise incision into a concept 
that includes irreconcilable oppositions is devised – the method of 
infradifferentiation – differentiation with an infrathin cut that uncovers different 
points of being through which a phenomenon can be experienced simultaneously  
in a polyphibic awareness. 
1.3.3. The actions – introduction to the fourth chapter  
Chapter 4. Research act and its evolution is an enactment of the methodology 
devised in the third chapter and of the theory revised in the second chapter. Since 
the main purpose of the thesis is to encourage engagement in transdisciplinary 
practice, experiments in practice became part of the research. The experimental 
practice is based on the lectures Creative Act, by Duchamp (1989), and Act of 
Creation, by Deleuze (2006). While Duchamp invites the posterity to continue his 
work, Deleuze sets the example himself by continuing Bergson’s work into 
Bergsonism. Participating in metaphysical and ‘pataphysical creations of 
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Bergson and Duchamp through a set of experiments generated imaginary 
solutions for participating in the transdisciplinary zone.  
The tangentially metaphysical experiment, referred to in the subchapter 4.1. 
Participating in a creative evolution, follows Bergson’s effort to establish a mutual 
dependence between the theory of evolution and the theory of life, by suggesting: 
if life, that is, evolution of life-forms, proceeds by “dissociation,” “division,” 
“dichotomy,” so should the evolution of forms of knowledge. From imaginary 
interpretation of his seminal work Creative Evolution, and his two 
supplementary essays on laughter and dreams, an imaginary organism of living 
knowledge is grown.  
The tangentially ‘pataphysical set of experiments, are accounted for in the 
subchapter 4.2. Participating in a creative act: from accurately re-enacting 
Duchampian interventions under Duchamp’s pseudonym R. Mutt to upgrading 
the notion of readymades. Duchamp’s seminal unfinished work, the Large Glass, 
initiated and first announced in the Box of 1914, is reused as a set of instruments 
in interaction with the Small Glass, in the context of Large Hadron Collider. The 
outcomes of experiments such as the discovery of the threshold between physics 
and ‘pataphysics with the utmost mathematical precision, or the ‘pataphysically 
derived geometry of phractals, are announced in the Box of 2014.  
By practicing participation in transdisciplinary act new insights are gained, new 
organs of knowing are invented and Duchamp’s instructions for participation in 
Creative Act can be updated.  Since, as Duchamp (1989, p. 139) notices, “in the 
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chain of reactions accompanying the creative act, a link is missing,” the purpose 
of experimentation is to imagine a solution, an imaginary link, a catalytic 
substance that accelerates the chain reaction between the artist and the spectator. 
The role of a catalyst is assigned to the curator – whose classical role of mediation 
between the artist and the spectator is upgraded to acceleration and hence 
proceeding from disappearance of mediation to immediate experience of living 
knowledge.  
Implementing the curator within Duchamp’s instructions for creative act does 
not come as a surprise, considering how Duchamp in his public role performs, 
just as much, if not more, as a curator rather than as a prolific artist, curating 
exhibitionsi in preference to exhibiting. He is neither eager to promote his art 
work, nor are his pursuits to “make works which are not works of ‘art’”ii 
straightforward artistic. On the other hand, it is clear from his writings and his 
meticulous preservation and restorations of his works that he is investing in 
posterity (Duchamp, 1989, p. 140), in an ever changing postproduction of his 
creative act.   
Most of all, Duchamp remains a silent curator. The creative act that Duchamp 
initiates in silence is a true transdisciplinary act, in the sense Nicolescu (2002, p. 
                                                 
i Duchamp was invited to design exhibition spaces for Surrealist shows: in Paris “International 
Surrealist Exhibition,” in 1938, and “Exposition Internationale du Surréalisme,” in 1947, and a 
Surrealist show in New York “First Papers of Surrealism” in 1942 
ii Duchamp’s note of 1913, published in Naumann (1999, p. 74) 
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101) explains silence as the element resisting representation and interpretation. 
In the same sense Deleuze (2006, p. 322) treats the act of resisting communication 
in the context of an act of creation. Duchamp hence is not merely a disruptive 
artist or an indifferent anartist, but readily enacts the role of the silent element, 
of the missing link, that he refuses to specify. Duchamp as a curator affords the 
spectator to participate in immediate creation by resisting communication, or 
rather, by reducing the interval of communication to the precise dimension of 
infrathin, in other words, by accelerating mediation to immediacy.  
Participating in a transdisciplinarity act is envisioned in this thesis as 
experiencing immediate knowledge by living it through the movement of 
polyphibianism, that is, by changing immediately with the changes in the 
organism of knowledge, by being incessantly newborn into it. Such requirement 
was stated by Poincaré (1913) as ludicrous and unthinkable or at least impractical 
in practicing disciplinary science – the science of the general. Poincaré was well 
aware of the human need to generalise in order to survive, that is, he was well 
aware of the urge to ignore the pervasive uniqueness of all phenomena, formally 
recognised only by the science of exceptions.  
Equating the unequal is considered a prerequisite for advancement of physics, 
and yet quantum physics progressing with accelerating speed at the periphery of 
physics and almost touching ‘pataphysics, proved otherwise. Duchamp, as a 
‘pataphysicist could not have conformed to generalisation and took Poincaré’s 
(1913, p. 363) discouragement from being as a “new-born babe […] before each 
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new object,” as a challenge. The intervention under the pseudonym R. Mutt, as a 
part of Duchampian transdisciplinary practice undertaken for the purposes of 
the thesis, is deliberately operating at that threshold between physics and 
‘pataphysics at the quantum scale, deriving polyphibianism tangentially from 
‘pataphysics, growing polyphibic organs for knowing the unique - organs that 
mutate with the organism that is incessantly newborn.   
Transdisciplinary zone is envisioned as a safety zone that guaranties survival of 
the transdisciplinarian species despite their tendency to avoid generalisation. The 
need for such safety zone was confirmed with the intervention at CERN - the 
institution of the science of the general, and yet operating at the fringes of the 
unique. Therefore, for safety reasons, an Interval of Suspended Judgement was 
requested for the programme Collide@CERN that organised collision of the 
institutions of art and science – Ars Electronica and CERN – when CERN was at 
the verge of discovering the particle responsible for mass in 2012. The 
intervention proposed to upgrade the original design for ASCOT apparatus 
within ATLAS detector with the readymade ASCO2.T in order to experience 
their discoveries immediately from multiple points of being, thus, in 
transdisciplinary manner, resisting representation – resisting the disciplinary 
urge for processing and presenting enormous quantities of information.  
Every installation of the Interval of Suspended Judgement is context-dependent. 
In the specific context of CERN both the procedures of physics and ‘pataphysics 
were precisely followed in order to locate the infrathin threshold. Intervals of 
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Suspended Judgement are intricate incisions into the disciplinary structure of 
knowledge that enable growth by further differentiation of knowledge into 
different kinds - an evolution of transdisciplinary organism of living knowledge. 
Participation in the Creative Evolution where Bergson merges the categories of 
life, evolution and knowledge was instrumental in order to imagine such 
evolution of living knowledge.   
Suspension of judgement is achieved by releasing the tension in the rigid 
intellectual framework that is obstructing the movement of living knowledge. 
Bergson suggests that the intellect can self-correct with its faculty of laughter. The 
comical, as the corrective for the automated or archived lifeless knowledge is, 
according to Bergson (2008, p. 3b), intimately connected to life: “We shall not aim 
at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition. We regard it, above all, as a 
living thing.” An idea for Bergson (2008, p. 12a) “must be changing every 
moment, for to cease to change would be to cease to live,” hence the knowledge 
that ceases to live becomes a laughing matter.  
Bergson’s essay on laughter prepares the mind-set necessary for the evolution of 
living knowledge that ceaselessly corrects itself - mutating and adapting to 
changes: laughter operates in absence of emotions. Indifference to emotions is 
complemented with indifference to conventions. Bergson’s essay on dreams, 
namely, considers dreaming as sleeping towards conventional reality and 
awakening towards its periphery. Bergson furthermore connects the logic of 
dreams to the logic of laughter. Just as Nicolescu introduces Lupasco’s logic of 
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the included middle to operate on multiple levels of reality, the logic of the 
absurd and the comical relax the tension of a polychotomy by resolving it from 
multiple points of being.  
Through his introspective exploration of his own dreams Bergson (1914, p. 50) 
comes to a conclusion: “we perceive still, we remember still, we reason still. 
Abundance, in the domain of the mind, does not mean effort. What requires an 
effort is the precision of adjustment.” Just like osmosis, the faculty of dreaming, 
imagining or inventing, is effortless, if there is no energy invested in preventing 
it. Knowing through transdisciplinarity is spontaneous, while knowing within 
the disciplinary domains requires the energy for adjustment to convention, for 
preventing the changes. Likewise Duchamp, as a transdisciplinarian, declared 
himself as a do-nothing: “the public began to take literally Duchamp's 
pronouncement that he preferred ‘living rather than working,’ by accepting his 
self-description ‘I am a breather’” (Judovitz, 1995, p. 196). The method of “do-
nothing” is a method of osmosis. Participation in a creative transdisciplinary act, 
is not a matter of assembling, but rather of disassembling the structures that are 
preventing the transmutation of a disciplinary researcher. 
The evolution of transdisciplinary knowledge in this thesis is imagined as 
evolution of an organism, while taking into account the interdependent relation 
of the organism and its environment. Polyphibianism could be envisioned as an 
animating agent, and its ambient would be a protoplasmic background – an 
arena nurturing polyphibians with the substance of life – a protoplasmagora. 
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And yet such predetermined interdependency, as a fixed set of active and passive 
roles, would not suffice for the level of complexity required for the living 
knowledge to emerge. Rather, the roles of figure and ground must be 
dynamically interchangeable.  Like a protoplasm differentiates itself into living 
and non-living constituents through metabolism, the role of the living and non-
living is intermittently switching. The protoplasmagora metabolises 
polyphibianism into itself, while polyphibianism in turn feeds on 
protoplasmagora. The metabolic products of this process are extracted as 
disciplinary knowledge or employed to grow new transdisciplinary knowledge.  
The open structure of transdisciplinary knowledge, as anticipated by Nicolescu 
(2002), implies its unconstrained growth. Polyphibianism is an elaboration on 
how such growth could be conceivable without compromising the assumptions 
of living knowledge. The archived and conserved disciplinary knowledge never 
grows old, and yet it is never young, never newborn. To preserve life of 
transdisciplinary knowledge it must remain young while growing and maturing. 
Transdisciplinary zone covers a limited area in between the disciplinary 
compartments that expands with eventual further compartmentalisation of 
disciplines, but this expansion within the closed disciplinary structure is, in 
principle, restricted. The growth of transdisciplinary knowledge therefore is not 
so much in the direction of expansion, of conquering more disciplinary space, as 
it is in direction of intensifying – growing increasingly intricate structures 
internally.  
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Bergson (2005, p. 23) facilitates imagination of such open living structure:  “what 
is properly vital in growing old is the insensible, infinitely graduated, 
continuance of the change of form.” Anticipating chaos theory and theory of 
complexity in his inquiries in living, evolving systems, Bergson’s descriptions 
surpass the then existing notions of space and spatial geometry. If invention of 
fractal geometry brought scientific descriptions closer to complexity of nature 
what kind of geometry would bring them even closer to life? What would be a 
comical corrective to limitations of fractals – a corrective to their overall 
disciplined repetitiveness? As ‘pataphysics corrects finances into phynances 
(Jarry, 1994, p. 58), the self-similarity of fractals is complemented with self-
diversity of phractals. 
As was exposed in the third chapter, Bergson, limited by linear language, lacked 
the instruments to express his ideas that anticipated the chaotic, complex reality. 
Only with the advent of chaos theory could his ideas be translated into diagrams 
of chaotic systems. The fourth chapter attempts to imagine new tools for the 
anticipated transdisciplinary practice. The language in this chapter occasionally 
escapes over the threshold of transdisciplinarity, by complementing 
mathematical and poetical language, the rare languages that transcend the 
disciplinary borders.  
Polyphibianism can at best be referred to in a language indifferent to 
conventions, in the language of the imaginary. Conceiving a polyphibic geometry 
of phractals as a crossover of mathematics and poetry is already a form of 
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inventing new organs of knowing. Conceiving a geometry that becomes self-
aware, that is self-correcting its fractal repetitiveness, might be just a question of 
precision in imagination. Phractals are pseudo-recursive transdisciplinary 
formulas that are bending the rules and enfolding exceptions within the pores, to 
live the knowledge in a continuity of change. 
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2. Literature review 
Although it is not the most recommended order of things, the sequence in which 
the research for this thesis proceeded is surely no exception. Rather than reading 
thoroughly the literature on a specific topic to form an idea of a hypothesis, this 
research was driven by a readymade idea, an imaginary proposition that was 
only post festum, after first manifestations, provided a context within existing 
literature and that found purposefulness in possible applications to the area of 
art - science collaborations and within the transdisciplinary zone in general. 
Literature that would confirm similar line of though was sought for, literature 
that seems rather similar but is only tangentially concerned with the matter is 
also mentioned. This chapter does not only present and summarise the most 
relevant items from this thesis’ bibliography, it serves also as an introduction to 
most pertinent topics in the specific context of this research. Most emphasis will 
be given here to domain of ‘pataphysics that transcends both physics and 
metaphysics and of course to transdisciplinarity that is beyond all enclosed 
disciplinary domains. 
2.1. Across disciplines: from meta- to ‘pata- 
Reviewing literature across disciplines will not be limited to established 
disciplines with long tradition, like physics or metaphysics. On the contrary, with 
the intention of a critical stance in this thesis, this literature review begins within 
disciplines that critiqued or even offered a comical corrective to the traditional 
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disciplines. Such is the pseudo-discipline of ‘pataphysics that has a non-
negligible tradition of more than a century of practice, with laughter being its 
most elaborate technique. A quote of ‘pataphysicist Rene Daumal (2012, pp. 3-5) 
that wrote extensively on the topic of ‘pataphysical laughter, serves as an 
appropriate introduction: 
I maintain and I know that pataphysics is not a simple laughing 
matter. And if we pataphysicians often feel our limbs shaken by 
laughter, it is the dreadful laughter from facing the evidence that 
each thing is precisely (and how arbitrarily!) just as it is and not 
otherwise, that I exist without being everything, that it’s 
grotesque and that all defined existence is a scandal.  […] 
Pataphysical laughter is the keen awareness of a duality both 
absurd and undeniable. In this sense it is the one human 
expression of the identity of opposites (and, what is remarkable, 
in a universal language). […] laughter is begotten in its 
dialectical forward march: 
I am Universal, I burst; 
I am particular, I contract; 
I become the Universal, I laugh. 
Since the inventor of science of ‘pataphysics, Alfred Jarry, whose work is by and 
large humorous, has attended classes of professor Henri Bergson, who wrote an 
essay on laughteri, it has been inferred by expertsii on ‘pataphysics that Bergson’s 
work, had a great impact on Jarry and can be considered as fundamental in 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.1.1. for more in depth exploration of Bergson’s notion of laughter  
ii Anthony Enns, the author of the chapter “Beyond Laughter” published in (Clements, 2002) 
mentions Roger Shattuck, as a proponent of Bergson’s theory of laughter being highly influential 
for Jarry, and yet Enns argues for Nietzsche’s theory of laughter to be even more relevant. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue this dispute.  
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appreciating Jarry’s work (Clements, 2002, p. 42). By relating laughter to intellect, 
that is, by taking laughter seriously, as an intellectual faculty, Bergson unravelled 
the peripheral area of the intellect, crucial for the research undertaken in this 
thesis, where the intellect can self-correct, by applying a sort of comical 
corrective. His essays on laughter (Bergson, 2008) and dreams (Bergson, 1914) are 
very closely related and extensively dealt with in this thesis. 
Undoubtedly the ‘pataphysical mind-set played an important role in setting up 
the art-research projects for this thesis, but unfortunately it is quite impossible to 
delineate ‘pataphysical methodology, without falling into trap, let alone to define 
‘pataphysics itself. As Hugill (2012, p. 1) explains: “To define it is merely to 
indicate a possible meaning, which when diurnally interpolated with the first 
meaning, will point toward a third meaning which will in turn elude definition 
because of the fourth element that is missing.”  
More specifically, Hugill (2012, p. 3) finds the concept of definition in itself 
“unpataphysical,” asking “how can a definition be exceptional, or contain its own 
contradictions.” Definition, by definition, therefore does not fulfil even the most 
rudimentary of ‘pataphysical requirements. Nonetheless the readers of this thesis 
should familiarise themselves with the “theory” of ‘pataphysics, and the most 
suitable place to search for a “definition” would be in the chapter “Elements of 
Pataphysics” from the book Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician, 
written by Jarry (1996, pp. 21, 22):   
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An epiphenomenon is that which is superinduced upon a 
phenomenon. Pataphysics, whose etymological spelling should 
be επι (μετα τα ϕυσικα) and actual orthography ’pataphysics, 
preceded by an apostrophe so as to avoid a simple pun, is the 
science of that which is superinduced upon metaphysics, 
whether within or beyond the latter’s limitations, extending as 
far beyond metaphysics as the latter extends beyond physics. Ex: 
an epiphenomenon being often accidental, pataphysics will be, 
above all, the science of the particular, despite the common 
opinion that the only science is that of the general. Pataphysics 
will examine the laws governing exceptions, and will explain the 
universe supplementary to this one; or, less ambitiously, will 
describe a universe which can be - and perhaps should be - 
envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws that 
are supposed to have been discovered in the traditional universe 
are also correlations of exceptions, albeit more frequent ones, but 
in any case accidental data which, reduced to the status of 
unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the virtue of 
originality. DEFINITION. Pataphysics is the science of 
imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes the 
properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their 
lineaments.  
This thesis takes such an imaginary solution and examines it thoroughly, testing 
it in various contexts with the aim to assess the potential of authentic art research 
as an alternative model to knowledge production. The value of such a speculative 
research is precisely in its originality, in imagining the yet unimaginable, in 
invention of instruments and imaginary solutions. Shattuck summarises the 
main principles of ‘pataphyics that to a certain extent guided also the thought 
experiments conducted for this thesis. What follows is an abridged version of 
Shattuck’s (1960, pp. 27-30) attempt to explain ‘pataphysics to outsiders, outside 
its domain, in “non-pataphysical terms:” 
1. ‘Pataphysics is the science of the realm beyond metaphysics; 
or, ‘Pataphysics lies as far beyond metaphysics as metaphysics 
lies beyond physics - in one direction or another. Now, 
metaphysics is a word which can mean exactly what one wants 
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it to mean, whence its continuing popularity. To Aristotle it 
meant merely the field of speculation he took up after physics. 
The pataphysician beholds the entire created universe, and all 
others with it, and sees that they are neither good nor bad but 
pataphysical. […] 
2. ‘Pataphysics is the science of the particular, of laws governing 
exceptions. The realm beyond metaphysics will not be reached 
by vaster and vaster generalities; this has been the error of 
contemporary thought. A return to the particular shows that 
every event determines a law, a particular law. ‘Pataphysics 
relates each thing and each event not to any generality (a mere 
plastering over of exceptions) but to the singularity that makes 
it an exception. Thus the science of ‘Pataphysics attempts no 
cures, envisages no progress, distrusts all claims of 
“improvement” in the state of things, and remains innocent of 
any message. ‘Pataphysics is pure science, lawless and therefore 
impossible to outlaw. 
3. ‘Pataphysics is the science of imaginary solutions. In the realm 
of the particular, every event arises from an infinite number of 
causes. All solutions, therefore, to particular problems, all 
attributions of cause and effect, are based on arbitrary choice, 
another term for scientific imagination. […] ‘Pataphysics 
welcomes all scientific theories (they are getting better and 
better) and treats each one not as a generality but as an attempt, 
sometimes heroic and sometimes pathetic, to pin down one 
point of view as “real.” […] The idea of “truth” is the most 
imaginary of all solutions. 
4. For ‘Pataphysics, all things are equal. The pataphysician not 
only accepts no final scientific explanation of the universe, he 
also rejects all values, moral, esthetic, and otherwise. The 
principle of universal equivalence and the conversion of 
opposites reduces the world in its pataphysical reality to 
particular cases only. […] ‘Pataphysics preaches no rebellion and 
no acquiescence, no new morality nor immorality, no political 
reform nor reaction and certainly no promise of happiness nor 
unhappiness. What would be the use, all things being equal? 
5. ‘Pataphysics is, in aspect, imperturbable. […] Only the comic 
is serious. The pataphysician, therefore, remains entirely serious, 
attentive, imperturbable. […] Imperturbability is not just a 
dignified version of “cool kicks.” “Playing it cool” means 
indifference and is, at best, an indifferent game. The 
pataphysician is concerned; not through engagement in an 
attempt to create human values, but in the manner of the child 
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looking through a kaleidoscope or the astronomer studying the 
galaxy. 
6. All things are pataphysical; yet few men practice ‘Pataphysics 
consciously. No difference in value, only in state, exists between 
ordinary men and those who are consciously aware of the 
‘pataphysical nature of the world, including themselves. What 
science but ‘Pataphysics can cope with consciousness, 
“selfconsciousness perpetually twisting out of itself into the 
reaches of ethernity? […] 
7. Beyond ‘Pataphysics lies nothing; ‘Pataphysics is the ultimate 
defence. Like the sorcerer’s apprentice, we have become victims 
of our own knowledge - principally of our scientific and 
technological knowledge. In ‘Pataphysics resides our only 
defence against ourselves. […] ‘Pataphysics allows a few 
individuals, beneath their imperturbability, to live up to their 
particular selves. […] ‘Pataphysics, then, is an inner attitude, a 
discipline, a science, and an art, which allows each man to live 
his life as an exception, proving no law but his own. 
The ‘pataphysical “inner attitude” of indifference, of “treating all things equally” 
and of “rejecting values” prepares one to safely detach oneself from disciplinary 
research and to search across and beyond disciplines, even beyond meta 
disciplines. It is of no surprise to learn from Hugill (2012, p. 227) that the author 
of the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarityi, the quantum physicist Basarab 
Nicolescu, is in fact “well acquainted with pataphysical literature.” It will be 
shown throughout this thesis, that attempts to imagine further evolutionary 
trajectories for transdisciplinarity, have been guided by these ‘pataphysical 
principles: consciously or unconsciously – artists and scientists or meta-scientists 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.1. where Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity is extensively dealt with 
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have transgressed the laws of the general  and followed the exceptional in their 
efforts to rethink the traditional ways of knowledge production. 
The seriousness of the ‘pataphysical humour has been proven with the passing 
of time – ‘pataphysics has survived and thrived in occult and out in the open for 
more than a century. Long after the founding father has passed away essays have 
been written on ‘pataphysics by the most prominent thinkers of twentieth 
century. Among others this thesis has consulted essays written by Deleuze. In the 
first essay entitled “How Jarry's Pataphysics Opened the Way for 
Phenomenology” Deleuze (2004, p. 74), inspired by Jarry, sets up conditions to 
transcend the boundaries of thought: “metaphysics is and must be surpassed. In 
so far as its fate is conceived as metaphysics, philosophy makes room and must 
make room for other forms of thought, other forms of thinking.” In his next essay 
entitled “An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry” Deleuze (1998, 
p. 91) further elaborates on Jarry’s phenomenology with emphasis on “planetary 
technology” and technical vs. poetic language.  
Since the imaginary solution, proposed to be examined in this thesis, is to evolve 
transdisciplinarity into an organism of living knowledge, the auxiliary literature 
was surveyed on the concept of life: from Erwin Schrodinger’s (1992) question 
“What is Life?” to Fritjof Capra’s (1997) “Web of Life: A New Scientific 
Understanding of Living Systems.”  It is, of course, far beyond the scope of this 
thesis to define yet another unfathomable concept, such as life, leaving it open to 
define itself through further evolution, ‘pataphysically or otherwise. Namely, 
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within the thesis the notion of living knowledge will tangentially approach 
complexity theory, by imagining self-organising structures that become self-
aware through comical corrective, linking it back to ‘pataphysical element, 
allowing the notion of awareness and consciousness to escape a general 
definition.  
The idea of living the knowledge is one of immediate knowledge where there can 
be no distinction between the observer and the observed, where the environment 
and the animal animating it form an inseparable and interdependent entity. This 
ecological shift in understanding is supported with existing literature on notions 
raging from Gregory Bateson’s “ecology of mind” to James Jerome Gibson’s 
“ecological approach to perception.” Important in this respects were also 
Deleuze’s and Foucaults’s essays on life and the writings of Jakob Johann von 
Uexküll, Giorgo Agamben, Jussi Parikka, and others.  
Besides the natural environment, the interdependence of the artist-researcher-
inventor on technological environment and vice versa is examined within the 
media theory of Marshall McLuhan. If life is taken as an open second order 
system, with the possibility of its ecosystem to become self-aware, the classical 
works of Heinz von Foerster, Norbert Wiener, Gordon Pask and others become 
relevant sources of inspiration. From the standpoint of self-reflecting 
introspective system of knowledge the writings on the phenomena of invention, 
such as those of Jacques Salomon Hadamard and Henri Poincaré, are again 
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indispensable. The crucial introspective writings of Poincaré, Bergson and 
Duchamp are elaborated upon throughout this thesis.  
2.2. Manifesto of transdisciplinarity 
There are numerous books, articles and conferences proceedings addressing 
transdisciplinarity as a promising approach to complex problems in various 
fields of research. The scope of most of these publications is too broad to be 
pertinent to specific questions of this thesis, nonetheless some books, such as “A 
Vision of Transdisciplinarity: Laying Foundations for a World Knowledge 
Dialogue” (Darbellay, et al., 2008), have contributed to a deeper understanding 
of how transdisciplinarity could operate. For the purposes of this research the 
main reference to the very definition of transdisciplinarity will be found in the 
Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2002). This chapter summarises 
ideas presented in this manifesto, that are in relation to the proposed evolution 
of the transdisciplinarity, as a basis and reference for chapters that follow. 
At the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity (on 6th of November 1994, in 
Portugal), a Charter was signed by the Editorial Committee comprising Lima de 
Freitas, Edgar Morin and Basarab Nicolescu. This Charter of Transdisciplinarity, 
with its accompanying book, Manifesto of Transdiscipilinarity, written by 
Nicolescu and published in 2002, is taken in this thesis as a departure point in 
deviation from standard knowledge production towards evolving 
transdisciplinarity into an organism of living knowledge.  
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In the preamble to the Charter the Editorial Committee describes the current state 
of affairs in disciplinary research, or what Nicolescu (2002, p. 34) terms the 
“disciplinary big bang,” remaining hopeful in spite of a list of concerns about the 
future: “a hope that this extraordinary development of knowledge could 
eventually lead to an evolution not unlike the development of primates into 
human beings” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 148). The preamble therefore already 
presupposes a potential evolution of knowledge – an evolution from which 
emerges a different kind of knowledge, or, as will be shown throughout this 
thesis, a different organism of living knowledge. Polyphibianism, or the 
evolutionary movement of the living knowledge, is in accordance with all the 
Articles of the Charter of Transdisciplinarity starting from the first:  
Any attempt to reduce the human being by formally defining 
what a human being is and subjecting the human being to 
reductive analyses within a framework of formal structures, no 
matter what they are, is incompatible with the transdisciplinary 
vision. (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 148) 
The “transdisciplinary vision” is thus open to speculative transmutations of 
human beings into polyphibians: transdisciplinary openness does not merely 
allow the human being to mutate into beings of different kind of awareness – 
such mutation within transdisciplinary zone become inevitable. That is, 
“transdisciplinary vision” is not compatible with any limitations imposed on 
such mutations, on the contrary, such reorganizing of awareness outside the 
“framework of formal structures” is required for transdisciplinary research.  
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Polyphibianism, although seemingly unforeseeable phenomenon, is in fact 
imaginable, or rather, perceivable by the “transdisciplinary vision.” Further 
consideration of the Articles of the Charter will show that polyphibianism can be 
imagined as an extreme execution of transdisciplinarity; it takes its most vital 
elements and accelerates the evolution into imaginary solutions. At its core, 
polyphibianism is a transdisciplinary movement propelled tangentially from 
transdisciplinary charter. If “transdisciplinarity complements disciplinary 
approaches” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 148), or, more precisely, if it “occasions the 
emergence of new data and new interactions from out of the encounter between 
disciplines” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 149), polyphibianism is just such emergence of 
new kind of awareness, that is, awareness emerging from knowledge 
reorganising itself into a living organism of knowledge.  
On the other hand “transdisciplinarity does not strive for mastery of several 
disciplines but aims to open all disciplines to that which they share and to that 
which lies beyond them” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 149). Mastery is according to 
Bergson (2005, p. 201) the goal of the intellect – by not striving at particular 
mastery of specific discipline transdisciplinarity is therefore moving beyond 
mere intellectual comprehension. Moreover, in aiming “to open all the 
disciplines” to new awareness, new experience of knowledge, transdisciplinarity 
is allowing one to be newborn in front of the phenomenon of one’s study. The 
charter foresees the opening as an “acceptance of the unknown, the unexpected 
and the unpredictable” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 151), the willingness to open one’s 
eyes to novelty.  
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The “transdisciplinary attitude,” as postulated in the Charter, calls for the 
“recognition of the existence of different levels of reality governed by different 
types of logic” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 149). Rather than recognising the levels, layers, 
planes or platforms of reality, the “polyphibic practice” is to experience reality 
through different imaginary organs – where each of organ variations 
instinctively executes a “logic” of a different kind. Incessantly mutating its 
organs, a polyphibian is not to be firmly defined once and for all, on the contrary, 
it is an ephemeral and evolving organic concept.  
Likewise are the transdisciplinarians “re-examining the concepts of ‘definition’ 
[...] An excess of formalism, rigidity of definitions and a claim to total objectivity, 
entailing the exclusion of the subject, can only have a life-negating effect” 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 149). This “life-negating effect” is what polyphibianism is 
trying to avoid – polyphibianism is the movement of knowledge towards life – 
towards an organism of living knowledge that can survive and thrive only by 
avoidance of firm frameworks, traditional schemas and matrices of facts, 
categories and concepts.  
The charter distinguishes trans-disciplinarity from inter- and multi-
disciplinarity: “In comparison with interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity, 
transdisciplinarity is multireferential and multidimensional.” (Nicolescu, 2002, 
p. 149). A parallel comparison is obtainable between mono- and poly- phibians 
where polyphibians multiply a fixed monophibic point of view into multiple 
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points of beingi. Polyphibianism, as a transdisciplinary spin-off, is just as 
multireferential - the references multiply through mutations of polyphibic 
organs. Regarding multidimensionality, which is attributed to transdisciplinarity 
through the so-called levels of Reality (that are rather levels of emerging orders 
or patterns of organisation), polyphibianism is not of integer dimensions, it 
pervades the state space with the evolutionary trajectory of fractal dimensions.  
Polyphibianism fulfils the following transdisciplinary conditions: 
“Transdisciplinarity constitutes neither a new religion, nor a new philosophy, 
nor a new metaphysics, nor a science of sciences,” and just as well goes beyond 
cultural and national affiliations as transdisciplinarians are “transnational” and 
“transcultural” (Nicolescu, 2002, pp. 149, 150). While transdisciplinarity “leads 
to an open attitude towards myths” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 150), polyphibic 
imaginary solutions are living the mythsii.  
Transdisciplinarity is returning to Bergson’s idea of a science of intuition as 
complementary to the science of intellect: “Transdisciplinary education revalues 
the role of intuition, imagination, sensibility and the body in the transmission of 
knowledge” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 150). Polyphibianism, by inventing imaginary 
solutions, overcomes intellectual abstraction by boosting intuition which leads to 
using the sensibility of the body “in the transmission of knowledge” and thus 
                                                 
i “point of being” is a term introduced by Derrick de Kerckhove (1997, p. 187), see appendix A 
ii see chapter 4.2.3. on myths in polyphibianism  
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avoiding the need of indirect communication (communication mediated through 
other insensible bodies).  
The charter requires other approaches to knowledge, beyond the generalization 
and abstraction of intellectual reasoning: “Authentic education cannot value 
abstraction over other forms of knowledge. It must teach contextual, concrete and 
global approaches” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 150). Polyphibianism is organising 
knowing into organic processes by inventing organs for metabolising knowledge 
on the abstract level with the utmost concreteness of a lived experience – the 
experience that is unrepeatable, unpresentablei. Polyphibianism is an imaginary 
solution of organising abstract knowledge into organic structures that can be 
maintained alive. The advantage of polyphibianism, the movement of the living 
knowledge, over classical principles of knowledge preservation, lies in the 
evolution of higher order organisms able to experience the accumulated 
metabolic products of knowing.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 1) traces back the first appearance of the term 
transdisciplinarity to writings of Jean Piaget, Edgar Morin, and Erich Jantsch in 
1970s as a response “to a need that was perceived [...] to celebrate the 
transgression of disciplinary boundaries.” This thesis explores the conditions that 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.1. for an example of a lived experience, where the spectator is invited to 
participate in the creative act of the artist – neither to represent the experience of the artist, nor to 
relive it or repeat it – the spectator is concretely experiencing a “transmutation,” mutating the 
organs of knowing 
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provoke such transgressions where intuition of another kind of knowledge 
induces self-awareness of limitations of intellectual reasoning – the intellect 
becomes self-critical and allows intuition to navigate the unknown territories of 
transdisciplinary zone. 
The immediate consequence of transgressing the conventionally “objective” 
reality is the sense of losing oneself in imaginary “subjective” experience that 
differs significantly from one point of being to another. The imaginary realm 
gains in coherence when the points of being resonate, self-organise in a coherent 
but ephemeral pattern – an imaginary solution – a mythological organism of 
living knowledge. That polyphibianism (a movement of polyphibians 
trespassing from one medium to another), as a tangential movement to 
transdisciplinarity, is an imaginary movement, would come of no surprise to 
Nicolescu who contrasts the reality as imposed by science with reality lived by 
myths before the science established its dominion:  
The ancients [...] created the metaphysical, mythological and 
metaphorical idea of cosmos [...] they came up with a 
multidimensional reality peopled with various entities, from 
man to gods, potentially passing through a whole series of 
intermediaries. […] Modern science was born through a violent 
break with this ancient vision of the world. It was founded on 
the idea [...] of a total separation between the knowing subject 
and Reality, which was assumed to be completely independent 
from the subject who observed it. (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 9) 
Multidimensionality is experienced by this trespassing from one kind of species 
to another. The subject cannot know the multidimensional reality merely by 
being able to imagine it from different viewpoints as an external observer – 
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higher dimensions are to be lived through self-aware imaginary organs. When 
intellect prevailed, and modern science took over, the observer was removed 
from the observed. Intellectual abstraction maintains the distance between the 
observer and the observed, demanding a complicated apparatus for remote 
communication of knowledge.  
The intuitive knowledge, on the other hand, can only be immediate: the 
polyphibic organism is at the same time the observed phenomenon and the 
organism observing itself, the problem and the imaginary solution invented for 
the problem that is lived. The polyphibic instruments know themselves and grow 
themselves on a higher order of awareness, intuitively induced at the periphery 
of the intellect. Since there is no limit to emerging orders of self-awareness, one 
returns, in a way, to the mythological idea of comprehending reality by “passing 
through a whole series of intermediaries.” These intermediary orders are neither 
lower nor higher, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 52) advises, “words high and low here 
have no other meaning than that which is topologically associated with the flow 
of transmission of information.” 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 10) further examines the foundations of modern science that 
asserts control over reality as its territory, by inspecting how modern science 
postulates the existence of “universal laws of a mathematical character” that can 
only be “discovered by scientific experiment” where “such experiments could be 
perfectly replicated.” These agreements that are rarely questioned in depth might 
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have their origin in the broader cultural context. Marshal McLuhan attributes 
such scientific assertiveness to the dominance of visual culture:  
If you can do it again then you’ve got a proof - scientific proof - 
can you do it again - that is visual space - anything that can be 
exactly repeatable is visual. As science gets more sophisticated it 
realizes that all experiments are subtly non-repetitive, and that 
repetition is not a proof, and no two experiments are ever alike, 
and visual space, in fact, has disappeared from science. (Picnic 
in Space, 1967) 
Indeed with “sophistication” of science, as in quantum theory or theory of 
complexity, science is carefully withdrawing from its pursuit to control, from the 
pursuit of pure universality, accepting even the exceptions and the unique as 
valid ingredients. Parallel to this shift in science the culture shaped by electronic 
technology is becoming less dominated by the renaissance notion of visual space 
- by a fixed view point in perspective - and more by a multiplicity of omnipresent 
points of being.  
With advancements from science of deterministic linear systems to nonlinear 
sciences of complexity the transgression of disciplinary boundaries became 
inevitable. Constrained by disciplinary research with established methodology, 
some researchers have turned to transdisciplinarity that offers no universal 
method. In the obscure transdisciplinary zone the nonvisual spaces interfere with 
the intellectually visualised schemas. Culture dominated by visual space that 
strived for one unified reality is spontaneously reorganising itself into a new 
culture, where reality multiplies itself, and new media emerge, infiltrating the 
existing cultural ecosystem.   
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In order to operate at a periphery of a discipline where a different kind of 
knowledge is available, to recognise the interface of a new medium infiltrating 
the old, the monophibians need to transmute into polyphibians, the linear 
perspective from a fixed viewpoint must multiply into self-organised network of 
points of being. Nicolescu (2002, p. 15) observes great disturbance in researchers 
that have detected such infiltration of the different kind of knowledge into their 
discipline: “Planck made a discovery that, according to his own testimony, 
provoked a real inner turmoil. The reason for this was that he unwittingly 
witnessed the entry of discontinuity into the realm of physics.” 
With the dawn of quantum mechanics the idea of continuity, and with it the idea 
of causality, was profoundly shaken.  How can the human organism prepare 
itself to experience knowledge that is intellectually accessible and yet it 
contradicts the experience of the accepted reality? In other words, how can one 
prepare oneself for another level of reality? To avoid the inner turmoil, which 
even today doesn’t give quantum physicist a rest of mind, a new organisation of 
knowledge needs to be invented – new organs need to be imagined for immediate 
explorations of different levels of organisation of reality:  
“How can we understand real discontinuity? That is to say, how 
can we imagine that there is nothing between two points [...]? 
Here our ordinary imagination experiences an intense vertigo, 
whereas mathematical language, which is based on another type 
of Imagination, experiences no difficulty whatsoever.” 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 16) 
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Manifesto of transdisciplinarity relies on mathematical language and invests in 
alternative mathematical logics to provide means of operating on humanly 
unimaginable terms. Polyphibianism, on the other hand, invents organs for 
imagining the yet unimaginable. If mathematics of complex systems is the 
underlying instrument of the transdisciplinary zone, can polyphibianism drive it 
to a critical point, exaggerating the mathematics to extreme, where mathematical 
systems become self-aware organisms, where fractals self-organise into living 
phractalsi?  
In the inner turmoil, such as described in the case of Max Planck, the polyphibian 
internalises the problem and mutates in a solution. To remain agile, a 
polyphibian cannot indulge in a mastery of mathematics, on the contrary a 
polyphibian is always on the way out of the comfort zone - the mastery over a 
problem is not a goal but a by-product to be discarded when appropriate. A 
plurality of organs-solutions in orchestration forms the organism that is to 
experience the problem-solution and to live the new knowledge. Nicolescu 
further compares the plurality in transdisciplinarity to that encountered in 
nondeterministic quantum domain to form new notion of causality: 
According to quantum mechanics, a physical quantity has 
several possible values, each of which is associated with a 
specific probability. However, in experimental measurement 
one obviously obtains a single result for the physical quantity in 
                                                 
i  see chapter 4.1.3. and 4.2.6. where phractal geometry is derived by imagining fractals that 
become self-aware  
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question. To abruptly deny the plurality of possible values for 
this physical ‘observable’ quantity through the act of 
measurement may have seemed obscure, but it certainly 
indicated the existence of a new type of causality. (Nicolescu, 
2002, p. 17) 
The clash of plurality of potential and single actualization induced a tectonic 
movement on the fringes of the intellectually comprehensible. The causality and 
continuity needed readjustments to accommodate intellectual expansion: “the 
nature of this new type of causality has been clarified thanks to a rigorous 
theorem - Bell’s theorem - together with some extremely precise experiments. 
Thus, a new concept entered physics – that of nonseparability” (Nicolescu, 2002, 
p. 17). With discontinuity and nonseparability the local causality was replaced 
with global causality: “global causality which concerns the system of all physical 
entities in its entirety” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 18). In spite of separation between 
entities, the communication on quantum level persists – the quantum reality 
forms an organism of immediate knowing. 
The intellect, stretching when confronted with collapse of virtual multiplicity and 
singular actualization, has outgrown its apparatus and cries for new organs that 
could metabolise directly what it could only infer indirectly. The periphery of the 
intellect is agitated by quantum shatter of traditional continuity and causality. 
The ‘pataphysical corrections of physics came just in time for quantum shock, but 
what neither quantum physics nor ‘pataphysics provided was an adaptation of 
organisation of knowledge – invention of new organs of knowing, a new 
metabolism for otherwise indigestible knowledge.  
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Polyphibianism is one of imaginary solutions generating new organisms to live 
within the plurality of knowledge. Polyphibianism is a dispersive movement of 
an individual actualisation into a plurality of options. Global causality is not in 
conflict with what Bergson (2005) assigns to the original impetus present in 
evolution – the evolution according to Bergson does not work towards a whole, 
but originates as a whole. Not surprisingly Nicolescu (2002, p. 18) comes to a 
similar conclusion: “at least at a certain level there is a coherence, a unity of laws 
that assure the evolution of totality of natural systems.”  
Protoplasmagorai is imagined as just such wholeness that differentiates but 
preserves coherence. Protoplasmagora is an imaginary organic analogue to 
quantum vacuum as described by Nicolescu (2002, p. 60): “The quantum 
fluctuation of the void determine the sudden appearance of virtual particle / 
antiparticle pairs which are annihilated in the course of extremely short intervals 
of time.” Rather than stating it as a “fluctuation between being and nonbeing” 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 61) that is, according to Bergson (2005), a falsely stated 
problem, protoplasmagora extends that fluctuation on the order between living 
and non-living, into a fluctuation of self-awareness.  
By supplying energy to quantum vacuum we can help it to 
materialize its potentiality. This is precisely what we do when 
we build the particle accelerators: When certain threshold 
energies are attained, real particles suddenly materialize at that 
point – being literally drawn out of nothing. These particles have 
                                                 
i see appendix A 
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an artificial character, in true sense of that word. (Nicolescu, 
2002, p. 61) 
Intellect is able to conceive of an apparatus that can harnesses potentiality of 
fluctuating vacuum, but this apparatus, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 61) elucidates, is 
discovering nature by creating nature: the particle accelerator is, in a way, 
practicing the “artificial science” rather than natural science or science of nature. 
The particles produced in the accelerator are an actualized potentiality of nature: 
“protons, neutrons and electrons are enough to build almost all of our visible 
universe. But scientist have succeeded in creating hundreds of other particles out 
of nothingness: hadrons, leptons, electro-weak bosons, etc.”  
Particle accelerators are apparatuses actualising artificial, virtual, imaginary 
solutions. For the purposes of this research a part of the particle accelerator 
ATLAS at CERN, with the acronym ASCOT (Apparatus with Super Conducting 
Toroids) (Norton, 1992), has been upgraded into a polyphibic prototype with the 
acronym ASCO2.T (Apparatus with Super COnducting Thought Transduction).i 
Only via a comical corrective can an intellectually conceived ASCOT be 
upgraded into ASCO2.T - a cyborganic detector of imaginary solutions. This 
polyphibic prototype is to experience the plurality of fluctuating potential, to live 
the knowledge in all its possible forms. The organism of the living knowledge in 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.3. for more on project ASCO2.T AT.LAST  
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this sense is imagining and inventing the “nature” that can be “artificially” 
actualised at demand.  
Quantum reality requires a different kind of knowledge organisation - the tools 
devised by intellect to classify and conceptualize knowledge are insufficient, 
ineffective in quantum domain, where communication is direct and immediate. 
While intellect depends on intermediary data representation, that is, on 
manifestation of the knowledge in an intermediary form, Nicolescu (2002, p. 19) 
shows that such representation of even the simplest phenomena is problematic 
in the quantum domain: “it is impossible to localize a quanton at a specific point 
in space and time ... in other words ... it is impossible to assign a specific trajectory 
to a quantum particle.”  
Trajectories, which are an indispensable intellectual constituent in construction 
of local causality, lose their meaning when causality is considered as global. No 
classical indirect approach suffices to gain adequate knowledge of the quantum 
domain; no trace, no memory, no history. Instead of mastering dead concepts 
there seems to be an urge for direct experience, for awakening the intuition and 
creating living organs for knowing, self-assembling into organisms that live the 
knowledge directly. The pace of evolution of the organism of living knowledge 
is synchronised with the rhythm of creation and annihilation of imaginary 
solutions in protoplasmagora.  
In pointing out that “localisable trajectory,” just as “local causality,” become 
obsolete notions in quantum mechanics, Nicolescu (2002, p. 19) stresses that 
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although localising in space-time is not a priority in quantum domain, the 
predictions in quantum theory do not lose in precision: “Until now, the 
predictions of quantum mechanics have always been verified with great 
precision, but this precision pertains to attributes proper to quantum entities, and 
not to those of classical objects” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 20). 
Polyphibianism redefines the notion of precision accordingly - in relation to the 
domain it passes through. In polyphibic research conducted for the purposes of 
this thesis the precise threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics was sought 
for. Out of potential plurality the accurate graph was drawn in specific context 
of ASCOT and ASCO2.T detectors at ATLAS, CERN – the singular solution was 
actualised in accordance with the rules of both physical and ‘pataphysical 
domain and with utmost mathematical precision.i   
Nicolescu (2002, p. 19) concludes: “‘Indeterminism’ is by no means 
‘imprecision.’” To avoid any accidental associations with quantum randomness, 
he categorises chance as a classical concept, and states: “‘Quantum randomness’ 
is not ‘chance.’” This thesis will examine how intellect coped with the notion of 
chance where there shouldn’t be any - within the comfort zone of classical 
deterministic science - the chance lurked in, creating a dichotomy of 
unpredictable determinism. First attemptsii by Henri Poincaré to deal with 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. for more on the threshold between physics and pataphysics 
ii see chapter 3.1. 
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chance in science, were complemented with Marcel Duchamp’s artistic 
experiments on “canned chance” exploring the precision and conventionality of 
chance. Indeterminism was not the only threat to classical thought, determinism 
itself was full of traps.  
It is important to note the distinction Nicolescu (2002, p. 22) makes between what 
he terms “levels of reality” and “levels of organisation.” While different levels of 
reality are incomparable and incompatible in their most fundamental schemas, 
levels of organisation can coexist and interpenetrate on the same level of reality. 
Polyphibianism does not operate only across the great gaps between the “levels 
of reality” but on subtler intricate intervals between “levels of organisation.” 
Polyphibianism is growing organs across all scales and territories, organs for 
experiencing the tension of indeterminism as well as conflicts within 
determinism. 
The evolution of transdisciplinarity into polyphibianism traces continuous 
mutations, adjustments of individual polyphibic organs, necessary for a leap 
between the “levels of organisation,” and a thorough cumulative mutation into 
an ever new kind of polyphibic species, able to leap between “levels of reality.” 
According to Nicolescu (2002, pp. 21, 22) “levels of organisation correspond to 
different structurings of the same fundamental laws,” whereas “two levels of 
Reality are different if, while passing from one to the other, there is a break in the 
laws and a break in fundamental concepts.” When that break happens, when 
monophibians breakdown their individuality and disperse into polyphibians, 
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old concepts become obsolete. These obsolete monophibic remnants are not to be 
simply replaced by the same kind of substitute, by new intellectual, abstract 
concepts, but by intuitive organic concepts – organs of knowing replace the 
concepts in knowledge.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 22) considers the “emergence of at least two different levels 
of Reality in the study of natural systems,” in particular, the quantum level of 
reality as opposed to the level described by classical physics, to be a “major event 
in the history of knowledge.” Nicolescu (2002, p. 22) does not derive the proof 
for “existence of different levels of Reality” exclusively for science but among 
other explorations “this affirmation was founded [...] on exploration of the 
interior universe.” Introspection is the main gateway to transdisciplinarity, 
questioning the fundamental conventions from within the human nature. It will 
be shown in this thesis that Henri Bergson’s introspection led to falsification of 
inappropriately stated problems and invention of new problem-solutionsi. 
The intuitive and introspective metaphysical explorations helped Bergson restate 
the physical problem of time in terms of duration. Nicolescu (2002, p. 24) seems 
to agree with Bergson in that “the time of physicists is only a gross approximation 
of the time of philosophers. The present time of the philosophers is a living time. 
It contains in itself both the past and the future, but is neither past nor future.” 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.3.1. for Bergson’s method of eliminating false problems in Bergsonism 
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Properties of time on one “level of reality” are violated on another. Temporal 
invariance or reversibility of time on quantum level are exceptions to the rule of 
increasing entropy. From entropy and evolution that differentiate the unity in a 
“disorderly” manner, new orders arise - new levels of organisation emerge at 
different scales.  
Polyphibianism moves through protoplasmagora - protoplasmic meta-
environments of living knowledge. This movement is adaptation of organs of 
knowing to the multiplicity of changing environmental conditions - it enables 
polyphibic organism to mutate, rather than remaining perfectly carved out and 
crafted for a single stagnant environment where only automatic habits are 
executed. The ability to know the environment and the environment itself are 
interdependent just as Gibson (1986, p. 8) elucidates the mutual dependence 
between the animal and its environment. As the movement of the animal changes 
the landscapei, so does the movement of the organism of living knowledge.  The 
environment becomes self-aware and aware of the organism that senses the 
environment, in other words, the environment senses itself through the sense 
organs of organisms inhabiting it: the living knowledge knows and lives itself.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 27) recognises “a direct relation between logic and the 
environment,” therefore, with changes in environment changes in logic, 
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reasoning, understanding and knowing in general are inevitable: “logic can only 
have an empirical foundation.” To adapt to the quantum environment the 
classical logic was required to change. Nicolescu (2002, p. 28) identifies the 
proposed changes in the axioms of classical logic in order to accommodate for 
seemingly “illogical” quantum behaviour. The preferred “correction” by 
quantum physicists is to adjust the second axiom of classical logic that 
accommodates only a pair of truth values A and non-A to accommodate multiple 
truths. This correction generates a multivalent logic.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 28), not entirely convinced by the predictive abilities of 
multivalent logic, proposes the option to “correct” the third axiom of classical 
logic that excludes the existence of a value that is neither A nor non-A. Nicolescu, 
for this purpose, introduces the logic of Stéphane Lupasco, whose “philosophy, 
which takes quantum physics as its point of departure, has been marginalized by 
physicist and philosophers.” Nonetheless, Nicolescu (2002, p. 28) believes that 
“history will credit Stéphane Lupasco with having shown that the logic of the 
included middle is a true logic, formalizable and formalized, multivalent (with 
three values A, non-A, and T) and noncontradictory.” Lupasco’s logic that 
Nicolescu assumes as suitable for transdisciplinary operations is already a 
significant corrective of two thirds of axioms of the classical logic.  
Polyphibianism evolves transdisciplinarity even further by departing entirely 
from classical logic – even the first axiom of identity is brought under scrutiny. It 
is the polyphibic attack on the first axiom – the axiom of identity – that starts the 
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movement of polyphibianism. This is an attack on indivisibility of the individual 
– I am not one I, I am many, I am a multiplicity – the indivisible individual 
divides. The dynamics of polyphibianism is a dynamics of multiple points of 
being. Embracing and experiencing several truth values of multivalent logics can 
be imagined as living the polyphibiologicsi. The tension in dichotomous 
contradictions, problematic for classical logic, is resolved in polyphibianism not 
merely into a third element but in multiple elements, but in a new complex 
invention - the interconnectedness of multiple new organs for knowing 
experiences as a new kind of organism. The force field of this multiplied tension 
is what forms the organism.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 30) observes how the third element that reconciles the existing 
dichotomy emerges on another level of Reality: “In the logic of the included 
middle the opposites are, rather, contradictories: the tension between 
contradictories builds unity that includes and goes beyond the sum of two terms. 
The rules of logical implication concerns not just two terms but three (A, non-A 
and T), all coexisting at the same moment in time.” Nicolescu (2002, p. 30) 
presumes there is a great advantage in the three terms coexisting simultaneously: 
“The logic of the included middle is perhaps the privileged logic of complexity; 
privileged in the sense that it allows us to cross different areas of knowledge in a 
coherent way.” The coexistence of dichotomy on one level and its resolution on 
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another creates a gateway. Polyphibians are trespassing in between realities 
coherently – although a mutation occurs, the logic is shattered, the individual 
dispersed, but the awareness remains coherent.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 34) examines carefully the scientific research as it is 
categorised and managed within scientific disciplines: “In the classical 
viewpoint, the disciplines as a whole were conceptualized as a pyramid, the base 
of which was physics. Complexity literally pulverised this pyramid, provoking a 
veritable disciplinary big bang.” Even though theory of complex systems has 
disturbed the hierarchy and categorisation of knowledge, fertilizing production 
of numerous new disciplines, combining and multiplying them, the disciplinary 
research ground has not reformed its foundations.  
The problem in fragmentation of knowledge through multiplication of scientific 
disciplines, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 34) maintains, is in reduction of area of 
disciplinary domains. The specialisation confines researchers to narrower areas 
and the flow of information between the disciplines is obstructed and reduced. 
Evolving transdisciplinarity into an imaginary organism of living knowledge 
removes the dependence on the channels of information flow between 
disciplines, by replacing the indirect communication with the direct experience 
of knowledge. The knowledge is not communicated from one organ to another 
by gradual translation but through instantaneous transduction. 
In determining the consequences of the disciplinary disintegration Nicolescu 
(2002, p. 34) recognises its origin: “the fundamental cause is perhaps easy to 
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discern: the disciplinary big bang is the response to the demands of technoscience 
without brakes, without values, without any end other than utilitarianism.” 
Extreme utilitarianism of science driven by intellect results in production of 
instruments for external use, for separation of the observer and the observed. 
Polyphibianism guides transdisciplinarity back towards internalisation of tools, 
intuitive introspection that invents organic custom made instruments – organs 
for experience rather than mechanisms for representing knowledge.  
Nonetheless, Nicolescu (2002, p. 34) admits some benefits of such extreme 
utilitarianism of science: “this disciplinary big bang also has enormous positive 
consequences because it has led to an unprecedented understanding of the 
knowledge of exterior universe, as well as contributing new impetus to the 
establishment of a new world viewpoint.” The intellectual drive increased the 
rate of production of both problems and solutions approaching a critical point 
where the intellect could transcend itself. The acceleration of techno-science has 
shown that there is not only space for a single monophibic view but enough 
imagination for plurality of polyphibic points of being. 
Accumulation of practical knowledge about systems is becoming system specific. 
Advancement of knowledge is not headed so much towards universal theory as 
it is towards specific solutions - applying to specific conditions. No matter how 
far the observer and the observed have been separated in the process of 
generalisation of solutions due to increased rate of solving problems, and 
increased specialisation and customization, they will meet again on another level 
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of organisation.  Devising the instruments for highly complex and specialised 
tasks is surpassing the speed of intellect and becomes, so to speak, instinctive – 
operating on subconscious internal know-how appertaining to particular 
discipline. These particular instruments are disciplinarily internalised and 
cannot be directly shared externally, among other disciplines. From the science 
of the general has emerged the techno-science of particular. Nicolescu wonders 
what kind of knowledge is being produced in these complex conditions: 
The knowledge of complexity, in order to be recognised as 
knowledge, bypasses one preliminary question: Is the 
complexity of which we speak a complexity without order, in 
which case its knowledge would have no meaning, or does it 
contain a new order and a new kind of simplicity which could 
appropriately become the object of a new knowledge? 
(Nicolescu, 2002, pp. 37, 38)  
Introduction of complex systems in science has instigated a turmoil in otherwise 
stable disciplinary hierarchy. New orders and new structures emerged in 
production of scientific knowledge. The aim of transdisciplinarity is not to 
simplify these structures or confine the research to simplest possible patterns. On 
the contrary, the aim is to invent new approaches to explore complexity 
efficiently. Polyphibianism invents new organs through which the complex 
emerging orders can be lived. With each new emerging order new organs are 
conceived – giving rise to even more complexity in the organism of knowledge. 
Although the overall complexity rises the organs as imaginary solutions are 
grown so as to fit the specific problem with ever greater precision. The organism 
of knowledge is therefore not gaining in universality but in comprehensiveness.    
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Disparate specialised organs of knowing are not isolated, as disciplinary 
specialists are bounded to their respective domains, but associate to the whole 
organism of knowledge inadvertently, through the emergent structures of order 
that connects over all scales in self-affinity that is again the prerequisite for self-
awareness of the organism of knowledge. The knowledge appertaining to one 
organ becomes a part of an organism and yet the organism in its potentiality was 
the implicate whole from which the organs differentiated. The organism of living 
knowledge is therefore the phenomenon that emerges and re-emerges on certain 
levels of organisation where it wakes up into greater or lesser degrees of self-
awareness.  
Embracing chance, chaos and complexity became unavoidable for advancement 
of disciplinary knowledge and with it the disciplinary research outgrew itself 
into transdisciplinarity. Evolution of transdisciplinarity into an organism is just 
as inescapable – whether it be the imaginary organism proposed in this thesis or 
some other kind. Polyphibianism, in one form or another, is bound to happen 
whether in human society or bypassing human intelligence altogether. 
Polyphibianism as evolutionary movement is not driven by basic survival 
strategies, rather, as Nicolescu predicts: 
Our evolution is self-transcendence. No one is obliged to evolve. 
The natural constraints of the environment that have obliged 
man to evolve biologically are no longer exercised. Biological 
evolution has reached full term. A new kind of evolution is 
emerging, linked to culture, science, consciousness. (Nicolescu, 
2002, p. 73)  
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A disciplinary researcher is often confronted with challenges for which the 
expertise of her or his discipline does not suffice. Collaborating with specialists 
from other disciplines and merging their know-how is what Nicolescu (2002, p. 
42) is concerned about: “the sum total of competencies is not competence: on the 
technical level, the intersection between different domains of knowledge is an 
empty ensemble.” Division of knowledge in disciplines separates the disciplines 
and dries out the interstitial area. Transdisciplinary zone, on the contrary, 
provides the living protoplasmic substance in between these artificial separations 
so the disciplines are connected into an organism and their instruments are 
correlated as organs with fluids and flows of information. 
The organs of knowledge do not combine linearly – no new knowledge or 
knowledge of a different kind arises from linear combinations of existent 
knowledge. The combinatorics of living knowledge intertwines strands of 
knowledge into complex geometries of life. The plurality of points of being 
ensures intervals of overlapping knowledge rather than, as Nicolescu noticed, 
the empty intersections between disciplines. Transdisciplinary zone in between 
disciplines needs to be filled with movement: this thesis imagines such a 
movement as polyphibianism. Polyphibianism encounters the problems that are 
of concern to many disciplines but are adequately addressed by none. For this 
problems polyphibianism grows imaginary organs solutions, unconstrained by 
disciplinary limitations.  
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Polyphibianism is a pioneering adventure of disciplinary specialists breaking 
free from the constraints of the obsolete apparatus of knowledge. Knowledge is 
released by polyphibians from disciplinary containers into organic vessels. The 
membrane of the container is not simply mechanically pierced to allow the 
leakage of knowledge. The membrane needs to be intricately organised so as to 
enable the transduction of knowledge from one form to another. The uniform 
and sterile separation of disciplines can be adjusted by allowing for evolution of 
transdisciplinarity. For this reason Nicolescu (2002, p. 42) finds a simple 
exchange of expertise inefficient - “the sum total of competencies is not 
competence.” 
Comparing attempts for such exchange of competencies between disciplines, 
Nicolescu consistently finds the same deficiency in all approaches:  whether 
inter-, cross-, or multi-disciplinary - none of them transcends the disciplines in 
the proper meaning of the word - the research remains within one of the 
disciplines. In multidisciplinarity, for instance, where the research subject of one 
discipline is introduced to several different disciplines, claims Nicolescu (2002, 
p. 42), “multidisciplinarity brings a plus to the discipline in question but [...] this 
‘plus’ is always in the exclusive service of the home discipline.” 
Interdisciplinarity does more than multidisciplinarity in the sense that it 
introduces the methodology of other disciplines into the discipline in question, 
and yet, for Nicolescu (2002, p. 43), “like multidisciplinary, interdisciplinarity 
overflows the disciplines, but its goal remains within the framework of 
disciplinary research.” 
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The advantage of transdisciplinarity, according to Nicolescu is in moving the 
research out of the discipline, that is, in truly transcending the discipline. 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 44) must hence first verify if there is “something between and 
across the disciplines and beyond all disciplines,” but within the disciplinary 
mind-set such proposition is impossible to prove: “from the point of view of 
classical thought there is absolutely nothing [...] transdisciplinarity appears 
absurd because it has no object.” There are no leftovers predicted in this schema 
- all knowledge is to be accommodated within containers. In other words, no 
scientifically viable knowledge can be produced outside scientific disciplines. If 
the viewpoint is reversed, “in contrast, within the framework of 
transdisciplinarity, classical thought does not appear absurd; it simply appears 
to have a restricted sphere of applicability” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 44). 
Transdisciplinarity in this sense has a greater scope. 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 45) understands disciplinary and transdisciplinary research 
as “complementary” rather than “antagonistic” since “transdisciplinarity is 
nourished by disciplinary research” and “in turn, disciplinary research is 
clarified by transdisciplinary knowledge.” The evolving transdisciplinarity 
depends less and less on the outcomes of disciplinary research and is driven more 
by an inner movement that enables incessant reorganisation of the organism of 
living knowledge. While a metabolic movement digests the disciplinary research 
outcomes and nurtures the polyphibic organs, the evolutionary movement 
enables the mutation and rebirth of the polyphibic organism.  
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What disciplinary research supplies to transdisciplinarity are dichotomies – 
transdisciplinarity is driven by tensions of contradictions arising in disciplinary 
research. Transdisciplinary movement is the movement from one level of reality 
to another, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 50) explains: “Two adjacent levels are connected 
by the logic of the included middle in the sense that the T-state present at a certain 
level is connected to a pair of contradictories (A and non-A) at an immediately 
adjacent level.” Transdisciplinarity provides the means of transport from one 
level to another without any limits or borders in the growth of knowledge: “The 
iterative process continues indefinitely, [...] open structure of the unity of levels 
of Reality [...] implies the impossibility of a self-enclosed complete knowledge.” 
Transdisciplinary movement emerges from the ephemeral nature of levels of 
reality, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 51) envisions them - as soon as a level of reality is 
established by resolution of a dichotomy another contradiction is already being 
constructed, urging for yet another level of reality. These levels form a transitory 
scaffolding towards an infinitely growing knowledge. Just as Nicolescu 
presupposes occurrence of contradictions on every new level which in turn 
drives the movement towards the next level, the tensions in polyphibic organs 
that are growing out of one experience into another drives the movement of 
transmutation from one ephemeral imaginary solution into another. 
What is of utmost importance in transcending the disciplinary methodologies is 
to imagine non-disciplinary ways of organising and experiencing knowledge. 
This means that the general mutual dependency between disciplinary and 
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transdisciplinary research is only an outline of the potential imaginary evolution 
of knowledge organisation. First and foremost the difference in kind of 
knowledge production must be comprehended. The transdisciplinary research is 
not meant only to feed back onto the disciplinary research - it is also meant to 
reorganise the disciplinary knowledge into organs, so as to enable further 
unlimited growth and self-organisation into different kind of organisms.  
The conditions for growth and evolution of transdisciplinary knowledge are 
guaranteed with its open structure that Nicolescu (2002, p. 52) ascribes to the fact 
that dichotomies will never cease to occur: “without ever reaching absolute 
noncontradiction, we can speak of an evolution of knowledge, which 
encompasses all levels of Reality: knowledge that is forever open.” This evolution 
is, as Nicolescu (2002, p. 52) asserts, not reversible: “that which is above is like 
that which is below, but that which is below is not like that which is above. Finer 
matter penetrates coarser matter but the reverse is not true.” With 
polyphibianism the organism of living knowledge, although ceaselessly 
newborn, inevitably and irreversibly matures.  
Nicolescu’s denial of “absolute noncontradiction” that is a prerequisite for open, 
indefinite growth of knowledge finds mathematical attestation in Gödel’s 
theorem: “sufficiently rich system of axioms inevitably leads to results that are 
either indecisive or contradictory” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 52). With evolution of 
transdisciplinarity the differentiation of the original impetus, that is the “axiom” 
of evolution, advances with each mutation. Evolution drives the complementary 
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threads of the “axiom” to grow apart, independently, in opposite direction until 
they meet again in a new context, irreconcilably contradictive. Rather than 
reusing the same combination in a changed context, a new organ is invented, and 
the tension is temporarily suspended.  
With Gödel’s theorem, not only does the knowledge remain an open conundrum, 
the theory of knowledge as well can never be completed: “The Gödelian structure 
of the unity of all levels of Reality, associated with the logic of included middle, 
implies that it is impossible to construct a complete theory for describing the 
passage from one level to the other, and, a fortiori, for describing the unity of all 
levels of Reality” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 53). The lack of a complete guide for 
trespassing into the transdisciplinary zone presents a problem only for 
monophibians anxious about the experience of trespassing, unwilling to trespass 
themselves.  For polyphibians no such navigation guide is needed, not even a 
manifesto, since the knowledge is lived internally rather than learnt externally 
and indirectly through manifestations.  
To be sure, there is a coherence of the unity of levels of Reality, 
but this coherence is oriented in certain direction: there is an 
arrow associated with transmission of information from one 
level to the other. As a consequence of this, if coherence is limited 
only to certain levels of Reality, it stops both at the ‘highest’ and 
at the ‘lowest’ level. If we wish to suggest the idea of a coherence 
that continues beyond these two limiting levels, so that there is 
an open unity, we must conceive the unity of levels of Reality as 
a unity that extends by a zone of nonresistance to our 
experiences, representations, descriptions, images, and 
mathematical formulations. (Nicolescu, 2002, pp. 53, 54)   
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According to Nicolescu, the coherence of knowledge on different levels of 
interpretation confines knowledge to a limited number of levels that can be 
comprehended with conventional human faculties of knowing. Human beings 
cannot resist to know through “experiences, representations, descriptions, 
images, and mathematical formulations.” Without introducing a “zone of non-
resistance” Nicolescu (2002, p. 54) cannot discuss “an infinite human knowledge 
[…] while simultaneously affirming the limitations of our body and our sense 
organs.” Nicolescu (2002, p. 54) further explains “the non-resistance of this zone 
[...] is due to the limitations of our bodies and of our sense organs – limitations 
that apply regardless of what measuring tools we use to extend these sense 
organs.” 
Only the knowledge that is experienced directly resists intermediaries. For 
knowing to be immediate, to experience each new level of reality, each new 
emerging order directly, human intellect must develop new organs for 
immediate knowing. A polyphibic organ imagined in this thesis is indifferent to 
intellectual abstraction and distancing of the observer and the observed. It resists 
the temptations of the intellect to jump from one level of reality to another 
without direct experience. 
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Nicolescu (2002, p. 54) compares the zone of non-resistance “to that which does 
not submit to any rationalization,” to the interval of suspended judgementi in 
which the organs mutate without reluctance or reservations. In this interval 
nothing can resist the immediate experience and with acceptance an immediate 
imaginary response is generated – the imaginary organ. Since in this interval all 
intellectual attempts of generalisation are avoided, the generated organs are 
unique, instinctive and precise instruments, perfectly fitting the unique, specific 
problem. 
The human knowledge is, as Nicolescu discerns, confined on the outside with 
human sense organs, and even if these are augmented with prostheses and 
apparatuses, the limits are merely stretched, never removed. On the inside the 
knowledge is unlimited, humans are able to grow imaginary organs indefinitely. 
Nicolescu’s reference to transdisciplinarity as a “zone of non-resistance” or “zone 
no-rationalization,” etc. is complemented in this thesis with the evolution of 
transdisciplinarity that can be referred to as a zone of infinite refinement of 
knowledge.  
The levels of reality as described by Nicolescu (2002, p. 55) are not simply layered 
independently, in parallel: “A level of Reality is what it is because all other levels 
coexist at the same time.” There is more to that level, that flat plane of thought, 
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than a two dimensional plane could present. The stack of transdisciplinary levels 
of reality functions as a mosaic of infrathini membranes with potential and actual 
fluctuations coming into resonance. With evolution of transdisciplinarity into 
polyphibianism the membranes articulate the protoplasmagora.  
Knowledge for Nicolescu (2002, p. 55) “is neither exterior nor interior: it is 
simultaneously exterior and interior.” This requirement for transdisciplinarity 
appears as a contradiction only from the disciplinary point of view, and is further 
resolved in polyphibianism:  with the organism-solution evolved or invented as 
an instrument for direct problem-experience the observed becomes the observer. 
The experience of knowledge is not mediated from the exterior - it is and remains 
an interior experience. The exterior that is observed is metabolised instinctively 
by the newly invented instruments. 
Examining the etymological source of transcendence and transdisciplinarity, 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 56) discovers that both terms “three” and “trans-” have the 
same etymological root where “three signifies transgression of the two, that 
which goes beyond the two.” For Nicolescu “Transdisciplinarity transgresses the 
duality of opposing binary pairs […] by the open unity.” In Marcel Duchamp's 
work 3 Standard Stoppages, which is of great importance for this thesis, the 
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number three signifies infinity. Executing the experiment three times opens up 
the standard of meter to infinite possibilities.    
Modern science was formed with intention to comprehend “nature.” Nicolescu 
(2002, p. 58) is aware of the effect the notion of nature has on knowledge 
formation: “the image of Nature exercises influence on all areas of knowledge,” 
and observes how changing the stance toward nature happens: “the passage 
from one viewpoint to another is not progressive, continuous – it happens by 
sharp, radical, discontinuous breaks. Several contradictory viewpoints can 
coexist.” 
Comparing the magical take on nature to the mechanistic conquest of nature, 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 58) finds both inadequate in transdisciplinary context, but the 
later approach was fatal for the very notion of nature: “the logical end result of 
the mechanistic viewpoint was the death of Nature - the very disappearance of 
the concept of Nature from the scientific field.” Through fragmentation of nature 
mechanistic science has forgotten the origin that ties the fragments of isolated 
system together - nature as a concept became obsolete. 
In the aftermath Nicolescu (2002, p. 59) concludes: “Nature was dead, but 
complexity remained.” Facing the remaining complexity the mechanistic 
approach is found inadequate to comprehend it and slowly retreats - with retreat 
of mechanical attack the idea of conquering nature, and therefore the very idea 
of nature fades. Nicolescu (2002, p. 59) announces that “nature is dead only for a 
certain viewpoint of the world: the viewpoint of classical thought.” Sterilization 
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of knowledge in “classical thought” prevented the subtle self-organisation of 
knowledge necessary for recognising the entire complexity in nature. 
Polyphibianism is directly linked to the bios – biotic knowing – a lived 
experience. The same tendencies are expressed in Nicolescu's manifesto of 
transdisciplinarity. Nicolescu (2002, p. 64), by broadening the classical viewpoint, 
reintroduces the surviving concept of nature, defining it more precisely as living 
nature: “This nature is living because it is there that life is present in all its degrees 
and its study demands the integration of lived experience.” Knowing by living 
the experience needs to be rediscovered - for that purpose Nicolescu (2002, p. 64) 
prepares a proposal: “The study of living Nature asks for a new methodology - 
transdisciplinary methodology – which is different from the methodology of 
modern science and from the methodology of the ancient science of being.” 
If transdisciplinarity begins in between and beyond disciplines, does evolution 
of transdisciplinarity render the disciplines obsolete? Does the disciplinary 
research evolve as complementary to transdisciplinarity or are disciplinary 
containers to be discarded? This thesis imagines evolution of knowledge 
formation into an organism of living knowledge, from the very first 
transmutation of disciplinary monophibic instruments into polyphibic organs, 
where the methodology is not determined in advance but follows the self-
organising principles.  Just as for Bergson (2005, p. xxiii) theory of evolution and 
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theory of knowledgei are inseparable, Nicolescu (2002, p. 64), in search for 
transdisciplinary methodology of knowledge production, turns to evolution: “It 
is the coevolution of the human being and of the universe which asks for a new 
methodology.” This thesis supplements such coevolution with the coevolution of 
polyphibians and their media. 
In hope to resolve the confrontations between disciplinary domains Nicolescu 
(2002, p. 65) puts “an attempt to elaborate a new philosophy of Nature, a 
privileged mediator of a dialogue between all areas of knowledge,” as “one of 
the highest priority in transdisciplinarity.” Similarly, polyphibianism priorities 
living knowledge where diverse organs grow and self-organise in a harmonious 
organism. Nicolescu (2002, p. 65) recognises that the expression “living Nature is 
a pleonasm”, since “the root of the Latin word natura is nasci and designates the 
action of giving birth.” Such pleonasm in the context of evolving 
transdisciplinarity reinforces the drive behind polyphibianism - the recursive 
rebirth of the polyphibian in front of every challenge - the very opposite of 
classical disciplinary research leading to the “death of nature” (Nicolescu, 2002, 
p. 58). Nicolescu (2002, p. 65) accordingly notes: “Living Nature is the womb of 
the self-engendering of the human being.” 
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Questioning the traditional ways of transmitting knowledge, of learning from the 
books, from representations of nature, Nicolescu (2002, p. 65) proposes instead 
to try and learn directly from nature, hence making the metaphorical connection 
between nature and the book obsolete: “Nature seems more like a book in the 
process of being written: the book of Nature is therefore not so much to be read 
as experienced.” The living knowledge is “transmitted” by growing it within 
itself - the organism of knowledge mutates and matures. Nicolescu (2002, p. 66) 
compares the classical world of disciplinary research to a “world of figuration” 
and the transdisciplinary world to a “world of transfiguration” – the polyphibic 
world of transmutation of organs of knowing.  
In the culture that is predominantly visual Nicolescu (2002, p. 68) comes across 
an exception, a “transgression of the field of sight” pointing to the threshold 
where visual experience becomes irrelevant: “microscopes encountered the 
quantum barrier.” The reason the quantum particles are “nonvisual” or 
“invisible,” explains Nicolescu, is the fact that they are “non-localisable.” The 
shift to non-local causality has disintegrated the primal dominance of the visual 
representations in science.  
Similarly Duchamp’s pseudo-scientific experiments have shaken the foundations 
of “retinal art” unveiling the world that escapes the retina. In the newly 
established “non-retinal art” localising, mapping, representing, measuring, and 
relating by local causality is to be avoided.  Abstaining from visual manifestation 
is, in essence, going against the intellectual current, against extraction and 
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externalisation. By overcoming the visual Duchamp is also trespassing the 
intellectual, moving beyond the intellectually homogenised visual space, 
bringing back from heterogeneity only visually incomprehensible items. 
The art-research projecti ASCO2.T AT.LAST in this thesis follows Duchamp into 
the non-retinal realm: the optical instruments of the visual that Duchamp submits 
to comical correctiveii are replaced by instruments of invisible collisions or in 
Nicolescu’s (2002, p. 68) words: “Particle accelerators are for the quantum world 
what microscopes and telescopes are for the classical world. Particles indicate 
their presence by the number of pulses recorded by electronic computers. Their 
properties are electronically reconstructed.” The cyborganic ASCO2.T upgrade 
of ASCOT apparatus designed for CERN particle accelerator is an imaginary 
solution to knowledge production outside the visually dominated domains, 
without the urge to return to reconstruction and representation. 
Nicolescu  and McLuhan both comment on the disappearance of the visual space, 
on the turn “toward the invisible: toward that which is beyond visible” 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 69), with the advent of nonlocal and nondeterministic 
quantum mechanics. Relating the “exactly repeatable” to “visual,” McLuhan 
(Picnic in Space, 1967) follows science in its advancements out of the visual 
conditioning, away from the compulsion to repeat the results of scientific 
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experiments: “as science gets more sophisticated it realizes that all experiments 
are subtly non-repetitive […] and visual space, in fact, has disappeared from 
science.” Nicolescu (2002, p. 68) continues: “The transgression of the field of 
vision leads to transvision: a new level of Reality that can be explored by means 
of science.” This non-retinal level is where the phenomenon does not return to 
the retina via representation. The “transvision” is visionary but not necessarily 
visual, just as the imaginary is not necessarily image related. The organs of 
imagination are independent of visual senses. The invisible and nonvisual 
knowledge requires different sense organs.  
Nothing essentially new is learnt by rendering the invisible visible, nothing of a 
new kind. For direct experience of invisible phenomena sense organs must 
become one with the phenomena. If human senses do not suffice for imagined 
reality new imaginary organs are called for. In turning towards “that which is 
beyond visible” alone does not guarantee independence from externalisation of 
experience - scientific research still depends on external detectors and 
instruments. For that reason Nicolescu (2002, p. 69) emphasises the “interior 
perception, the manifestation of what one can call quantum imagination” as a 
complementary drive in research. This introspective, internalized speculation is 
the only access to experience of the otherwise unimaginable, unpresentable. In 
order to experience it, this thesis proposes evolution of internalized instruments-
organs. The prerequisite for invention of internal instruments is the silence of 
“habitual thought:” 
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Since we are not quantum entities we cannot ourselves explore 
this quantum world, but we can nevertheless perceive it if we 
make the effort to integrate within ourselves the paradoxical 
information that is provided to us by scientific theory and 
experiments. This effort must penetrate an interior silence by 
quieting habitual thought based on perception of macrophysical 
level. (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 69) 
Duchamp practiced indifference towards the visual by introspectively 
approaching the non-retinal realm. Practicing indifference towards the visual 
culture, the culture of repetition, increases sensibility towards the non-repetitive, 
towards novelty as such. Even in experiencing the same phenomenon, novelty 
arises if the experience changes in kind. In fact, Duchamp strived to be newborni  
in front of every experience of a phenomenon (Molderings, 2010, pp. 2257-63). 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 70) finds the same advantages in the state of being newborn: 
“at the door of the quantum world we can become again as infants by sacrificing 
our habits of thought, our certainties, our imagery, because the quantum 
imagination is an imagination without imagery.” As Nicolescu anticipates the 
different kind of imagination, the Manifesto of transdisciplinarity opens up to 
polyphibianism.  Polyphibianism resumes where the Manifesto pauses: 
Comprehension of the quantum world therefore passes through 
a lived experience that integrates knowing based on scientific 
theory and experiment into our very being, while making us 
discover a new level of perception within ourselves. (Nicolescu, 
2002, p. 70)  
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Can the quantum world and other worlds of different orders of organisation than 
the human order be known by living the experience?  Can humans be inventive 
enough to integrate themselves within such living knowledge? Manifesto of 
transdisciplinarity is an inexplicit list of intents to be actualized both internally 
and externally. It therefore serves to this thesis as a signed treaty upon the current 
state of affairs and fundamental guidelines to resolve the tensions. Specific 
imaginary solutions need to be invented upon this agreement: integration of 
knowing with being, and theory of knowledge with theory of evolution, as 
Bergson (2005, p. xxiii) proposed. The imaginary solutions are not necessarily 
representable as imagery, but can nonetheless, for the purposes of trespassing 
between disciplinary apparatus of visual culture and the nonvisual 
transdisciplinary zone, be manifested as notesi, sketches, graphs, diagrams, etc. 
Nicolescu (2002, p. 71) offers further support in imagining solutions: “In the 
transdisciplinary vision the classic real/imaginary dichotomy disappears. The 
real is a fold of imagination and the imagination is a fold of the real.” Like the 
potential and the actualised, the real and the imaginary are intricately 
intertwined. Nicolescu continues: “From fold to fold we invent ourselves.” From 
this reinventing oneself, by folding imaginary realities, one is reborn as a 
polyphibian. With folds the indivisible individual divides and disperses oneself 
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over the protoplasm of knowledge. Transdisciplinary zone begins where the 
disciplinary researchers are reborn in a common researching organism.  
Nicolescu (2002, p. 74) notes the implicit potential for rebirth in the disciplinary 
researcher trespassing beyond her or his discipline: “Homo sui transcendentalis 
is in the process of being born. He is not some new man but man reborn. This 
new birth is potentially inscribed in our very being.” 
Returning to the roots of the term transgression, Nicolescu (2002, p. 74) explains 
it in its simplest original meaning, “to pass to the other side, to cross,” that only 
later assumed the meaning of “the violation of law,” therefore, his proclamation 
of transdisciplinarity as “a generalized transgression” returns to its broader, 
primary meaning. Although far from violation of law and order, 
transdisciplinarity, as it evolves, trespasses from one order to another. Once 
accessed, the transdisciplinary zone is not to be appropriated, rather, Nicolescu 
(2002, p. 82) envisions “a transnational space, a space that does not belong to 
anyone.” This thesis proposes protoplasmic agora as such “transnational space,” 
a dynamic space of turbulent inventiveness without any imposed 
preconceptions. The movement of polyphibianism requires protoplasmagora just 
as a movement in art or science needs a fertile safety zone.i  
If one engages exclusively in the crossing of different levels of 
Reality, this new behaviour, to be with, neither for nor against, 
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but both for and against, traps one in a new dogmatic […] It is 
only through the harmony of levels of Reality and levels of 
perception, that is to say, through an accord between thought 
and one’s own experience of life, that this trap may be avoided. 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 87)  
Transdisciplinarity is not a quest for knowledge. Rather than trying to conquer 
within and beyond disciplines, transgressing domain boundaries, 
transdisciplinarity evolves in order to live knowledge more fully, fine tuning the 
organs of knowing. Self-organising into an imaginary organism, knowledge 
ceases to be a commodity, something to be extracted and externalised from the 
organs. Self-awareness of such complex organism of living knowledge renders 
any separation into the observer and the observed impossible – awakening 
organs into an organism prevents disintegration and fragmentation of 
knowledge. Polyphibianism is an evolutionary movement that is keeping the 
organism supple, stretching and contracting it, preventing the stiffening of 
knowledge by making it contradict itself only to subsequently resolve 
contradictions in transmutation. 
Within the protoplasm of transdisciplinary zone unexpected connections are 
discovered between disparate and incomparable disciplinary methodologies and 
between incompatible mind-sets of researchers coming from different 
disciplines. Nicolescu (2002, p. 89) understands transdisciplinarity as “the science 
and art of discovering […] bridges […] between different areas of knowledge and 
different beings,” where “we find the framework for an authentic revolution in 
intelligence.” It is only through introspection into the depths of 
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transdisciplinarity, where intellect prospers in its protoplasmic state, that 
intelligence becomes self-aware and is able to self-organise on another order.  
“Today, revolution can only be revolution in intelligence, which transforms our 
individual and social life into [...] an act that unveils the poetic dimension of 
existence,” where, for Nicolescu (2002, p. 90), the Greek term poetic, means to 
make, “to do, today, means to reconcile contradictories.” Polyphibianism feeds 
on contradictions and indecisiveness, occurring in sufficiently complex 
intellectual system of presumptions, as demonstrated by mathematician Gödel. 
With self-organisation the complexity of newborn organs of intelligence 
sporadically increases, ensuring the driving force for this evolutionary 
movement.  
Emerging from transdisciplinary research, the levels of reality in themselves, 
according to Nicolescu (2002, p. 87), do not yet prevent another dogmatic system. 
Polyphibianism inhibits a set of axioms, to form a dogma, by evolving a self-
aware curiosity. A pure inner curiosity of living knowledge to know itself 
questions any such set with multiple organs of knowing, being always newborn 
in front of dogmatic schemes. Driven by incessant curiosity, polyphibianism 
maintains the illusion of static and stable harmony within the dynamic organism 
of living knowledge. 
Identifying a new culture of apparitions as an alternative to the old culture of 
appearances Roy Ascott (2003, p. 281) criticises in the later the tendency towards 
formation of homogeneous dogmatic systems: “A culture concerned with 
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appearances bases itself on certainties, a deﬁnitive description of reality. 
Uniformity of dogma, uniformity of outlook and goals, cultural continuity and 
consensus, semiotic stability: these are its distinguishing features.” With advent 
of cyberspace Ascott sees a new culture on the rise, a culture of changing 
emergent phenomena, a culture of apparitions:  
What both the art and technologies of cyberculture are able to 
show is that there is a radical shift in our perceived relationship 
with reality, where the emphasis has moved from appearance to 
apparition; that is, from the outward and visible look of things 
to the inward and emergent processes of becoming. In this 
culture, neither the precise state of art nor its cultural status can 
be ﬁxed or deﬁned; it is in a constant state of transformation. This 
is not a state of transition between two known and ﬁxed 
deﬁnitions or destinations, rather, it is transformation itself as a 
deﬁning characteristic, as intrinsic to the identity of interactive 
art as the composed and ﬁnite object was to its classical 
predecessor. Interactive art is art in a state of endless becoming. 
It is art in ﬂux. (Ascott, 2003, p. 281) 
The shift from retinal to non-retinal art initiated by Duchamp is now reinforced 
by technological infrastructure. Duchamp escaped the dominance of visual 
culture, by avoiding visual representation, repetitiveness, formation of habits of 
thought and taste. Trespassing into the territories beyond the visible became 
widely accessible and navigable with computer networks. Cyberspace was not to 
become another visual space, observed from a fixed point of view. Visualisation 
of cyberspace does not enhance it, added visual dimension of cyberspace does 
not contribute to its essence. Cyberspace exists as interactions of multiple points 
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of beingi, of nodes appearing and disappearing in the complex web of 
relationships. Both Ascott and Nicolescu recognise artists as forefront explorers 
of cyberspace where cyberspace serves as an operational prototype for the 
transdisciplinary zone. Nicolescu observes how transference of “computer 
methods to the realm of art” transubstantiates the medium:  
Art […] uses incredible information circulation on the internet as 
if it were new matter. Information rediscovers its original 
meaning of “in-formation:” to create new forms, ceaselessly 
changing new forms, arising out of the collective imagination of 
artists. The interconnectivity of computer networks allows such 
connections between artists, who come together in real time on 
the Internet to create together [...] a world that arises from 
somewhere else. This “somewhere else” is found in the inner 
worlds of artists […] These experimental researchers constitute 
the germ of a genuine transdisciplinary research. (Nicolescu, 
2002, p. 98) 
As has been shown before, the individuality of a disciplinary researcher 
trespassing into the transdisciplinary zone divides and disperses. Ascott (2003, 
p. 376) reports the same divisibility of classical notion of indivisible self in 
cyberspace: the “cyberself” or the “embodiment of technoetic relativity” is an 
individual “made up of many selves: de-centred, distributed, and constructively 
schizophrenic.” Cyberculture cannot be formed by monophibians. Every 
monophibian entering the cyberspace is instantaneously dispersed in a 
polyphibic network. Cyberself is therefore proto-polyphibic. Any centralised 
                                                 
i term point of being is borrowed from Derrick de Kerckhove, see Appendix A 
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monophibic tendency to manifest a unique identity is superficial, existing only 
on the interface with the classical reality. Polyphibic creativity is initiated deep 
within the decentralised peer to peer exchange network of organs of knowing 
that mutate with the evolving source code.  
With the shift from the culture of appearances to the culture of apparition Ascott 
(2003, p. 280)  predicts a shift to a “radically new role of the artist.” No longer 
concerned with appearances, the artist does not visualise the observed 
phenomena as an external observer, but rather immerses himself in emergent 
phenomena: “Instead of creating, expressing, or transmitting content, he is now 
involved in designing context,” inventing the transformative environment, the 
protoplasmic agora of participation in creative act. “Connectivity, interaction, 
and emergence are now the watchwords of artistic culture […] Art is no longer a 
window onto the world but a doorway through which the observer is invited to 
enter into a world of interaction and transformation.” (Ascott, 2003, p. 280) 
Protoplasmagora is shaped by the organism of living knowledge, welcoming 
new visitors, new mutations of the polyphibic species. 
Cyberspace is the space of apparition, in which the virtual and 
real not only co-exist, but co-evolve in a cultural complexity. 
Apparition implies action, just as appearance implies inertia. 
Apparition is about the coming into being of a new identity, 
which is often, at ﬁrst, unexpected, surprising, disturbing. If 
appearance is claimed as the face of reality, of things as they are, 
apparition is the emergence of things as they could be. (Ascott, 
2003, p. 279) 
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Polyphibian, being incessantly newborn, is not concerned with external 
appearances but only with internal experience of the emerging new orders of 
knowledge organisation. With increasing complexity higher and higher orders 
of organisation emerge in cyberspace. This tendency suffices for Nicolescu (2002, 
p. 99) to treat cyberspace as proto-transdisciplinarian: “It is here that the 
transdisciplinary method is shown to be indispensable because all creation 
encounters a wall of representation.” Transdisciplinarity evolves into a living 
organism of knowledge by evading the “wall of representation,” deflecting the 
trajectory of the artist (transdisciplinary explorer) and dispersing the artist’s 
identity: “True artistic creation arises at the moment of crossing several levels of 
perception simultaneously, engendering a transperception” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 
99). An artist can participate in multiplicity of emerging orders only with a 
polyphibic awareness. 
Ascott  (2003, p. 283) envisions art in cybernetic culture that he terms “telematic 
art” independently of cybernetic technology, its principles are transferable to 
advancements beyond cyberspace: “Working with networks is a matter of 
attitude before it is anything to do with machines. Telematic art is conceptually 
driven, not technologically led.” Ascott (2003, p. 283) enlisting the “fundamental 
concepts of art as action, interaction with the art-in-process, […] art as 
transformation, change, ﬂux and ﬂow,” conceives of “the art-work as arena.” 
This thesis imagines the evolution of such arena into protoplasmic agora, where 
the artist – the forefront transdisciplinary explorer – transmutes into a 
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polyphibian and co-creates the agora:  protoplasmagora is formed and in-formed 
by the movement of polyphibianism. 
Polyphibian passes from one medium to another, from one culture to another, in 
silence. Polyphibian leaves traces behind but no translations. “Translation, be it 
partial or general, between different cultures is inconceivable, because cultures 
emerge from the silence between the words,” and for Nicolescu (2002, p. 101) 
“this silence cannot be translated.” Silencei opens up the interval – the interval of 
suspended judgementii. Judgement and prejudice results from habitual 
automatic translations. To be transcendental, translations must be original, 
relentlessly mutating the meaning. By introducing chaos into communication 
more of the silent meaning is transferred directly, by resonance: direct, silent 
communication is about adjusting the rhythm of intervals, leading into 
resonance. 
Direct communication of the living knowledge between polyphibians is 
nonrepresentational. Protoplasmagora is silent, knowing is immediate. The in-
formation passed between polyphibic organs is internal and private, nothing is 
extracted for public presentation. Translation of silence between cultures of 
monophibians, on the other hand, results in silence devoid of meaning. The 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.2. for more on silence as resistance to communicate indirectly in case of Duchamp 
and Deleuze  
ii see chapter 4.2.4. for more on the interval of suspended judgement  
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meaningful silence is not hesitation, not thought of before execution, but 
emerging spontaneously. Silence organises the intervals. It has an active 
organising role. Nicolescu (2002, p. 105) compares this silence to quantum 
vacuum: “It is a full silence, structured in levels.”  
Protoplasmagora is a structured interval of silent tension between the 
irreconcilable, incompatible opposites. This interval includes everything – 
nothing is left out by silence. The interlude of complexity and simplicity of such 
silent vacuum of potentiality is what makes protoplasmagora able to afford the 
creation of organisms of living knowledge. Living knowledge is not about 
speaking out, it is the direct active in-formationi. Nicolescu explains: “silence 
appears to us as an unknowable, because it is the unfathomable well of 
knowledge, but this unknowable is luminous because it illumines the very 
structure of knowledge” (2002, p. 105). The form of knowledge informs and 
reforms the organism - by yielding to the form the organism and the living 
knowledge become one.  
If there is a universal language, it goes beyond words, because it 
concerns the silence between the words and the unfathomable 
silence that is expressed by each word. Universal language is not 
a language that can be captured in a dictionary; it is the 
experience of the totality of our being, reunited at last, beyond 
all its myriad forms. (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 106) 
                                                 
i term active in-formation is borrowed from David Bohm  
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Mastering more than one discipline, being fluent in more than one language, 
belonging to more than one culture is undoubtedly an arduous task. Nicolescu 
(2002, pp. 105, 106) instead proposes a transdisciplinary, transcultural and 
translinguistic attitude, where transculture is “first of all an experience, because 
it concerns the silence of different actualizations,” while translanguage is “an 
organic language, which captures the spontaneity of the world, beyond the 
infernal chain of abstraction after abstraction.” Rather than learning from 
multiple disciplines, cultures and languages externally, the transdisciplinary 
method is to internalise this universal experience. The aim of this thesis is to 
imagine how such knowledge could be lived by examining to what degree 
categorisation of knowledge into disciplines, cultures and languages becomes 
obsolete with evolution of transdisciplinarity.  
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3. Research methodology 
3.1. Anticipating chaos: the method of introspection 
3.1.1. Quality over quantity, smooth over striated  
In contrast to well devised research methodologies specific to each disciplinary 
domain the transdisciplinary zone lacks such protocols – any attempt to establish 
a set of rules would reduce transdisciplinarity to yet another discipline. The 
challenge of describing transdisciplinary mode of exploration can only be 
compared to the challenging moment of a major breakthrough within a discipline 
ripping apart the disciplinary scaffolding that was for long considered a stable 
ground and suddenly become obsolete.  
An example will be given in the field of physics where, within safely 
deterministic systems, indeterminism lurked in at fin de siècle: chance emerged 
where by definition should be none, and the existing methodology that was to 
predict the behaviour of the system failed – in some cases literally 
catastrophically. With this unexpected encounter with chaos in physics the 
method of approaching systems, deterministic or not, needed to be entirely 
reconsidered. The customary thinking in terms of quantities about the systems, 
where chaos is inevitable, had to be replaced with qualitative observations. 
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Another example will follow from the field of metaphysics, where the difficulties 
to express the complex ideas (of coming into knowing, of knowing by intuition) 
in linear language become insurmountable. The linearity of intellectual reasoning 
impedes the interpenetrating intuitive notions from being experienced. The same 
inclination towards the qualitative, mosaic approach, rather than the 
quantitative, sequential approach in representations of research results is noticed 
in advancements of both metaphysics and physics.  
At the same time that chaos was anticipated in physics, through Poincaré’s 
explorations of unorganised matter, and in metaphysics, through Bergson’s 
studies referring to evolution of organised matter, Duchamp grasped chaos in 
both domains, dealing ‘pataphysically with occurrence of chance in systems so 
conventionally standardised that chance should not occur. Infecting systems 
with chance and, at the same time, conserving or canning the chance was his way 
of overcoming the limitations of intellect with humour.  
The case of Henri Poincaré anticipating the theory of chaos is well known and 
well documented (Barrow-Green, 1997). After supposedly resolving the stability 
of the “three-body problem” (the problem of determining the motion of three 
bodies from their given initial conditions), Poincaré revised again his award-
winning paper that was being prepared for print. By discovering an error in one 
of his proofs, Poincaré reached quite the opposite conclusion: the three-body 
system was far from stable and impossible to resolve with the available methods 
of classical mechanics. Left without adequate tools for reasoning in the given 
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situation, Poincaré had to devise his own method, turning away from 
quantitative to qualitative analysis: 
From Poincaré onward, then, celestial mechanics becomes a new 
discipline, namely, qualitative dynamics. New mathematics, in 
the forms of measure theory and topology, supplements the 
older methods of analysis. New devices, the Poincaré section 
and shifts on it, for example, become the stable method of the 
subject. The questions asked are no longer so much how to find 
an appropriate approximation method for determining the 
details of some celestial orbit, but, rather, the qualitative, often 
global, questions about the nature of the phase portrait for some 
especially interesting, or especially tractable, dynamical 
structures. (Sklar, 2013, p. 178) 
Unable to quantitatively determine the trajectories of the three bodies due to 
unavoidable error in approximating initial conditions or, in other words, the 
sensitivity to the initial conditions, now known as the trademark of chaos, 
Poincaré invented new qualitative ways of coming into knowing the movement.  
Bergson develops a similar preference towards quality or rather avoidance of 
quantification. Like Poincaré in physics, Bergson attempts to invent new tools for 
metaphysical comprehension of movement and time, by introspectively 
questioning the existent methods.    
Poincaré devised an abstract mapping of the system to show not the actual 
trajectories of the system but to depict the overall tendencies of the system. One 
is not preoccupied any longer with the measurement of time intervals, of velocity 
and positions of the three bodies in units of a classical uniform space construct. 
Rather, one discerns a peculiar non-uniform articulation of a different kind of 
space, a state space growing together with evolution of the system, where the 
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insight can be gained about two seemingly very close tendencies that 
subsequently diverge and generate immense complexity: 
When we try to represent the figure formed by these two curves 
and their intersections in a finite number, each of which 
corresponds to a doubly asymptotic solution, these intersections 
form a type of trellis, tissue, or grid with infinitely serrated mesh. 
Neither of the two curves must ever cut across itself again, but it 
must bend back upon itself in a very complex manner in order 
to cut across all of the meshes in the grid an infinite number of 
times. The complexity of this figure will be striking and I shall 
not even try to draw it. (Poincaré, 1957, pp. 380, 381) 
It took more than half a century and invention of computers before the first 
attempts were made to draw such entangling figure that Poincaré named 
“homoclinic tangle.” Concurrently with rediscovery of chaotic phenomena in the 
sixties, when sensitivity to initial conditions detected by meteorologist Edward 
N. Lorenz, in 1961, lead to formalisation of chaos theory as part of physics, on 
metaphysical level, Gilles Deleuze was responsible for revival of Bergson’s 
philosophy that lead to Bergsonism in 1966. To advance Bergson’s ideas the 
before mentioned difficulties with linear language were avoided by Deleuzian 
practice of entangled, enfolded writing and diagrammatical thinking. 
It has been shown (Harris, 2004) that it is possible to resolve the potential, virtual 
ideas implicit in Bergson’s writing with precisely such tangled diagrams and 
strange attractors that Poincaré had in mind when studying the potential form, 
the virtual state that the system of the three bodies tended to. In his attempt to 
diagram Bergson’s specific method of knowing a process in its multiplicity and 
heterogeneity, of knowing movement and duration, Paul Harris (2004, p. 98) 
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proceeds cautiously: “if we were to state Bergson’s particular dilemma, we might 
use his own terms and say that the very act of representing multiplicity in words 
presents a potential trap, that to do so is to transpose a virtual concept into an 
actualized symbolic entity.”  
Harris (2004, p. 100) suggests that Bergson finds the metaphors he employs to 
depict complexities of his notions inadequate to the degree that they lack the 
intricate structure of chaos. Examining, for instance, how Bergson compares the 
internal experience of life and of duration to a simple unrolling of a thread, Harris 
(2004, p. 104) notes Bergson’s struggle to show how such simple unrolling of time 
as a thread described in classical Euclidian geometry and Newtonian mechanics 
does not suffice to describe the unfolding thread of duration. What Bergson was 
looking for, according to Harris, was fractal geometry that would allow for 
interpenetration of the past and the present, a fractal dimension to accommodate 
a lived experience of time:    
Bergson lacks any notion of “space” or spatial metaphors which 
would accommodate the definitive characteristics of his concept 
of multiplicity. The chief impasse lies in that fact that qualitative 
or continuous multiplicity entails “reciprocal penetration,” a 
tangled weave of sorts, and Bergson could not find a visual or 
spatial analogue because he equated space in general with the 
Euclidean space of common sense. Quite simply, the main 
reason that chaos diagrams serve as such effective heuristic 
supplements for Bergson’s metaphors for multiplicity is that 
they are constructed in fractional dimensional spaces where 
successive magnifications reveal “reciprocal penetration” across 
different scales. (Harris, 2004, pp. 102,103)  
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Just as Poincaré found himself without appropriate tools and had to devise new 
mathematics for the physical phenomena he encountered, Bergson was stuck 
with the existent spatial concept and could not continue his metaphysical quest 
without reinventing his philosophical method. Harrison shows how Bergson’s 
metaphysics urged for the same changes in classical spatial notions as did 
Poincaré’s physical conundrum at the threshold of chaos. Harris exposes a 
qualitative difference between the two kinds of spatial representations of motion:  
Chaos dynamics differs crucially from classical dynamics in that 
space no longer precedes movement in the same way. A chaotic 
motion or “orbit” does not occupy a fixed, box-like space; it 
rather outlines the space needed to hold it as it unfolds; it 
produces its own spatial form as it evolves. Deleuze and Guattari 
conceptualize this kind of diagramming in terms of “smooth 
space” (Harris, 2004, p. 109)  
The space of chaos diagrams, or the “smooth space,” is a heterogeneously 
articulated space that Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 392) oppose to the “striated 
space,” a homogenised space that is arbitrarily divided into uniform units.  The 
heterogeneous state space structure of fractal dimensions grows with the 
movement of the system through its potentialities. The state space is free to 
expand to as many dimensions as needed to accommodate all the variables of the 
system and at the same time it follows and forms according to the system’s 
evolution: dimensionality of the attractor or tendency of the system is accurately 
fractured into the finest fractal dimensions. It is to this “smooth” infinitely 
intricate fractal structures that Harris tries to map Bergson’s thought:  
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The fractal maps onto the discussion of Bergson’s descriptions of 
how the past gathers itself and folds into the present, that is, this 
folding cannot be reduced to a single heuristic metaphor or 
image, but must be figured as a process of continual remixture 
and redistribution. The fractal as actual object, we might say, has 
a presence in the present only as a virtual fissuring. 
Apprehended this way, the fractal functions not as an ideal 
object outside thought, but a diagram that filters thought into a 
mobile form. (Harris, 2004, p. 114) 
Chaos theory invents tools for operating with dichotomies, the opposing terms 
that intricately interpenetrate without contact – operating in proximity and yet 
tending far apart – forming a dichotomous tangle. Before these tools such 
interpenetration was hard to conceive, as Harris (2004, p. 111) notes:  “For 
Bergson, the insurmountable difficulty in finding the proper conceptual figure 
for duration is that no image can represent duration as both continuous with 
itself and differing from itself.” Harris envisions how Bergson would present his 
ideas if these instruments of thought were available to him: 
If Bergson’s image is diagrammed using tools from chaos theory, 
it would unfold as follows. The body contracted to a point, from 
which a line extends out, becomes a tangled mesh, a spreading 
shape of constant volume that occupies more and more of a 
multi-dimensional phase space. What Bergson imagined as a 
linear trajectory “in” space (which he then had to extract from 
the space) gives way to a fractal-dimensional, shifting form that 
creates the space it occupies. (Harris, 2004, p. 110) 
In order to avoid the uniformity of space the movement does not need to be 
extracted from it – in state space the movement articulates space naturally, grows 
and expands itself indefinitely within a confined volume. This thesis continues 
the efforts of reviving Bergson’s thought by translating it from linear language to 
nonlinear diagrams. Focusing on Bergson’s attempt to form a theory of 
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knowledge in mutual dependence with the theory of evolution this thesis, 
equipped with diagrammatical methods, is aiming to conceive a living 
knowledge. The growth of living knowledge is precisely this indefinite swelling 
within a confined space, forming an intricate tangle – of fractal and even phractal 
dimensionsi. Without the fear of heterogeneity the living knowledge is inventing 
new organs for resolving dichotomous by-products of disciplinary research 
within a transdisciplinary zone.  
3.1.2. Canned chance – a standard for exceptions   
If we could know exactly the laws of nature and the situation of 
the universe at the initial instant, we should be able to predict 
exactly the situation of this same universe at a subsequent 
instant. But even when the natural laws should have no further 
secret for us, we could know the initial situation only 
approximately. If that permits us to foresee the subsequent 
situation with the same degree of approximation, this is all we 
require, we say the phenomenon has been predicted, that it is 
ruled by laws. But this is not always the case; it may happen that 
slight differences in the initial conditions produce very great 
differences in the final phenomena […] (Poincaré, 1913, p. 398) 
As has been shown by Poincaré, chance can emerge even in chance-free, 
deterministic systems, if they happen to be sensitive to initial conditions. 
Although a system has been constructed and conceptualized so as to determine 
a precise solution, the simulation of the system can only be initiated with 
approximation - under certain circumstances the slightest imprecision can yield 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.1.3 for more on living knowledge and phractal geometry 
112 
 
catastrophically divergent results. No convention can set up a standard measure 
for acceptable approximations in order to maintain chance-free predictability of 
the system.  
Determinism, measurement and standards are conventions that are 
advantageous in a rather limited domain – as soon as the threshold of that 
domain is crossed they become inadequate. To avoid chance, science avoided the 
non-deterministic systems, but Poincaré has brought to light the occurrence of 
chaos within the otherwise orderly deterministic systems. In the words of David 
Ruelle (1991, p. 48), Poincaré “wanted to understand how chance crept in” - he 
needed to negotiate this inevitable conundrum in his own terms. Ruelle (1991, p. 
49) recognises Poincaré’s faith in determinism and his attempt to resolve this 
dichotomy, since the non-deterministic quantum physics was not yet developed: 
“essential point made by Poincaré is that chance and determinism are reconciled 
by long-term unpredictability.”  
It is well known that Marcel Duchamp read extensively Poincaré’s later writings 
and, undoubtedly, his ponderings on chance. Namely, Duchamp instinctively 
reacted to Poincaré’s ideas on chance and conventions in science. Duchamp also 
questioned the authority that prescribed the standardisation, such as standards 
in measurement, and pointed to the arbitrariness of their choice. In 1913 he 
fabricated a new standard for meter - the metrical unit of length - that was his 
country’s pride and joy. The new standard unit of meter was to be based on 
chance. Duchamp documented the instructions for fabrication of the new 
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standard that was to be determined experimentally and entitled it 3 standard 
stoppages. With these instructions the experiment was to be reproduced three 
times with irreproducible outcomes: a thread one meter long was to fall from a 
height of one meter onto a horizontal plane (Duchamp, 1989, p. 22). Shaped by 
chance the threads were subsequently fixed on a canvas and preserved in a box. 
Choosing three curved threads to present one standard out of infinite possible 
curves by pure chance is conserving the chance or in Duchamp’s (1989, p. 33) 
own words: “3 Standard Stops = canned chance.”  
Poincaré must have had realized that with every new intuitive idea we need to 
devise new measurement tools, tools to experiment with our intuition. Namely, 
by encountering chaos, Poincaré invented many such mathematical instruments 
that allowed him to cope with chance as the underlying principle of nature. 
Herbert Molderings (2010) recounts how Duchamp might have implemented 
Poincaré’s findings and inventions in his own peculiar manner, referring to 
Poincaré’s introduction of qualitative geometry or “analysis situ.” Indeed, 
Duchamp seems to have released the unit of meter from its quantitative role and 
turned it into a qualitative measure of relations.  
Roberto Giunti (2002) proposed that Duchamp might have disregarded both the 
last axiom on parallel lines and the first axiom that allows no more than a single 
straight line to connect two points, thus liberating himself from constraints of 
Euclidean geometry. Riemannian geometry’s disregard to the last axiom can be 
demonstrated on a sphere. Through two given points on a sphere, we can in 
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general draw only one great circle – the equivalent of a straight line – with one 
exception: if the two given points are at the ends of a diameter, an infinite number 
of great circles can be drawn through them.  
Riemannian geometry therefore includes outstanding cases in which through 
two points an infinite number of “straight lines” can be drawn.  Duchamp might 
have meticulously set the experiment to satisfy the conditions of such exceptional 
case, therefore choosing the Riemannian geometry as the basis for his 
measurement standard. If three treads from the box are put one on top of the 
other, Giunti (2002) observes, all three of them pass through the same two points, 
as if Duchamp would on purpose make them equivalent to the shortest path 
between these two points, while at the same time preserving their unique forms. 
Duchamp admits his “joke about the meter - a humorous application of 
Riemann’s post-Euclidean geometry” in a response to a questionnaire concerning 
the 3 Standard Stoppages (Naumann, 1984).i Consequences of this joke would be 
a shift from Euclidean standpoint, where there is only one straight line that 
connects two points, two things, two events, two facts, to the Riemannian 
standpoint, that allows for infinity of lines, infinity of paths between two things, 
infinity of causes linking two events, infinity of theories connecting two facts.  
                                                 
i Marcel Duchamp as cited in Henderson (2005, p. 61), chapter 5, notes 26, 39: Artist's files, 
Department of Painting and Sculpture, the Museum of Modern Art, New York; first published 
by Naumann, The Mary and William Sisler Collection, pages 170-71 
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Duchamp was aware his gesture as an artist to find the adequate geometry for 
conveying the idea of probabilistic worldview will not reach his audience 
immediately, stating: “I don't think that the public is prepared to accept it [...] my 
canned chance. This depending on coincidence is too difficult for them. They 
think everything has to be done on purpose by complete deliberation […] in time 
they will come to accept chance as a possibility to produce things” (Roberts, 
1968). Poincaré (1913, p. 66), who considered the choice of geometry a matter of 
convenience,  could not have agreed more – choices made in science can be, in a 
sense, quite arbitrary. 
It is proposed in this thesis that transdisciplinary methodology is to be based 
precisely on such acceptance of chance. With the 3 Standard Stoppages Duchamp 
exits the idealized deterministic domain and enters the transdisciplinary zone of 
no fixed standards, no conventions, no measures. And yet within 
transdisciplinarity there are orderly windows, windows of periodicity and short 
term predictability. Duchamp applies his game with humour by reintroducing 
comical standards and reusing the canned chance at carefully selected windows 
of opportunity. Not only is ‘pataphysics laughing at physics - the science of the 
general, the science of standards - Duchamp, at every such window of periodicity 
within chaos laughs back at ‘pataphysics - the science of exception - by 
standardising the exceptional.  
Contrary to Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré, although aware of the traps 
present in idealisation of scientific theories, remain reserved to a degree and 
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appreciate some of the benefits of disciplinary confinement (as in the case of 
avoiding non-determinism). Bergson (2005, p. 94), for instance, tries to rationalize 
why science must limit itself to a very narrow domain: “Perhaps even it is 
necessary that a theory should restrict itself exclusively to a particular point of 
view, in order to remain scientific, i.e. to give a precise direction to researches 
into detail.” These are conventional windows of periodicity, of lawfulness in the 
chaos of reality. These are disciplinary islands within the transdisciplinary ocean, 
where, as expected, methodology developed specifically for thriving on an island 
cannot guarantee survival when diving into the ocean.   
If, as Bergson’s proposed, theory of knowledge and theory of life are considered 
in essence inextricable, then the periodicity windows and the non-periodic 
rhythms of life need to be taken into account. While the living knowledge is 
imagined within this thesis to grow outside conventions and standards, there are 
quasi-periodic or perfectly ordered openings where new disciplined knowledge 
can form temporary standards and conventions. These landscapes of living 
knowledge are incessantly changing – orders emerging and disappearing into 
other kind of orders. Only ephemeral scaffolding of standards are beneficial - 
erecting a permanent structure would impede the flow of living knowledge, 
while the scaffolding is to self-organise and self-assemble with each new 
emerging order. 
Duchamp was aware of this interchanging nature of knowledge – of areas where 
intellect reigns intertwined with areas where navigation is possible only by 
117 
 
power of intuition. As was shown, the first step towards transdisciplinary 
navigation was a shift from quantitative to qualitative research method applied 
to unpredictable zones opening up in disciplinary research. Further dissolving of 
disciplinary boundaries was caused by Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré with 
questioning the extent to which concepts and categories, such as a category of 
space, of unit, of uniformity, of standard, of determinism etc., could be taken for 
granted. While Duchamp was “merely” joking about it and Bergson has only had 
an intuition of it, Poincaré has proven that there is much to be gained in 
knowledge if these categories are temporarily discarded – demonstrating how 
exploration outside categories and conventions is not only possible, but opens up 
the scope of research to a much wider zone. 
3.2. Aesthetic Anaesthesia: the method of indifference  
“My first accidental experience (that we commonly call chance) 
happened with the Three Standard Stoppages, and, as I said 
before, it was a great experience. The idea of letting a piece of 
thread fall on a canvas was accidental, but from this accident 
came a carefully planned work. Most important was accepting 
and recognizing this accidental stimulation. Many of my highly 
organized works were initially suggested by just such chance 
encounters.” Duchamp as quoted in Kuh (1962, p. 92) 
Does a discovery happen by chance or by choice, or both? This chapter begins by 
examining how “spontaneous” a scientific discovery actually is, and whether or 
not it is as effortless as a process of osmosis. Do ideas that occur by chance pass 
through a selectively permeable “sieve,” as suggests Poincaré’s introspective 
inquiry? While the second subchapter performs an “anaesthesia” on aesthetics in 
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general, as commonly referred to in art, and tries to re-awaken the authentic 
sensibility in an artist, the first subchapter discusses aesthetics as it was originally 
defined and its role in science. The sensibility common to both artist and 
scientists will be clarified by resolving the tension between seemingly opposing 
stances of Duchamp (indifference to aesthetics) and Poincaré (reliance on 
aesthetics). 
3.2.1. Chance and choice – spontaneous aesthetics of discoveryi 
Aesthetic, as such, was first defined by Alexander Baumgarten (Hammermeister, 
2002, p. 4) in his 1735 text entitled ‘Philosophical meditations on some 
requirements of the poem’.  Derived from Greek aisthetikos, meaning sensitive, 
or from aisthanesthai, to perceive, to feel, Baumgarten characterizes this new 
branch of philosophy as a theory of sensibility. Suddenly sensibility is recognised 
as a gnoseological faculty, that is, a faculty that produces a certain type of 
knowledge. Baumgarten is defending the relevance of the sensual in 
confrontation with the rational. 
Building upon the spectrum of cognition, divided by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
into obscure and clear cognition, followed by further division of clear cognition 
in the confused and the distinct, and furthermore division of the clear distinct 
cognition into adequate, and inadequate, intuitive, symbolic, etc., Baumgarten 
                                                 
i this subchapter is taken from the abridged article (Ljubec, 2012a) 
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(Hammermeister, 2002, p. 5) focuses attention on the clear and confused 
cognitive insight – at first sight a contradictory state. While obscure cognition is 
not fully conscious without concepts, Baumgarten explores within the clear 
cognition, which Leibniz otherwise classifies as conscious and conceptual, the 
element of confusion. 
In clear and distinct cognitive insight one can fragment the object of perception 
and enumerate all features, while in clear and confused cognitive insight the 
multiple features of the object cannot be separated or listed, according to Leibniz. 
The subject is aware of the complexity of the object but this awareness is not 
analytic. Rather the cognition is lively and emotionally charged. With emotions 
come the likes and dislikes, the attraction and repulsion. It is the balance between 
such involvement and indifference that we have to master, according to 
Duchamp. In order to “clarify our understanding of the word ‘art’ - to be sure, 
without any attempt at a definition,” Duchamp (1989, p. 139) states “that art may 
be bad, good or indifferent, but, whatever adjective is used, we must call it art, 
and bad art is still art in the same way that a bad emotion is still an emotion.”  
In this sense to be attracted to, repulsed or even indifferent are only three 
tendencies on a continuous scale of aesthetic sensibilities. With refinement of our 
sensibility we are accessing a wider spectrum of possible cognition – from 
obscure, intuitive and whole to rational, conceptual and fragmented. 
Baumgarten (Hammermeister, 2002, p. 6) argues that there are no direct leaps 
possible between extremities of this spectrum, that is, from obscurity to distinct 
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insight. To make a leap we always need an artefact, a work of art that functions 
as a membrane, allowing for osmosis to happen.  
It is known through his writings that Henri Poincaré observed himself very 
closely during his scientific inquiry. A discovery of a mathematical law for 
Poincaré is precisely that leap from obscurity to distinct idea through what he 
terms a “sieve,” a sort of filter, not unlike the selectively permeable membrane. 
The role of the “sieve” in the process of discovery is described in the following 
passage from Poincaré’s (Brown, et al., 1981, pp. 10-18) lecture “Mathematical 
discovery:” 
[...] mathematical work is not a simple mechanical work, [...] it is 
not merely a question of applying certain rules, of 
manufacturing as many combinations as possible according to 
certain fixed laws. The combinations so obtained would be 
extremely numerous, useless, and encumbering. The real work 
of the discoverer consists in choosing between these 
combinations with a view to eliminating those that are useless, 
or rather not giving himself the trouble of making them at all. 
The rules which must guide this choice are extremely subtle and 
delicate, and it is practically impossible to state them in precise 
language; they must be felt rather than formulated.  
Under these conditions, how can we imagine a sieve capable of 
applying them mechanically? How can we explain the fact that, 
of the thousand products of our unconscious activity, some are 
invited to cross the threshold, while others remain outside? Is it 
mere chance that gives them this privilege? Evidently not. For 
instance, of all the excitements of our senses, it is only the most 
intense that retain our attention, unless it has been directed upon 
them by other causes. More commonly the privileged 
unconscious phenomena, those that are capable of becoming 
conscious, are those which, directly or indirectly, most deeply 
affect our sensibility. 
It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in 
connexion with mathematical demonstrations, which, it would 
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seem, can only interest the intellect. But not if we bear in mind 
the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers 
and forms and of geometric elegance. It is a real aesthetic feeling 
that all true mathematicians recognize, and this is truly 
sensibility.  
Now, what are the mathematical entities to which we attribute 
this character of beauty and elegance, which are capable of 
developing in us a kind of aesthetic emotion? Those whose 
elements are harmoniously arranged so that the mind can, 
without effort, take in the whole without neglecting the details. 
This harmony is at once a satisfaction to our aesthetic 
requirements, and assistance to the mind which it supports and 
guides. 
Poincaré clearly talks of aesthetics in the way Baumgarten originally formulated 
it. It is not a mechanical procedure nor a pure rational knowledge that facilitates 
discovery, but a special sensibility that attracts the distinct from the obscurity. At 
the core of philosophy of aesthetics, whose goal is to defend the role of sensual 
experience, lies the confidence that the inability to transform an idea that is 
confused into a distinct idea should not be dismissed as a failure, on the contrary, 
it should be considered as another kind of cognitive achievement. But in this 
game of sensual, and therefore emotional involvement, the neutral involvement 
or complete indifference also plays a significant role. 
At first indifference in the sensual and emotional involvement sounds as 
contradictory as the Liebnitz’s clear and confused cognition. Indifference is 
recognised on the spectrum of aesthetic sensibility by Duchamp (1989, p. 141) in 
his lecture ‘Apropos of Readymades’, held in 1961, as a “total absence of good or 
bad taste – in fact a complete anaesthesia.”  He devotedly employed indifference 
when choosing his readymades. Why would Duchamp be aesthetically 
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indifferent, why would he be reacting only to objects that do not visually attract 
him, choosing only those to which his eye is emotionally neutral, insensible?  
One has to bear in mind that Duchamp was probably well acquainted with 
Poincaré’s introspective analysis. Duchamp’s notes include remarks on 
Poincaré’s findings and some of Poincaré’s ideas (for instance the idea of the 
sieve) are even present in Duchamp’s work. The sieve as the interface, as the 
selectively permeable membrane, is reconfigured by Duchamp: it is only to visual 
sensibility that Duchamp is indifferent to. Indifference in one sensual area 
reconfigures the interface to reality to permit other ideas to get through.  
3.2.2. Aesthetic sensibilities of a serious artist 
If de-categorization occurs within scientific disciplines a new methodology 
usually develops, on the basis of which new disciplines and categories are 
founded. In contrast to such presumably unavoidable re-categorisation this 
research relies only on ephemeral scaffolding, in order to prevent any permanent 
structure from being instituted, or methodology to become established.  Rather 
than pursuing a generalised methodology, this research is focused on specific 
and exceptional sensibilities – the unnoticed and underdeveloped ones - such as 
the vaguely defined vocation of the artist that has been generalised to the degree 
of losing relevance. 
To rediscover the role of the artist in the contemporary world, Marshall 
McLuhan’s (1994, p. 18) remarks remain of great value. McLuhan defines the 
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artist as the “expert aware of the changes in sense perception,” the one that is 
“always the first to discover how to enable one medium to use or release the 
power of another.”  McLuhan in fact continues the Ezra Pound’s recognition of 
the role of the artist as the “antennae of the race:” the artist according to McLuhan 
(1992, p. 5) is namely “constantly making raids on the inarticulate.” More 
precisely, “the artist picks up the message of cultural and technological challenge 
decades before its transforming impact occurs,” (McLuhan, 1994, p. 65) or, in 
other words, the artist is “always the first to discover how to enable one medium 
to use or to release the power of another” (McLuhan, 1994, p. 54). 
McLuhan’s spotlight on sensibility returns, or better, refuels art with the original 
scope of aesthetics defined by Alexander Baumgarten (Hammermeister, 2002, p. 
5), as a theory of sensibility, where sensibility, functioning as a gnoseological 
faculty, produces a certain type of knowledge. Baumgarten is defending the 
relevance of sensual in confrontation with the rational. That rational science 
depends on the sensual is confirmed by scientists themselves, as has been shown, 
Henri Poincaré reveals the role of aestheticsi in mathematical discovery. 
The constrictions of the category of art were, most of all, challenging for artists. 
Marcel Duchamp would confront territories beyond art, not only those opposing 
art, or anti-art, but also those indifferent to art, or simply anartii. The artist for 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.2.1. for more on the role of aesthetics in mathematical discovery 
ii see appendix A for more on the difference between art, anart and anti-art 
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Duchamp (1983, p. 138) would become a “mediumistic being” not to be 
considered independently but in a process of creative act that includes the 
spectator. The phenomenon of being “mediumistic” is further explored and 
expanded on in this thesis, beginning with the ecological relationship of the artist 
to the medium.   
James Gibson’s (1986, p. 8) observation of mutual dependency between the 
animal and its medium, made him rethink the entire approach to the perception 
faculty in the animal.  The same precautions were taken approaching art in this 
research: exploration of the specific sensibilities of the artist has led to 
considering the artist as a being able to trespass from one medium to another as 
soon as it senses the change in the rate of flow. Animals, whose technology has 
been evolved for the primary medium, but are resilient enough to journey into 
the adjacent medium are termed amphibians. Artists, sensible to any new 
emerging media, would therefore be tempted to trespass through a multiplicity 
of media and should therefore be termed polyphibians. 
The equilibrium state for a polyphibian is “with one foot in an unknown 
territory,” always trespassing and breaking through the interfaces that separate 
adjacent media. Sometimes the traces of the breakthrough that the polyphibian 
leaves behind on the interface are categorised as art. These are nothing but traces 
- not to be mistaken for representations of a system. These traces are merely the 
consequence of the raw matter on the periphery of the existent medium being 
modified under the peculiar rules of the next medium.  
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Marcel Duchamp’s readymadesi are an example of such conflicting situation 
connecting opposing systems. The readymade is the raw matter modified under 
alien conditions where the awareness of the artist and that of the spectator meet. 
It is important to note that this awareness is not necessarily visual. Duchamp was 
not only avoiding the visual representation - as a member of a predominantly 
visual culture he trespassed beyond the limitations of the retina by engaging in 
“non-retinal” art. Throughout this thesis the inconveniences of the visual 
medium are brought forth as encountered in the western culture, where the 
visible was raised to almost legislative role and the invisible was almost ignored. 
In the context of transdisciplinarity, the dependency between the animal and the 
medium is further examined in order to understand how to set free a disciplinary 
researcher from constrains of her or his discipline, for instance, how to liberate a 
visual artist from constrains of the visual medium. The innate sensitivity of the 
artist is to be awaken and applied to transdisciplinary research methodology. The 
arguments are derived from J. J. Gibson’s consideration in the field of visual 
perception. According to Gibson (1986, p. 16) the animal implies the 
environment, just as the environment implies the animal. Their interdependence 
is implicit in their structure, but this structure, as Gibson argues, is not effectively 
described by physical sciences in terms of basic mathematical concepts such as 
space, time, matter and energy. The physical reality without life does not yet 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.3.3. for more on readymades  
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constitute the environment. Gibson therefore decides to rethink this 
interdependency in a more adequate terminology comprising media, substances 
and surfaces rather than abstract planes and spaces.i 
In order to comprehend the trespassing from one medium to another, a more 
profound understanding of media is needed. The role of sensibility and 
indifference in trespassing is made clearer by McLuhan who introduces the laws 
of media through the familiar notions of figure and ground. While figure is the 
area of attention, ground is the area of inattention or indifference. Ground, for 
McLuhan (1992, p. 5), is “con-figurational” – all figures are present at once – 
making it difficult to discern: 
The study of ground “on its own terms” is virtually impossible; 
by definition it is at any moment environmental and subliminal. 
The only possible strategy for such study entails constructing an 
anti-environment: such is the normal activity of the artist; the 
only person in our culture whose whole business has been the 
retraining and updating of sensibility. […] Once the old ground 
becomes content of a new situation it appears to ordinary 
attention as aesthetic figure […] The business of the artist has 
been to report on the current status of ground by exploring those 
forms of sensibility made available by each new mode of culture 
long before the average man suspects that anything has changed. 
(McLuhan & McLuhan, 1992, p. 5) 
This approach is reminiscent of Bergson’s quest for the science of intuition as 
complementary to the science of intellect. Instead of formulating the problem 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.1. for more on Gibson’s terminology that describes the interdependency of the 
animal and its environment  
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within the known theoretical context, the science of intuitive sensibility would 
take the problem outside the context, into its anti-environment, not subjecting it 
to laws, but treating it as exception, studying the relations within specified area, 
with methodology that is officially recognised only by ‘pataphysics. 
Contemplating on findings of the twentieth century physics and the 
independently evolved metaphysics of that time, McLuhan (1992, p. 55) quotes 
quantum physicist de Broglie: “If Bergson could have studied quantum theory in 
detail he would have observed that in the image of the evolution of the physical 
world which it offers us, at each instant nature is described as if hesitating 
between a multiplicity of possibilities, and he could doubtless have repeated as 
in The Creative Mind that time is this very hesitation or it’s nothing’.” 
To continue de Broglie’s line of thought, McLuhan (1992, p. 56) adds: “Quantum 
theory also seemed to de Broglie to have confirmed Bergson’s insight that reality 
was characterized by interpenetration, by fusion of its components, 
individualities such as atoms or sensations.”  In de Broglie’s words, quantum 
mechanics has given up individualising particles, distancing itself from the most 
convenient and trivial modes of fragmentation, recognising the infinitely 
intricate articulation of reality.  
To escape the entrapment of classical researcher’s perspective from a fixed 
viewpoint McLuhan adopted a more fluid model of a non-reductionist research 
with multiple points of view. This approach, termed mosaic, was introduced by 
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Nobel laureate Georg von Békésyi (1960), in order to contrast the notion of 
perspective.  The dynamic advantage of a mosaic lies in its two-dimensionality, 
where the viewpoints are floating, as opposed to the inert perspective, with a 
fixed viewpoint that McLuhan (1962, p. 15) condemns as a “three-dimensional 
anguish.” Namely, “in extreme contrast to ‘point of view’, which assumes a fixed 
position from which to examine each situation and to assert one’s preference,” 
McLuhan poses the mosaic which requires “constant readjustment to our 
surroundings.” In other words, McLuhan (1992, p. 63) concludes:  
Ground cannot be dealt with conceptually or abstractly: it is 
ceaselessly changing, dynamic, discontinuous and 
heterogeneous, a mosaic of intervals and contours. As von 
Bekesy discovered, the appropriate form of awareness is 
acoustic-tactile-kinetic and alive to the stress and coercion that 
each exerts on the other.  
The multi-sensuous awareness due to the interplay among the figures of the flat 
ground is a prerequisite for the transdisciplinary inquiry, as proposed in this 
research project.  The configuration implies hesitation between multiple models 
and possible modes of comprehension. McLuhan (1962, p. 31) observes: “the 
method of the twentieth century is to use not single but multiple models for 
                                                 
i Georg von Békésy, while researching the auditory spaces, writes about the metaphor of mosaic 
in his essay ‘Experiments in Hearing’ as that flat field that contains multidimensional spaces 
coming into resonance. With McLuhan’s comparison of electric culture to the acoustic tribal 
culture (the acoustic space is to return and overshadow the visual space), it is not surprising that 
McLuhan found this model, derived from research on auditory perception, relevant. The acoustic 
information does not come from one fixed perspectival point, rather, many points come together 
to form a mosaic. 
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experimental exploration - the technique of the suspended judgment.” 
Suspended judgementi provides delay or distance required – the interval in 
which dichotomies can coexist and interpenetrate. Hesitation to individualise 
allows for osmosis or interpenetration in the interval of multiplicities. 
New questions arise with the new mosaic approach. How do figure and ground 
interpenetrate in the mosaic model? How are the animal and the medium it 
animates distinguished in the mosaic? How is the sensibility of the artist to the 
medium to be understood according to the mosaic model? In an attempt to 
answer such questions a return to Gibson’s approach to perception is necessary. 
If the shift from the model of perspective to mosaic model resulted from Georg 
von Békésy comparison of visual and acoustic perception, Gibson’s (1983, p. 319) 
approach to perceptual systems opens up even wider possibilities: 
When the senses are considered as perceptual systems all 
theories of perception become at one stroke unnecessary. It is no 
longer a question of how the mind operates on the deliverances 
of sense, or how past experience can organise the data, or even 
how the brain can process the inputs from the nerves, but simply 
how information is picked up.  
Gibson transfers the emphasis from the sense organs to a wider perceptual 
system that is in tune with the ecosystem and therefore eliminates the need to 
investigate how information reaches the specific sense, or in terms of 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. for more on the interval of suspended judgement 
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polyphibianism, how knowledge is accessed and processed by organs of 
knowledge. The sensibility of the artist relies on tuning into the system, where 
the information is, according to Gibson (1983, p. 319), recognised by a sort of 
resonance: “Active perceptual systems as contrasted with passive receptors have 
so developed during evolution that they can resonate to this information.” 
The remaining question for Gibson (1983, p. 319) is how the information 
articulates itself. The animal or the artist, for that matter, does not work directly 
with physical quantities – its sensibilities recognise the invariants and 
relationship to variables of the system: “This stimulus information is available in 
the everyday environment. The individual does not have to construct an 
awareness of the world from bare intensities and frequencies of energy; he has to 
detect the world from invariant properties in the flux of energy.” Gibson (1983, 
p. 320) disposes of the classical notion of sense organs, the obsolete categorisation 
of senses:  
When it is recognised that receptors, nerve boundless, and the 
corresponding modalities of sensory experience do not provide 
a fixed number of senses or permit a fixed inventory of sense 
impressions, we are free to study the redundant overlapping 
activity of perceptual systems unhindered by the old doctrines. 
This freedom is granted to McLuhan in transition from the visually dominated 
culture to a culture that due to advent of electric media becomes again an 
orchestration of all senses, where original sense organs are complemented with 
interpenetration of newly invented organs of knowing. Gibson (1983, p. 319) 
furthermore decentralises the perception system by discrediting the brain as the 
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central organ, rather, in accordance with McLuhan’s idea of an overwhelming, 
omnipresent environment of electronic media, the perceiver is positioned within 
the environment as a perception system co-perceiving itself.  
The observer and the observed are in relation of introspection, interpenetrating 
each other. The polyphibian is part of polyphibianism, the organism of living 
knowledge, therefore it co-knows itself. In terms of transdisciplinarity, the 
information is articulated in various forms that resonate with various organs of 
knowing. The movement of polyphibianism through protoplasmagora tunes the 
mutations of polyphibic organs – the organs are invented by fine tuning to the 
protoplasmic environment. 
The transition from perceiving in perspective mode to perceiving in mosaic mode 
is better understood when taking in consideration Gibson’s (1986, p. 212)  
explanation of the scanning movement of the eye: “just as there is no pure 
fixation, there is also no pure movement. There are postures of the eyes that are 
relatively stable and movements of the eyes from one such posture to another, 
but they grade into each other. Moving and fixating are complementary. They 
combine in the act of scanning.” From this “mosaic perception” Gibson (1986, p. 
213)  infers thought-provoking facts about attention and awareness:  
It is also a fallacy, if a little more plausible, to assume that a series 
of fixations is a series of acts of selective attention to the different 
objects in the world. Each fixation would then be a centering of 
foveal attention on one object to the exclusion of another. Each 
saccade must then be a movement of attention from one object 
to another. But the truth is that attention is not only selective, it 
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is also integrative. Attention can be distributed as well as being 
concentrated.  
If the attention of the serious artist is to be distributed over the entire 
environment and at the same time concentrated, the point of view of an 
individual artist must divide into multiple points of being. The coherence of these 
points of being constitutes a polyphibian - a mode of being that resolves the 
dichotomy between selective separation and integration of knowledge. This 
mode implies arising of polyphibic awareness of interpenetrating heterogeneous 
reality that cannot be conveniently homogenised. Gibson (1986, p. 213)  
continues:     
The awareness of the details is not inconsistent with the 
awareness of the whole. Each in fact implies the other. One can 
perfectly well pay attention to some aspect of the environment 
that extends over a large angle of ambient array, such as the 
gradient of the ground that goes all the way from one’s feet out 
to the horizon. Hence a whole series of fixations can be a single 
act of attention. 
The mosaic mode, as elaborated by McLuhan, is exactly one single act of attention 
arising from scanning and shifting viewpoints, that is, attention of a floating 
viewpoint. The series of fixations in polyphibianism does not compromise the 
wholeness of the organism of living knowledge, since, as Gibson explained, there 
is “no pure fixation,” and there is also “no pure movement” – polyphibianism as 
evolutionary movement is a series of organ mutations. The rhythm of this single 
act of attention with its intervals of shifting is crucial in inventing organs of 
knowing in resonance with the whole movement of the living knowledge.  
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A specialist within a discipline with all the appertaining instruments and 
expertise forms a monophibic organ of knowing. Once these organs become 
aware of each other they can self-organise in a polyphibic organism that solves 
the problems on transdisciplinary level of knowledge organisation. If new 
disciplines were to be established at this point, they would be of a higher order 
than the disciplines of monophibians, and yet they are never established, never 
fixed. Due to complexity and uniqueness of polyphibic problem-solutions there 
is no stability to constitute a methodological tradition of a discipline - the habits 
break as soon as the problem is experienced from a different point of being. In 
terms of Gibson, evolution of transdisciplinarity is a polyphibic “act of scanning,” 
an unlimited movement of knowledge with “no pure fixation,” categorisation or 
conceptualisation. 
A monophibian that awakened its sensitivity of the “serious artist” through 
introspection, that is, by inspection of environment through itself, “senses the 
changes in the rate of perception.” A solution, an intellectual instrument that has 
overgrown its confined applicability, is beginning to influence and interpenetrate 
foreign domains. In the contact with other media the intellectual mechanism 
bursts in laughter into a multiplicity of fragments that spontaneously articulate 
and self-organise organs of knowing.  
While the neighbouring monophibians, caught in their habitual operability, not 
noticing these changes in the medium, simply continue their quest under the old 
rules, the monophibian that transcended into a polyphibian develops new ways 
134 
 
of operating and navigating the new medium. The medium is not necessarily a 
realised technology - it suffices to be merely a potential, imaginary technology in 
the minds of several human beings that changes the course of action in a 
standardised research methodology.  
The new born polyphibians meeting for the first time in the protoplasmagora, 
meet not in person but introspectively, intra-personally, collaborating 
inadvertently. This collaboration is not a teamwork of a few individuals but of 
dispersed dividuals. There is no indirect communication but immediately shared 
instinct and intuition. If individuation of human beings into individuals is 
nothing but evolutionary stratification - all the individual strata come from the 
same origin and share the same instincts - these need to be awaken into intuition 
in a multitude of dispersed dividuals that recognise their organs emphatically. 
No organs of knowing belong to a foreign body. 
3.3. Inventing concepts – conceiving organisms  
3.3.1. Bergson, Bergsonism, Polyphibianism 
My way of getting out of it at that time, was, I really think, to 
conceive of the history of philosophy as a kind of buggery or, 
what comes to the same thing immaculate conception. I 
imagined myself getting onto the back of an author, and giving 
him a child, which would be his and which would at the same 
time be a monster. It is very important that it should be his child, 
because the author actually had to say everything that I made 
him say. But it also had to be a monster because it was necessary 
to go through all kinds of decenterings, slips, breakings, secret 
emissions, which I really enjoyed. My book on Bergson seems to 
me a classic case of this. (Deleuze, 1991, p. 8) 
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From his letter to Michel Cressole it is already clear that Deleuze was more than 
a commentator to Bergson: he not only revived Bergson’s philosophy - from 
Bergson Bergsonism was born as a mutated species. This procedure will be 
reiterated throughout this thesis especially through participation in Creative Act 
and Creative Evolutioni, with polyphibianism being born out of Bergson as a next 
generation of Bergsonism. The growth of polyphibianism out of Bergson is, in 
accordance with Bergsonism, gradual - but then, suddenly, it makes a leap. 
With Bergsonism intuition becomes a method - a method of precisionii (Deleuze, 
1991, p. 13). By attributing precision to intuitive method and practicing it as 
equivalent to any intellectual method in its scope, knowledge outside the reach 
of the intellectual disciplinary science becomes relevant and accessible to a 
different kind of science, a science based on intuition, as often proposed by 
Bergson, accepting the possibility that there are other ways of gaining accurate 
knowledge. But how is precision to be achieved beyond the constraints of a 
scientific discipline?  
Taking Bergson’s advice to state the problems accurately, just as life does, 
Deleuze (1991, p. 16), in a sense, introduces a proto-method of a living 
knowledge: “Life is essentially determined in the act of avoiding obstacles, 
stating and solving a problem. The construction of the organism is both the 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.1. where Bergson’s seminal work Creative Evolution is elaborated upon 
ii see chapter 2.2. for more on the changing notion of precision in transdisciplinarity 
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stating of a problem and a solution.” Achieving precision within 
transdisciplinary zone, where intellect mutates aided and guided by intuition, 
requires reversal and deviation from the predetermined methods of intellectual 
reasoning that ensure precision within scientific disciplines. In contrast to 
disciplinary approach transdisciplinarity solves problems outside domains of 
concepts or precepts, it is stating a problem as an organism: it is living the 
knowledge. 
The most indispensable critique offered by Bergson in this regard is, according 
to Deleuze (1991, p. 18), the “critique of the negative and negation in all its forms 
as sources of false problems.” Deleuze (1991, p. 19) recounts the two examples of 
the false problems encountered by Bergson: that of non-being and that of dis-
order: “The idea of disorder appears when instead of seeing that there are two or 
more irreducible orders (for example that of life and that of mechanism each 
present when the other is absent), we retain only a general idea of order that we 
confine ourselves to opposing to disorder.” The same goes with the “being in 
general […] which can only be opposed to nothingness” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 18). 
Another example of a false problem, pertinent to this thesis, is the problem of 
crossing disciplinary boundaries. Since disciplinary research has been proven 
successful in production of knowledge, there is a fear of knowledge produced 
without such discipline. Transdisciplinarity, although always welcomed in 
theory, is negated the possibility to access knowledge in practice – what is 
practiced are only forms of disciplinary exchanges (interdisciplinarity, 
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multidisciplinarity, etc.). Referring to the previous example - transdisciplinarity 
is considered disorderly because it does not fit the disciplinary order,  in other 
words, knowledge that was not orderly institutionalized, cannot count as 
knowledge. From such questionable reasoning follows: if knowledge is a 
disciplinary domain, there cannot be any knowledge that is not already, at least 
potentially, accommodated by scientific disciplines.  
Rhizome, as proposed by Deleuze, is a convenient first aid in realizing the 
transdisciplinary potential: transdisciplinarity feeds on the roots of trees of 
knowledge rhizomatically, growing smaller refined networks to feed other trees 
and connecting them underground. Transdisciplinarity is essentially an 
underground activity that invents a rhizomatic organism as a response to the 
problem of efficiently supplying the tree of knowledge.  But the evolution of 
transdisciplinarity does not end at one such imaginary organism – this thesis 
proposes ceaselessly evolving organism-solution termed polyphibian, while the 
impetus or the movement of this evolution is termed polyphibianism. 
The example of order / dis-order, provided by Bergson as a false dichotomy, as 
a deceitfully stated problem, demonstrates how to restating problems with more 
precision generates instruments leading to solutions: therefore polyphibianism, 
as a solution, must be born out of a precisely stated problem. Here the ability of 
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Bergson to anticipate the subtle chaotic structuresi becomes even clearer – 
Bergson accurately intuits orderly substructures intertwined in the overall 
chaotic structure that could be mistaken as lacking in order. Polyphibian must be 
created so as to be aware of a phenomenon through all possible orders - 
polyphibian is a protoplasmic vessel invented to accommodate knowledge not 
only of any order, but of intertwining orders. 
This thesis applied the method of imagining the organism-solution not only to 
transdisciplinarity in general, but to a particular case of disciplinary “collision” 
between art and science. The new program Collide@CERN, introduced in 2012 
by Ars Electronica in partnership with CERN, was chosen as a test bed for 
plasticity of art-science collaborations, by testing the stretch in imagination that 
AEC-CERN partnership would tolerate.ii For this purpose the project ASCO2.T 
AT.LAST was proposed where ASCO2.T is an organic solution to a technical 
problem. Instead of the intellectually programed existing apparatus ASCOT this 
project suggested the use of intuitive and precise cyborganic ASCO2.T apparatus. 
With precision matching and even slightly surpassing that of intellect the 
threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics has been located. Over that 
threshold ‘pataphysics, as science of exceptions, differentiates in kind rather than 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.1.1. for more on anticipation of chaos theory in physics and metaphysics  
ii see more in chapter 4.2.3. 
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to a degree. Therefore it cannot mislead us to false problems that are, according 
to Bergson, a consequence of differentiation in degree. 
Bergson imputes the tendency to recognise only the differences in degree and not 
the differences in kind to mechanical thinking, whereas Deleuze (1991, p. 24) 
expounds on linearity of such thinking that is not limited only to mechanic but 
spreads in the organic domain, by criticising how it: “postulates a unilinear 
evolution and takes us from one living organization to another by simple 
intermediaries.” Unilinear evolutionary changes are changes confined to one 
dimension – therefore to differences in degree. It is only in nonlinear thinking 
that sudden shifts in kind are possible. A complex system has the potential of 
abrupt changes, of leaps over different order, when crossing a critical point.  
In a reductionist monophibic science that is uniformly fragmenting systems a 
multiplicity of interpenetrating phenomena can be mistaken for a single 
homogeneous phenomenon. Even if the same phenomenon is given several 
different names, by monophibic habit the phenomenon is not grasped in all its 
heterogeneity, but switching between its appearances - one aspect at a time. To 
live the knowledge in all its complexity one must transcend the current human 
condition and invent polyphibic organs of knowing. Bergson uses notion of 
duration to introduce the potential of intuition that opens up human awareness 
to the uncompromised complexity:  
Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly 
human wisdom and equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up 
to the inhuman and the superhuman (durations which are 
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inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human 
condition: This is the meaning of philosophy, in so far as our 
condition condemns us to live among badly analyzed 
composites, and to be badly analyzed composites ourselves. 
(Deleuze, 1991, p. 28)  
For Bergson it is only by intuition that this is possible. Intellectual activities, the 
action driven intellect must be halted, the judgement suspended. For this reason 
and for the purposes of this thesis the Interval of Suspended Judgementi, has 
been established in the specific context of ASCO2.T AT.LAST intervention at the 
precise location of the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics. Within this 
interval the knowledge is not to be collected, comprehended, conceptualized, 
categorized and archived, rather, these activities are to be suspended and the 
polyphibian is to be born anew, growing new organs of knowing. Similar 
avoidance of conceptualisation and other intellectual activities appertain to 
Bergson and Bergsonism: 
But this broadening out, or even this going-beyond does not 
consist in going beyond experience toward concepts. For 
concepts only define […] the conditions of all possible 
experience in general. Here, on the other hand, it is a case of real 
experience in all its peculiarities. (Deleuze, 1991, p. 28) 
With linear habits of mind that McLuhan would attribute to the visual culture, 
conditioned by invention of print, linear narratives and linear perspective, the 
awareness of change itself succumbs to linearity – differentiation is only 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. for more on Interval of Suspended Judgement  
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comprehended as a linear gradation of differences in degree. With the advent of 
electric – acoustic culture that according to McLuhan (1994) obscured the visual 
culture, the fixed point-of-view, necessary in perspective, becomes obsolete and 
is replaced, as suggested by McLuhan’s scholar Derrick de Kerckhove (1997), 
with the point-of-beingi. Living knowledge arises from coherent awareness of 
multiple points of being. Instead of one dimensional, monophibic, fixed and 
sequenced external observations, the polyphibic awareness imagined in this 
thesis emerges from the fluidity of internal multiplicity.  
For Deleuze (1991, p. 39), the “word multiplicity is fundamental in terms of the 
construction of the method.” As was shown with the comparison between the 
point of view and the point of being, it is not enough to collect and concatenate 
multiple elements. The linear, numerical multiplicity with its own fixed metric 
based on the number of elements it contains, is already actual, Deleuze explains, 
while a virtual multiplicity can be only found in duration. This virtuality ensures 
that changes are not conceivable beforehand, on the linear, numerical scale, but 
rather, with each division in this virtual multiplicity, there is a change in kind. In 
contrast to the actual multiplicity, the virtual multiplicity can only be defined 
through the difference in kind. 
                                                 
i see appendix A for more on “point of being,” a term introduced by Derrick de Kerckhove (1997, 
p. 187)  
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Transdisciplinarity is such multiplicity – it evolves by differentiation, by 
divisions that change it in kind. The individual participants in transdisciplinarity 
are divided and dispersed only to be self-organised in polyphibic organs of 
knowledge. Just as for the landscape of a complex system the strategy for getting 
to the highest peak is impossible to devise as soon as multiple agents interact 
with the landscape, so in transdisciplinarity every agent becomes an active 
ingredient of the landscape, changing the landscape ceaselessly. The 
transdisciplinary landscape becomes self-aware from every point of being of each 
agent. The landscape reacts upon itself by reacting on those points of being, by 
further differentiating, dividing the individuals into different species, a different 
kind. 
[…] duration was not simply the indivisible, nor was it the 
nonmeasurable. Rather, it was that which divided only by 
changing in kind, that which was susceptible to measurement 
only by varying its metrical principle at each stage of the 
division. […] the multiplicity proper to duration had, for its part, 
a “precision” as great as that of science. (Deleuze, 1991, p. 40) 
The precision that this thesis proposes for transdisciplinarity is inherent in any 
complex system – at any scale of organisation there is a precise critical point at 
which a new kind of order emerges in the system. Transdisciplinarity, as it 
evolves, becomes self-aware of its critical points – it can divide its knowledge 
according to this critical articulation. Lack of such self-awareness of criticalities 
in disciplinary science results in arbitrary fragmentation, homogenising of 
differences in kind into differences in degree. Transdisciplinarity, on the other 
hand, knows its critical points, knows when it will change in kind, mutate, 
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become newborn. For transdisciplinarity it matters where and how precisely it is 
divided and cut - with each cut transdisciplinary knowledge begins a new kind 
of life. 
While disciplinary research prides itself in applying high standards of objectivity, 
there is much to be gained from subjectivity in transdisciplinarity. Subjective, 
lived experiences of a phenomena differ in kind, they are in essence irreducible, 
incomparable. Objective experience can be repeated many times, reinterpreted in 
many ways, but interpretations can only differ in degree if the objectivity is to 
remain intact. In Bergson’s terms (1910, p. 83), objective is applied to “what is 
known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions 
could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it,” implying a certain 
redundancy and stagnation. Furthermore Bergson finds the subjective in “what 
seems to be completely and adequately known,” confirming the wholeness of the 
lived knowledge. 
Polyphibianism can be imagined as a bifurcation diagram of an evolutionary 
movement – a diagram of a precise bifurcating cut, of critical differentiation of 
the organism of the living knowledge into different kind of evolutionary 
trajectories. At each cut a new organism is born, a new life-form of knowledge 
emerges. This movement is obstructed by conceptualisation and yet it is by this 
very movement that concepts entangled into dichotomies can be resolved, that 
is, through polyphibianism dysfunctional, dead concepts are accurately 
disentangled into a multiplicity to be lived. “A multiplicity of this kind has 
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essentially the three properties of continuity, heterogeneity, and simplicity,” says 
Deleuze (1991, p. 43), adding that “the concrete will never be attained by 
combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its opposite. 
The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another 
generality” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 44). 
A concept is invented as an instrument that will overcome the limitations of the 
user, a tool that will enable the user to build even better tools. But an innocent 
temporary invention, a heuristic method, can soon be heavily relied upon, 
making users dependent of their habits. At the moment the invention begins to 
control the user and not the other way around, it changes in kind. Such change 
in kind comes as no surprise to Bergson (1992, p. 155), who distinguishes in an 
intellectually conceived apparatus a heterogeneity of kinds. Intellect, on the 
contrary to instinct, devises tools open to general problems. While an insect, for 
instance, creates a tool instinctively for a specific task, perfectly adapting and 
confining the tool to that task, intellect builds in the freedom to improve the 
instrument with every new challenge, adapting itself to an ever more general 
problem. 
Considering these changes in the apparatus, the different kinds implied within 
one system become apparent to the monophibian only when they are actualized. 
Namely, to recognise the potential of the virtually heterogeneous composite of 
different kinds, a polyphibic awareness is required. The process of actualising is 
sequencing one kind after another, blending them on a linear scale so as to forge 
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a mere difference in degree. While the plurality of such potentiality resonates 
with polyphibic awareness, the actual and the drive to actualise events in a 
sequence is essentially a monophibic tendency.  
To resist a tool one has to ceaselessly create new tools: tools not devised in 
accordance with a rule but in search for an exception to the rule. One must avoid 
forming habits and applying the same tool to different situations. Although the 
openness of intellectual invention is inspiring, it is the generalization that is the 
drive behind such inventions. This thesis imagines obtaining the same kind of 
intellectual openness in inventions combined with its instinctive specificity.  
Organisms instinctively invent and use organs for exceptional tasks – every 
organ is a solution to a specific problem. Could an imaginary organism of living 
knowledge ceaselessly create new organs for every new problem in order to 
know the unique, unrepeatable, and irreducible, rather than to know in general? 
A composite analysed by method of Bergsonism is split by a precise cut at the 
critical threshold between two different kinds only to be synthesised “at a turn 
in experience” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 93), converging again, but elsewhere, in 
something else. This movement of analysis-synthesis and diverging-converging 
between plurality and singularity, heterogeneity and simplicity, is the 
prerequisite for transformation from monophibian to polyphibian: the indivisible 
individual is divided into a coherent multiplicity that at a critical point forms a 
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new individuality. As proposed beforei, this diverging-converging method is 
currently best explained diagrammatically – as a state space diagram of a 
complex structure. 
To sum up the discussion on the method of intuition, Deleuze (1991, p. 94) finds 
life to be Bergson’s all-encompassing analogy and therefore tries to compare life 
to duration and differentiation: “it is as if life were merged into the very 
movement of differentiation.” Knowing by intuition is intuitively differentiating 
within heterogeneity, finding differences in kind between intertwined 
phenomena. The theory of knowledge and the theory of evolution, as Bergson 
proposedii, can converge within the movement of differentiation. Likewise, as 
argued in this thesis, the evolution of transdisciplinarity into an imaginary 
organism of living knowledge gets its impetus from this same movement:  
What does Bergson mean when he talks about élan vital? It is 
always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, a 
simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the 
process of dividing up: Proceeding “by dissociation and 
division,” by “dichotomy,” is the essence of life. (Deleuze, 1991, 
p. 94) 
Following Bergson (2005, p. xxiii)  in his attempt to establish a relationship 
between the theory of evolution and theory of life, this thesis suggests: if life, that 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.1.1. where diagrams of chaos are applied to Bergson’s concepts of duration, 
interpenetration, etc.  
ii see chapter 4.1.3. where Bergson’s thesis on inseparability of theory of knowledge and theory 
of evolution is explained  
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is, evolution of life-forms, proceeds by “dissociation,” “division,” and 
“dichotomy,” so should the evolution of forms of knowledge. With explorations 
of the potential evolution of transdisciplinarity it became clear that dichotomies 
arising in disciplinary research are the very point of departure in the 
transdisciplinary zone. In Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, as noted beforei, 
Nicolescu (2002) shows a possible way in which transdisciplinarity could resolve 
a dichotomy by opening up new levels of reality. Just as Bergson after dissecting 
something in analysis proposes synthesis somewhere else into something else, so 
Nicolescu relying on Lupasco’s logic of the included middle, proposes resolution 
or synthesis on another level, different from the level of analysis.   
 
The entanglement of complementary yet incompatible tendencies in a dichotomy 
can be grasped in a complex cut separating the tendencies that grew infinitely 
close together without intersecting each other. This differentiation by precise 
intuitive cut, as Deleuze could name Bergson’s method, does not only coincide 
with direction of transdisciplinary methodology: far from being merely 
Bergson’s metaphysical whim, it is applied, as will be shown, also by Duchamp, 
as well as Poincaré, in their physical or ‘pataphysical inquiries. Duchamp, 
fascinated by all sorts of cuts in modern science, encountered in technology of x-
rays as cuts, in theory of electromagnetism, in theory of higher dimensions where 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.2. for more on the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity 
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cut gains a topological notion, etc., was “following Poincaré’s definition of an n-
dimensional continuum as that which can be cut completely by a continuum of 
n-1 dimensions” (Henderson, 2005, p. 83). Duchamp even invents a very subtle 
notion of infrathin cut (Duchamp, 1983).  
By rewriting Bergson in his own creative act, Deleuze brings Bergson closer to 
the pertinent needs of transdisciplinarity. This can be observed by comparing 
Deleuze’s Bergsonism and Nicolescu’s Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity: both 
resolve dichotomous tensions, caused by intellectual reasoning, on different 
planes. These planes or levels of reality are part of “Open Unity” or “Whole” and 
both authors envisage how human condition could be transcended. Just as was 
shown beforei, it is the chaotic complex structure, anticipated by Bergson and 
diagrammed by Deleuze, that plays a role in Nicolescu’s fundamental relation 
between science of complexity and transdisciplinarity. To summarize in 
Deleuze’s words:  
Man therefore creates a differentiation that is valid for the 
Whole, and he alone traces out an open direction that is able to 
express a whole that is itself open. Whereas the other directions 
are closed and go round in circles, whereas a distinct “plane” of 
nature corresponds to each one, man is capable of scrambling the 
planes, of going beyond his own plane as his own condition, in 
order finally to express naturing Nature. (Deleuze, 1991, p. 107) 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.1.1. 
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3.3.2. Bergson – McLuhan: sample pseudo organism 
Transdisciplinarity, as proposed by Nicolescu (2002), resolves a given dichotomy 
on separate levels of reality – with every level bringing about both resolution of 
the old dichotomy, from the old level, and eventually the emergence of a new 
dichotomy, resolvable only on the next new level. Evolution of 
transdisciplinarity into polyphibianism offers instead a resolution of tension 
through metabolism, resulting in formation of organs of knowing and 
knowledge by-products. Wherever a tension arises, metabolic processes tear 
apart and stratify the existing knowledge enabling unexpected new ways of 
knowing.  
For instance, reading separately the writings of authors as independent as 
Bergson and McLuhan (independent to a degree that there is no direct influence 
on one another), one in general notices neither a strongly manifested support nor 
opposition between their lines of thought. Yet, one might accidentally come 
across a notion used by both authors – the notion of vision and the visual – that 
is inadvertently explained in opposing terms while they are both trying to 
explain analogous opinion. At this point one could either dismiss this accidental 
discovery or examine it further, digest it and inspect its by-products.  
Having difficulties in finding a correspondence between visual and tactile 
faculties Bergson (2007, p. 66) asks: “how could there be anything common, in 
the matter of quality, between an elementary visual sensation and a tactile 
sensation, since they belong to two different genera?” To ruminate on relation of 
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both senses, one would need to introduce a new order: “so we are now obliged 
to suppose, over and above visual sensations, over and above tactile sensations, 
a certain order which is common to both, and which consequently must be 
independent of either.” Considering the visual and tactile senses as of different 
kind, Bergson compares them to instinct and intellect respectively. Instinct and 
intellect are according to Bergson (2005, pp. 184, 185) just as incomparable:    
The reason is that instinct and intelligence are two divergent 
developments of one and the same principle, which in the one 
case remains within itself, in the other steps out of itself and 
becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert matter. This gradual 
divergence testifies to a radical incompatibility, and points to the 
fact that it is impossible for intelligence to re-absorb instinct. 
That which is instinctive in instinct cannot be expressed in terms 
of intelligence, nor, consequently, can it be analysed. 
While touching depends on continuous contact, uninterrupted immediate 
proximity with the object, seeing, for Bergson (2005, p. 185), is knowing at a 
distance or “the possibility of perceiving a distant object without first perceiving 
all the objects in between.” According to Bergson (2005, p. 191), instinct employs 
sympathy that works remotely as well - from his understanding,i insects, for 
instance, accurately empathise with their prey by knowing precisely their inner 
workings, instinctively recognising their weaknesses at a distance, from their 
own point of being.  
                                                 
i Bergson (2005, pp. 190, 191) often cites examples of instinct in insects. Whether or not his 
interpretations of the scientific findings of that time are still valid, is not important for 
development of the argument in this chapter.   
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Bergson (2005, p. 185) therefore concludes that like vision “instinct also is a 
knowledge at a distance” - both faculties enable focus on a specific distant object 
that the observer is not locally connected to. Intellectual endeavours for which 
Bergson (2005, p. 185) finds analogy in touch are on the contrary aiming towards 
continuity, towards local causality: “the function of science is just to express all 
perceptions in terms of touch.” To make precisely the same point in regards to 
science, that is to critique its dependence on continuity, McLuhan (Picnic in 
Space, 1967) on the other hand compares intelligence to vision:  
If you can do it again then you’ve got a proof - scientific proof - 
can you do it again - that is visual space - anything that can be 
exactly repeatable is visual. As science gets more sophisticated it 
realizes that all experiments are subtly non-repetitive, and that 
repetition is not a proof, and no two experiments are ever alike, 
and visual space, in fact, has disappeared from science.i 
Namely, while both Bergson and McLuhan would agree on the basic intellectual 
tendency to ensure continuity, McLuhan in contrast ascribes the preference for 
continuous, sequential, linear, homogeneous and static to visual culture of the 
rational, intellectual, literate society, whereas the culture that relies more on the 
acoustic – kinetic – tactile  senses operates instinctively and irrationally, forming 
a tribal society. Despite seemingly opposing cross references between visual and 
tactile vs. intellectual and instinctive, there is no fundamental disagreement 
                                                 
i see also chapter 2.2. 
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between Bergson and McLuhan. Rather, by examining closely this discrepancy, 
one witnesses the inconsistency between how senses work and how the culture 
around the senses forms.   
It is the workings of the visual sense and not the workings of visual culture that 
Bergson recognises as discontinuous. It is culture of intellect formed around the 
sense of vision that interprets discrete visual data continuously, interpolating 
intellectually the continuous sequence where it is missing. Reconciling the 
apparent conflict between Bergson and McLuhan triggers new questions on 
formation of culture around a sensorium. McLuhan and Bergson are 
participators in protoplasmagora evolving a polyphibic organism around the 
same problem. Where the tension arises new polyphibic organs of knowing 
emerge. In polyphibianism one is attentive to turbulences in the flow: switching 
incomparable asymmetric terms around and yet deriving the same conclusions 
signals a new threshold. It is a signature of a new access point, an opportunity 
for speculation, of new knowledge that becomes readily available from new 
points of being.  
3.3.3. Bergson – Duchamp – Poincaré: “pseudo all in all”  
As was shown in the case of Bergson and McLuhan, that tangentially shared one 
opinion but diverged in exactly the opposite direction in the terms of explanation, 
a new organism can be conceived from such contact, new organs of knowledge 
can be grown out of this divergence. Not quite as trivially resolvable is a 
polyphibian growing out of independent work of Duchamp, Bergson and 
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Poincaré. Duchampian scholars are still struggling with evidence on Duchamp’s 
appreciation of either Bergson or Poincaré, where for every indication of 
Duchamp’s endorsement, there is a clue of disapproval or at least disinterest.  
This thesis proposes that a “final verdict,”i if necessary, should not only be 
ambivalent towards Duchamp being Bergsonist or anti-Bergsonist and admirer 
of Poincaré with or without tongue-in-cheek. The virtual contact of the three 
Parisians in protoplasmagora, rather than a contact in Paris that could have had, 
but never actually took place, should result in conceiving a new polyphibic 
organism to handle the dissolution of rather obsolete categories of artists and 
scientists with Duchampian meticulousness and inspire mutation and invention 
of new organs of knowledge. 
In his interviews, Duchamp is often found praising science, eager to adopt the 
scientific method in art, and just as often revealing his scepticism, inventing new 
ways to circumvent the traps: “The word ‘law’ is against my principles. Science 
is evidently a closed circuit, but every fifty years or so a new ‘law’ is discovered 
that changes everything. I just didn’t see why we should have such reverence for 
science, and so I had to give another sort of pseudo explanation.” (Tomkins, 1965, 
pp. 36, 37).  
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.1. for more on Duchamp’s explanation of the final verdict of posterity  
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By admitting his “pseudo” attitude and by not attaching himself to any discipline 
Duchamp becomes a true transdisciplinarian, achieving precisioni in his work in 
his own anti-disciplinary manner. It is only with serious humour that one can 
pass indifferently from one scientific paradigm to another, escaping cunningly 
all aesthetic tendencies in art: “I’m pseudo all in all, that’s my characteristic. I 
never could stand the seriousness of life, but when the serious is tinted with 
humour it makes a nicer color.” (Tomkins, 1965, pp. 36, 37)  
Paris in the early twentieth century was a historical and geographical interval, 
gathering artists that were reinventing art. At that moment Paris was the urban 
interface where poets and painters would mutate in painters and poets (as for 
instance Guillaume Apollinaire would expand half way in one direction or as 
Joan Miró would in the other direction). These and other transmutations took 
place in the city of Paris where right on its outskirts an International Committee 
for Weights and Measures convened annually at the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures since 1875.   
It wasn’t long before the Metric System, the joy and pride of France, became a 
joke. In 1913 Duchamp set up the unrepeatable experiment of “3 Standard 
Stoppages” also known as the “Joke on Meter,” in which the standard of meter is 
redefined through a chance operation and preserved in 3 versions as “canned 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.2. and 3.3.1. for more on different aspects of precision  
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chance.” Such simple gesture triggered a cascade of questions: from what is the 
role of choice and what is the role of chance, to questioning the role of 
conventions and convenience in science - as a consequence of Poincaré’s (1913, p. 
65) statement on how there is no true geometry, only a more convenient one.  
The insinuation that the shape of geometry and science could be chosen 
according to convenience instigated a fierce debate in France at the end of the 19th 
century, continuing in the early 20th century.  In his exhaustive study devoted to 
3 Standard Stoppages Molderings (2010, p. 1839) investigates the context of 
philosophical disputes on conventionalism, that could have informed and 
influenced Duchamp to take such casual approach to choosing standards: “Henri 
Poincaré, the outstanding scientific authority of his time, put forward a theory 
that not only the axioms of geometry but also most of the principles of physics 
[…] were based on mere conventions.” 
The story becomes interesting when “conventionalist” theory of Poincaré is 
exaggerated by a mathematician and philosopher Éduard Le Roy - “a comrade 
in arms of Bergson,” reports Molderings (2010, p. 1852). Considering the 
“arbitrariness” of science, Le Roy’s “antiscientific” conclusion is that intellectual 
quantitative knowledge cannot grasp the “truth,” reserved only to intuitive 
qualitative knowing. Poincaré, in defence, responded to Le Roy - the response 
was published in the chapter “Is Science Artificial” of Poincaré’s book “The Value 
of Science,” and Molderings (2010, p. 1878) asserts Duchamp must have had read 
it and in this dispute “clearly sided with Le Roy.” 
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Taking the side of intuition would affiliate Duchamp with Bergson, although he 
is in general considered anti-Bergsonist. Molderings (2010, p. 1878) argues: “like 
Le Roy, Duchamp radicalized Poincaré’s conventionalist theories […] that 
scientific laws are merely academic constructs and generalized Poincaré’s 
observations on the relativity of scientific axioms, principles, and laws to the 
point of total scepticism.” Specifically, in the context of convenient geometry and 
conventional standards, Molderings (2010, p. 1950) affirms Duchamp’s irony in 
overstating Poincaré: “Duchamp radicalized Poincaré’s thesis […] to the point 
that all units of measure are valid, no matter how personal, fortuitous, or 
arbitrary they might be.” 
In contrast to convenient uniformity of spatial and temporal constructs, Bergson 
strived for experience of heterogeneous qualities, with arguments against 
arbitrarily homogeneous fragmentation, such as the infinite and uniform division 
of space and consequently essentially “spatial” conceptualizations of time. In 
early 20th century Paris – the cosmopolitan centre of culture of visual hegemony 
and freshly homogenized space with metric measures - there were many 
disruptions and breakthroughs of polyphibic nature preferring the openness of 
protoplasmagora over scientific categorisations.  
Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré, admitting it to a greater or lesser degree, were 
all aware of a threshold between the conventional scientific knowledge and 
knowledge in inconveniently protoplasmic state. These three individuals left 
behind a valuable record of their introspective inspection of their methods, 
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whether in science, philosophy or art. As metaphysics goes beyond physics, and 
‘pataphysics - as a science of all sciences - goes even beyond metaphysics, the 
study of their introspective writings unveils ‘pataphysical traces in their attempts 
to overcome insurmountable obstacles in visual manifestation of their insights.  
The selection of these three individuals for the comparative study is based on the 
fact that they all come from approximately the same historical and geographical 
interval and, in this sense, from the same initial conditions in cultural 
background. Furthermore, there was no personal cross contamination between 
them: no collaboration, communication, or contact was noted among them, 
although they might and probably were aware of one another, considering their 
influence in Parisian scene.   
The comparative study begins with the search for the same traits. One of them, 
barely noticeable, yet significant, is the use of the term osmosis in both Duchamp 
and Bergson. Literal meaning of osmosis was defined in 1867 as the passage of a 
solvent through a semi-permeable membrane from a less concentrated to a more 
concentrated solution until both solutions are of the same concentration.  Later 
in 1900s a figurative meaning was adopted for gradual or unconscious 
assimilation of ideas, for instance McLuhan (1967, p. 8) would claim that the 
alphabet is technology absorbed by osmosis. Bergson and Duchamp use the term 
osmosis not just in figurative, but almost in instrumental way.   
Bergson (1910, p. 112) refers to diffusion, endosmosis, as a principle of 
“intermingling of the purely intensive sensation of mobility with the extensive 
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representation of the space traversed.” He explains how “between this succession 
without externality and this externality without succession, a kind of exchange 
takes place, very similar to what physicists call the phenomenon of endosmosis” 
(Bergson, 1910, p. 109), and how “by a real process of endosmosis we get the 
mixed idea of a measurable time, which is space in so far as it is homogeneity, 
and duration in so far as it is succession, that is to say, at bottom, the 
contradictory idea of succession in simultaneity” (Bergson, 1910, p. 228). 
Duchamp (1989, p. 139), on the other hand, talks of “transference from the artist 
to the spectator in the form of an aesthetic osmosis taking place through the inert 
matter.”  
The spontaneous effortless diffusion is bound to happen through a selectively 
permeable interface, if there is no pressure opposing it. The artificial pressure 
that requires investment of energy to keep substances fixed in place is termed 
osmotic pressure. Taken in a figurative way, the osmotic pressure implies that to 
maintain habitual uniform intellectual structures demands energy, while 
creation of novelty is as spontaneous as osmosis, no energy is required. The 
concept of filter was also focus of Henri Poincaré’s introspection in the discovery 
of a new mathematical law. Poincaré attributed the crucial selection of ideas to 
peculiar delicate sievesi functioning as a selectively permeable membrane. In 
Poincaré’s (Brown, et al., 1981, p. 18) words “aesthetic sensibility […] plays the 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.2.1. for more on Poincaré’s introspection in mathematical discovery 
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part of a delicate sieve.” Sieves were later incorporated in mechanics of 
Duchamp’s Large Glass.    
A comparative case study of Bergson, Duchamp and Poincaré cannot be simply 
a linear comparison, since these individuals continue trespassing from physical, 
beyond metaphysical, into ‘pataphysical inquiry, and back. The indivisible 
individuals divide, becoming dividuals, extending the limits of their respective 
professions and even exchanging personalitiesi. Although there was no actual 
contact between them, they did not simply work in parallel – a comparison of 
their movement forms organic configurations of polyphibianism. In this 
formation of polyphibic organs of knowing Duchamp plays the role of a catalystii 
“infradifferentiating” Bergson’s and Poincaré’s ideas.  
Henderson (2014, p. 1), discussing the anti-Bergsonist vs. Bergsonist stance of 
Duchamp, relates his “shifting identities” to the “paradigm shifts” in science. 
Within the given historical context Henderson demonstrates how Duchamp’s 
identity shifted away from the spatial fourth dimension with the dawn of 
Einstein’s theory of four-dimensional space-time. Duchamp first became 
interested in the spatial fourth dimension through his engagement with Cubism, 
                                                 
i Duchamp occasionally worked under pseudonyms 
ii see chapter 4.2.2. for more on the role of a catalyst in the creative act  
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but as he deviated from this movement, Henderson claims, he also rejected all 
the Bergsonian ideas that Cubism endorsed.  
In this context of rebelling against Cubism, and, allegedly, indirectly against 
Bergsonism, another term is to be noted in this threefold case study – the term 
readymade. Applied in slightly different sense by each of the three dividuals – it 
is again a matter of establishing the “infradifference” between the readymades 
that opens up to new knowledge. In short, Bergson considers readymades in his 
study on laughter, Poincaré in the form of ideas and Duchamp makes a limited 
number of readymades per year. Henderson assumes: 
Duchamp’s use of ready-made may derive from Bergson, who 
associated it with the very qualities Duchamp was seeking in art: 
the intellectual, the external, and the mechanical versus the 
expression of the organic “fundamental self” of the artist.  
Challenging the Puteaux Cubist’s belief that taste, beauty and 
the touch of the artist were manifestations of profound self-
expression, Duchamp found a means for “unloading ideas” via 
pre-existing objects. (Henderson, 2005, p. 200) 
Although Henderson recognizes the diffuse presence in 
Duchamp of various Bergsonian motives, because she regards 
Bergson as the antiscientific philosopher of the “inner self” and 
of “profound self-expression,” Bergsonian notions seem to her 
incompatible with the artistic revolution prompted by 
Duchamp. […] Herein lies Henderson’s solution: since 
Duchamp rejects the aesthetic principles of the Puteaux Cubists, 
he also abandons Bergsonism, which represents their 
philosophical matrix. Thus, the Bergsonian ideas “undoubtedly” 
present in Duchamp’s artistic lexicon are nothing but debris 
accumulated in the course of his battle with the cubist disciples 
of Bergson. (Luisetti, 2008, p. 77) 
Federico Luisetti nonetheless proposes to further examine the role of Bergsonian 
readymades by focusing on Duchamp’s (1989, p. 74) crucial question: 
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“Speculations. Can one make works which are not works of ‘art’?” Luisetti (2008, 
p. 79) is convinced that “Duchamp’s answer is the readymade,” when the 
readymade is understood as “a nonartistic work, a postponement of the aesthetic 
delectation of the work of art.” Duchamp is working on a bifurcation, 
simultaneously in two directions, exaggerating the tension to untangle the 
dichotomy. Bergson (2008, p. 41a) contrasts “the rigid, the readymade, the 
mechanical” with “the supple, the ever-changing and the living, 
absentmindedness in contrast with attention, in a word, automatism in contrast 
with free activity, such are the defects that laughter singles out and would fain 
correct.” Can Duchamp’s comical corrective on the readymade achieve Bergson’s 
aim?  
As a parody of the phenomenological return to the perceptual 
consistency of the “things themselves,” they [readymades] 
appear to be merely existing objects, pieces of the external world 
without symbolic connotations. Yet, because of their provocative 
“thingness,” they refuse to be assimilated to the mechanisms of 
representation and stand as something in between, occupying 
the interval between everyday objects and artworks. At this level 
of perception, the readymades’ enigmatic presence is nothing 
but a form of existence that has abandoned the heavy machinery 
of representation: logical and linguistic definitions, conceptual 
schemes, analogical connections, iconographic references—in 
Duchampian words, “visual memory.” […] Since the 
readymades have lost their connection with the instruments of 
representation, they don’t criticize or negate artistic 
representation and its mighty institutions, […] humbly, they 
have found a collocation in the incommensurable intervals of a 
new method of appearance.  (Luisetti, 2008, pp. 79, 80) 
This “new method of appearance” exaggerates both Bergson’s and Poincaré’s 
concern of anything readymade, critically opening up intelligence to new 
possibilities of  knowledge production, awakening intelligence to the underlying 
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complexity in the growth of knowledge. Poincaré, like Bergson, is aware of the 
living knowledge – invention is not a result of an automaton, it is not simply an 
output of a readymade soution – invention is born, it is organic and it mutates. 
Duchamp reads Poincaré’s statement with deliberate irony to uncover a higher 
order of organisation: 
It never happens that the unconscious work gives us the result 
of a somewhat long calculation all made, where we have only to 
apply fixed rules. We might think the wholly automatic 
subliminal self particularly apt for this sort of work, which is in 
a way exclusively mechanical. It seems that thinking in the 
evening upon the factors of a multiplication we might hope to 
find the product ready made upon our awakening, or again that 
an algebraic calculation, for example a verification, would be 
made unconsciously. Nothing of the sort, as observation proves. 
(Poincaré, 1913, p. 394) 
Regardless of his seemingly contradictory statements in the interviews – whether 
he admits it or not (and he sometimes does and other times doesn’t) – Duchamp 
is living in between the disciplines, shifting his point of being between art and 
science within the transdisciplinary zone. With his sense of humour Duchamp 
corrects two concepts at the price of one – however he mocks art and tries to 
disinfect the subjective by conducting himself pseudo scientifically by attempting 
objectivism – he at the same time, on the other hand, mocks science and corrects 
it by introducing the subjective, the unique, the chance, the exception in a field of 
all general and objective.  
Duchamp’s aesthetic indifference and indifference to all the mechanical habits of 
scientific mind is fulfilling Bergson’s requirement of absence of emotion - if 
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humour is to be effective as a corrective of the mechanical thinking, that is, if the 
mechanical thought is to correct itself through laughter. Consequently, serious 
humour is the key ingredient in polyphibianism that is to evolve 
transdisciplinarity from mechanical to organic, living knowledge. Such academic 
disputes among Duchampian scholars that keep the debate from the early 20th 
century alive, by inserting Duchamp as a catalyst in the chain reaction, form a 
fertile ground for growth of transdisciplinary knowledge.   
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4. Research act and its evolution 
4.1. Participating in a creative evolution 
4.1.1. Essay on laughter: knowledge is a laughing matter 
[…] laughter’s shaking is for the body a blast of bones and 
muscles torn apart by the great wave of anguish and panic–
stricken love piercing into the last inner intimate atom, and then 
with that smack form the absolute, pieces of pataphysician jump 
inside the guy’s skin and pounce on the appalling lies lining 
indefinite roads in space and spring at length toward chaos; the 
individual who has known himself within the whole can well 
believe for a moment that he will scatter into a dust so 
homogeneous that it will spread like a dust filling an absence of 
dust in no place, at no time: he explodes, that lucky Earthling, 
but his all too solid skin, that elastic sack holds him together and 
puckers only at them most flexible parts of his face, makes the 
corners of his mouth rise and his eyelids tighten, and distended 
as far as it can be, it all suddenly contracts and snaps back on 
itself as the lungs fill up with air and then empty out; thus is born 
the rhythm of laughter, realised and sensed in oneself, observed 
just as clearly as in the eyes of another laugher. Each time he 
thinks he is going to burst once and for all, the laugher is held 
back by his skin, I mean his form, by the bounds of his own 
particular law whose form is outer expression, by the absurd 
formula, the irrational equation of his existence which he has not 
yet solved. He constantly bounces back off that absolute star that 
pulls him, never standing still, and heating up from all the 
repeated impacts, he turns maroon, then cherry-red, then white, 
and shoots of boiling corpuscles and bursts again even more 
violently, and his laughter becomes the mad rage of wild 
planets, and the fellow breaks something, yucking it up like that 
[…] (Daumal, 2012, pp. 3, 4) 
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As is evident from the extract quoted above, René Daumal offers an extensive 
description of physical processes unfolding along with ‘pataphysical laughteri. 
The foundations for applying “serious humour” to research, as is practiced in 
‘pataphysics, are provided in Bergson’s (2008) essay on laughter. This essay will 
serve as a preliminary training in methods tangentially ‘pataphysical, before 
attempting to participate in Bergson’s (2005) seminal work ‘Creative Evolution’, 
where the theory of knowledge and the theory of evolution are merged, thus 
facilitating imagining an evolving organism of living knowledge. 
Laughter, or the “comical corrective,” as considered by Bergson (2008), is 
therefore the most expedient approach to the domain of “intellectual 
knowledge,” since, as Bergson (2008) implies, laughter occurs at the very extreme 
of the intellect – at the critical point on intellectual periphery - at which the 
intellect halts and looks into the abyss. This introspective jump into the depths of 
the unknown never ends in fatality but somehow resolves in a successful, 
although sometimes bitter, overcoming of the gap, expanding the intellectual 
territory. 
Laughter, operating at the forefront of the intellect, is propelling the intellect 
through the physical, bodily turmoil into the ‘pataphysical mind-set. Whenever 
life is in a hurry to optimize itself, to adapt itself optimally to the current 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.1. for introduction to ‘pataphysical laughter 
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environment, it forgets it is also a crucial interpenetrating ingredient of that ever-
changing environment. When a habit is introduced into life, it is only by 
recognition of the comical aspect of a repetitive, rigid, mechanical response that 
life can be released from such constraints.  Bergson (2008, p. 3b) finds laughter so 
vital that he refuses to extract it from life: “We shall not aim at imprisoning the 
comic spirit within a definition. We regard it, above all, as a living thing.” 
Bergson recognises in human intelligence this unique response with humour 
whenever it encounters mechanical obstructions in the flow of life. The comical, 
according to Bergson (2008), serves as a corrective to society - it is a solution to 
rigid repetitiveness in automation driven human societies. When the utilitarian 
attitude causes malfunction in the society, the comic relief resets its livelihood. 
This research elaborates on Bergson’s methods of inducing the comical response 
by injecting humour into the mechanical stiffness. The methodology of the 
comical in this thesis is crafted so as to enable the transition out of the disciplinary 
into the transdisciplinary research. 
Bergson considers the comical primarily as a social corrective – the benefits of 
this corrective are largely notable at the scale of human society, consequently 
correcting the individual human character as well. Furthermore, the comical 
corrects specific characteristics of the individual in question, it divides the human 
according to these characteristics and repackages it in various social contexts. The 
general individual characteristics, predictable according to laws of physics, are 
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redistributed through humour to accommodate the ‘pataphysical exceptions. 
From here polyphibianism proceeds, giving birth to mutating dividuals. 
Namely, polyphibianism departs from the utilitarian human endeavour that is 
goal oriented, seeking to conquer and categorise nature, forming a classified 
knowledge. Polyphibianism differs from the typical production of knowledge in 
the Western human society precisely in its tendency to incessantly differentiate. 
The bottom level of human society is fixed and sealed - there is no further 
differentiation - the human individual is the unit, whereas there is no 
predetermined basic unit in polyphibianism – polyphibians are dividuals, always 
ready to be further differentiated through the adaptive, comically corrective 
mutations.  
A monophibic human being, the standard unit of human society, can be 
differentiated into a polyphibic organism by dissolving and dispersing 
individuality over a network of attention – a network of knowing through 
multiple organs and multiple points of being. In this highly alert network the 
observer changes the observed through changes in its self-observing nodes: 
polyphibic organs of knowing mutate along with the evolutionary movement of 
the living knowledge. Polyphibianism moves in the opposite direction of 
conquering nature or conquering the knowledge about nature. Namely, the 
imaginary organism of living knowledge is by definition an open system and 
therefore cannot be captured in its entirety. 
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Since there are no objectives in polyphibianism, there are no categorisations of 
conquered objects in the classical sense – what remains reminiscent of a 
methodology are modes of navigation. Whenever a propensity arises to 
categorise encountered features of the living knowledge and to fit them into 
existing or, for this purpose, expanded scaffolding of scientific disciplines, 
polyphibianism takes a turn – it deviates into a comical relief. These comical 
correctives awaken any part of polyphibic network to propel the movement 
further, to ensure incessant change. Transdisciplinary is always on the move in 
between and beyond disciplines.   
How to imagine laughter of an imaginary organism of living knowledge? What 
ensures the plasticity of the protoplasmic agora that nourishes polyphibianism? 
If chemicals in the primordial soup are responsible for the change of rate of 
reactions there must be a role for a catalyst in protoplasmagora.i When the human 
individual is stripped of its human agenda, when the ego dissolves and the 
individuality is lost, to maintain a coherence in the movement, the dispersed 
individual tunes into the somnolentii frequency through which the 
communication is accelerated to the extreme of immediate knowing. As in 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.2. for more on catalysts in creative act, where the role of the curator is imagined 
as a catalyst  
ii see chapter 4.1.2. for more on dreams – the relation of sleeping towards one aspect of reality and 
awakening towards another  
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telepathy the network of polyphibic awareness attunes and corrects itself 
instantaneously.  
How do the somnolent and the comical relate? Bergson detects the presence of 
the absurd in the comic and tries to justify their interdependence by finding a 
direct link between humour and dreams. After proving that the comical exists in 
absence of emotion Bergson searches for the most sterile setup for laughter – 
conditions that are not emotionally affective. Absurdity that results from mental 
illness is already contaminated with sympathy, therefore the only absurdity that 
can be laughable is that of a sane person, the absurdity that the audience can 
emotionally detach from. 
Absurdity of the sane is only encountered in dreams. The logic of absurdity 
differs from the classical logic, customary in most scientific reasoning. In his 
manifesto of transdisciplinarity, Nicolescu had to introduce a new logic that 
seems absurd from the viewpoint of the classical logic – it is the logic of the 
included middlei. On the other hand, Bergson equates that sane absurdity with 
the dreaming logic – the logic of intellectual relaxation – relaxation to the point 
of including middle terms, of resolving dichotomies. In dreams the most 
contradictory phenomena can coexist without tension, in most unusual 
superposition. Only a relaxed intellectual faculty can attune to such coherent 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.2. for more on the logic of the included middle 
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multidimensional attention. Bergson (2008, pp. 3b, 4a) assumes in the logic of the 
comic the roots of collective imagination: 
For the comic spirit has a logic of its own, even in its wildest 
eccentricities. It has a method in its madness. It dreams, I admit, 
but it conjures up, in its dreams, visions that are at once accepted 
and understood by the whole of a social group. Can it then fail 
to throw light for us on the way that human imagination works, 
and more particularly social, collective, and popular 
imagination?  
Laughter is emotionally neutral, as Bergson (2008, p. 4a) diagnoses: “Indifference 
is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion.” Serious 
artistsi working in such neutral medium of indifference, develop a different kind 
of sensibility, a different kind of aesthetics with indifference to taste. Duchamp 
(1989, p. 139), whose art “bad, good, or indifferent” is based on serious humour, 
practices abstinence from taste by comical corrective: “I have forced myself to 
contradict myself in order to avoid conforming to my own taste” (Janis & Janis, 
1945, p. 257). 
Indifference is the side effect of the medium, of technology, of intellectual 
invention. According to McLuhan (1994, p. 43), any technology that extends the 
senses also cuts off the senses. Laughter as technology allows human beings to 
look farther, to see a broader picture or to extend the current use of intellect, at 
the price of cutting off emotions and empathy. Such anaesthesia of feelings serves 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.2.2. for more on McLuhan’s notion of “serious artist” 
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Bergson (2008, p. 4b) as a critique of the comic itself – a second order critique of 
the culmination of intellect in laughter: “In a society composed of pure 
intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there 
would still be laughter.” 
Is the comical then just the extreme separation of the observer and the observed, 
the ultimate isolation of the individual? Even if the second order comical 
corrective attempts to correct the prerequisite first order comical distancing from 
the observed, the attempt would result in reintroducing sympathy, which has to 
be avoided at all costs, in order to remain comical. Therefore, how could laughter 
possibly induce movement of polyphibianism in direction of reintegrating the 
observer and the observed into the imaginary organism of living knowledge? 
Namely, the overall presence of the observer within the observed is achieved 
only by empathy. The observer knows the observed through immediate 
intuition, through interpenetration of feelings, in becoming one and the same 
entity of knowledge with the observed, rather than through intellectual analysis. 
From monophibic standpoint an irreconcilable dichotomy arises, if the extreme 
intellectual and intuitive activities are considered in unison – the indifference of 
laughter and the involvement of empathy cannot coexist in a monophibic 
scheme. Such dichotomy can only be resolved on a different level of intellectual 
and intuitive organisation.  Imagine an immensely intricate organism that is 
emotionally detached from each and every part of itself, while the parts remain 
empathically engaged. Every part undergoes critique, being ceaselessly 
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corrected. While the corrections are instantaneously propagated through the 
entire organism the parts are able to self-organise accordingly, thus correcting 
themselves in self-awareness of the whole.    
Whereas a monophibian observes the observed either by subjective immersion 
or by objective detachment, the polyphibian is able to intertwine both modalities, 
merging the observer and the observed through infinite differentiation. In a 
monophibic attempt to combine the methods of involvement and indifference, 
one method corrupts or contaminates the results of the other. The subjective 
synthesis contaminates the sterilised objective analysis, while the later fragments 
and corrupts the wholeness of the former.  
Monophibic corrective to inaccessibility of knowledge in between the disciplines 
is to continuously establish auxiliary disciplines, to prevent disciplinary leaks of 
knowledge, escaping the conventions of science, in hope to complete the picture 
of a given phenomenon, but no matter how many new disciplines are provided 
the pieces of the puzzle never quite fit together. Within the transdisciplinary zone 
that contains all disciplinary leakages, a polyphibian is imagined as a solution to 
the problem of maintaining the coherent intellectual capabilities without losing 
the intuitive awareness of the whole.  
Polyphibian, is an imaginary solution – imagined temporary solution for a 
transitory interval – a transition in which one evolves oneself, one’s being, one’s 
body into a less fragile system, that is, into a more adaptable and enduring 
system. Endurance provided, that is, after one is set to empower oneself 
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incessantly by technology that repairs itself, then the edge that intellect affords 
to human species, will no longer be necessary. Intellect was required to trigger 
the avalanche. The tipping point of the comical slide was the critical point for 
awakening the intellectual structures to self-organise and become self-aware. 
Imagining a resolution of dichotomous tension between involvement and 
indifference in the form of a polyphibian could resolve the tension between 
subjective and objective, or artistic and scientific, research. But the usage of such 
obsolete categories does not come without a warning: just as artists and scientists 
come to their major discoveries by bypassing this division, by submerging into 
protoplasmic state of knowing, so are the subjective and objective experience 
never really divided, but their impurity does not obstruct the researcher, because 
independently of these divisions the insight is gained and cultivated in the 
protoplasm.  
Polyphibianism moves in opposition to the arbitrary fragmentation, indifferent 
to convenience, comically correcting the conventions. Rather than dissecting the 
knowledge in arbitrary manner until separation into sections causes the death of 
knowledge, polyphibianism searches for natural articulations and with precise 
incision inspires multiplication of life within knowledge. By differentiation, 
dissolving, dispersing, disseminating the life, the knowledge is set free to 
propagate. Growing the knowledge is therefore directly correlated with growing 
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the imaginary life-forms, not unlike the aspirations for the living knowledge in 
Nicolescu’s manifesto of transdisciplinarityi.   
This infrathin incision is a fractal cut of the two irreconcilable yet infinitely 
intertwined tendencies of comic indifference and emphatic involvement, forming 
an intricate fractal geometryii. Such dichotomous tension cannot be resolved by 
adding yet another integer dimension, but by revealing the dimensions in 
between – the fractal dimensions. Only then the comic and the empathic can 
come infinitely close together without disturbance, even though, by definition, 
they cancel each other out when in contact.  
In the same manner an infrathin incision in the mind-set of an individual 
monophibian dissolves the monophibic individuality into a polyphibian. No 
other effort is required in this imagination, the method of introspection is 
spontaneously followed, dispersing one person into multiple personalities, as in 
a dream, correcting the monophibic personality by laughing at oneself from 
multiple points of being. In what way is a polyphibian more alive than a 
monophibian? Polyphibianism, by ceaseless differentiation and division, 
multiplies life into a living knowledge. If incisions of differentiation are accurate, 
the living knowledge will grow indefinitely. 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.2. for more on transdisciplinarity  
ii see chapter 4.1.3. for more on fractals, phractals and polyphibianism 
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A polyphibian is a transitory being, spasmodically laughing at itself from 
different points of being. To get into a state of being transient, one first needs to 
cultivate empathy with multiple points of being, rather than focusing on one. The 
comical corrective keeps the polyphibian in movement, always in transition in 
between the media, driven by curiosity, free from fear of the unknown, free, in 
fact, from any other emotion, be it attachment or detachment. With the fractal 
geometry of closely packed emotional indifference and involvement, the anxiety 
in confronting the transdisciplinary zone becomes unnecessary. Curiosity of a 
transdisciplinarian spontaneously reaches areas of knowledge that disciplinary 
science has denied itself the access.  
Bergson (2008, p. 5a) expresses the complicit nature of laughter: “However 
spontaneous it seems, laughter always implies a kind of secret freemasonry, or 
even complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary.” Laughter unites the 
disciplinary researchers prepared to enter the transdisciplinary zone, a zone in 
which one is allowed to be newborn as an imaginary organism and to research, 
navigate, cultivate and grow organs of knowing. Polyphibianism, as a gathering 
of beings with similar tendencies for growing knowledge, forms a guild in 
ecological sense, rather than sociologically. Although the entrance into the 
polyphibic guild is not straightforward, it is accessible to anyone through 
introspection.  
In a group of disciplinary researchers, preparing to trespass the disciplinary 
borders, any automatism “closely akin to mere absentmindedness” entices 
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laughter. In other words, Bergson (2008, p. 8a) finds a comic character “comic in 
proportion to his ignorance of himself. The comic person is unconscious.” 
Through introspection, a monophibian becoming a polyphibian laughs at itself: 
at its comic character, at the automatism of its actions, of its habits, of its 
ignorance of itself.   
To realise the consequences of such spontaneous invention as laughter, 
McLuhan’s (1994, p. 45) clarification is on offer: “Any invention or technology is 
an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension also 
demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions 
of the body.” Likewise, the technology of laughter, as any other technology, at 
the same time extends oneself into new senses, new organs of knowing, and 
amputates the old: laughter alleviates the pain of transformation by 
multiplication of one’s points of being.  
The mechanical automatism, acquired through optimisation of an individual for 
a single way of perceiving, reacting, reproducing, and representing, cracks in 
laughter. Just as the mechanical that accumulates over the lifespan of a 
monophibian numbs and desensitises the monophibian, in the same manner the 
comic is a technology that relies on numbness in order to painlessly dismantle 
the mechanical. But once the joke is over – what replaces the painkiller? What 
kind of prosthesis can provide sufficient distraction to substitute the sensual 
experience, after the senses have been self-amputated? What kind of technology 
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protects this being in transition, in direct exposure to the bare protoplasmic 
environment?  
The danger a disciplinary researcher, willing to trespass disciplinary borders, 
confronts is to turn back to the old habits before reaching the transdisciplinary 
zone. Whether trapped in transdisciplinary surrogates, such as interdisciplinarity 
or multidisciplinarity, or simply establishing new disciplines, this researcher has 
not utilised the comical corrective to its fullest. Loosening up the habits does not 
break them, while forming new habits is counterproductive, contributing to the 
overpowering apparatus of disciplinary science. The comical needs to be 
perpetually applied until complete transformation takes place.  
To become a polyphibian out of a joke on monophibic deficiencies means not to 
return to serious research after the joke has subsided, but to continue researching 
with serious humour that enables one to grow knowledge through oneself, 
through unique, exceptional organs invented as serious comical correctives. A 
polyphibian does not provide knowledge externally to some apparatus for 
archiving it, because it consumes, it lives the knowledge in its protoplasmic state. 
There is no need to externalise and manifest the extracts of knowledge to other 
members of polyphibianism, since the knowledge is lived immediately through 
all points of being – there is nothing external to the imaginary organism of living 
knowledge.  
The movement of trespassers, transdisciplinarians or polyphibians, granted the 
awareness of its origins, does not revolve around conventional society - in 
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Bergson’s (2008, p. 8b) words - the movement that “inclines to swerve from the 
common centre round which society gravitates,” resists the centripetal force of 
the social apparatus. A propensity of simply swerving away would be, for 
Bergson (2008, p. 8b), a “sign of an eccentricity” and “inelasticity of character.” 
Polyphibians are indeed eccentric, inasmuch as they are driven to the periphery 
of society, working at the fringes of the intellect, self-organising into new forms 
of intelligence, without any strong intention to resume the monophibic mode of 
awareness. And yet, polyphibianism, as evolutionary movement, never loses the 
original impetus, which is evident in all the forms of mutations of organs of 
knowing.  
Rather than “elasticity of character” that would reset a polyphibian back to a 
monophibic state of mind, it is plasticity that is required to be incessantly 
newborn. Plasticity enables the polyphibic organism to take on all the possible 
forms, to empathise with any form of life, to ceaselessly mutate its organs of 
knowing. If “inelasticity of character,” the inability to return to the centre, is 
corrected by monophibic humour, as Bergson (2008, p. 8b) claims, the polyphibic 
humour upgrades elasticity into “plasticity of character.” Polyphibianism, with 
poly-distributed points of being, never separates from the origin, it lives in 
contact with its origin, but its advantage is in its ability to diverge far from it.  
This thesis, almost arbitrarily, derives the polyphibian from the “category” or 
rather the “character” of a “serious artist,” defined by McLuhan as the being that 
is aware of changes in the media landscape.  The suggested methodology for the 
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serious artist is serious humour. Bergson (2008, p. 8b) notes that the comical, 
although utilitarian by nature, comes close to art in the following sense: “the 
comic comes into being just when society and the individual, freed from the 
worry of self-preservation, begin to regard themselves as works of art.” 
Comically induced polyphibic growth of living knowledge is in that manner 
related to art, to incessant creation, imaginary solutions and invention through 
mutation. Being the imaginary organism of living knowledge, the polyphibian is 
by definition a living “artform.” 
By inventing new organs of knowing, a polyphibian is newborn into technology 
of knowledge. Through this intimate relationship with technology a polyphibian 
empathises with monophibic inventions from a distance, from different points of 
being, realising the changes before they are registered by monophibians. 
McLuhan (1994, p. 22) attributes such ability to artists, considering  “art, at its 
most significant, as a DEW line, a Distant Early Warning System that can always 
be relied on to tell the old culture what is beginning to happen to it.” From 
monophibic perspective such distant “eccentric” art that offers no guarantee of 
return to the old centre occasionally induces laugher in despair.   
Art is mainly comic to the spectator who approaches art with rigidity: art feeds 
back the comical corrective to the spectator. A monophibic spectator receiving 
such feedbacks laughs at its own stereotyped, standardized, coagulated, rigid, 
habitual condition: being stuck in a medium is comic. In trespassing that 
medium, that is, in becoming polyphibic, one unplugs oneself from the existing 
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apparatus and invents new “breathing” organs for the new medium. For the 
remaining monophibians the actions of the newborn polyphibian could seem 
disorderly, even anarchic through the old medium - the old societal structures 
might not appreciate the changes. And yet, polyphibian is the embodied 
knowledge, the embodied technology arising from comical correctives that 
transform - transformations, even if ignored by monophibians, nonetheless 
happen on another order of organisation.   
In disciplinary research, every encountered methodological repetition, whether 
in theory or experimentation, could potentially induce laughter. The very 
representation of research results is already comically challenging. In contrast to 
the process of creation, to the birth of ideas, Bergson (2008, p. 12b) gives the 
example of communicating the preserved ideas in a public speech: “a certain 
movement of head or arm, a movement always the same, seems to return at 
regular intervals. If I notice it and it succeeds in diverting my attention, if I wait 
for it to occur and it occurs when I expect it, then involuntarily I laugh. Why? 
Because I now have before me a machine that works automatically. This is no 
longer life, it is automatism established in life and imitating it. It belongs to the 
comic.”  
In transdisciplinarity there is no need for repetition of experiments, not even 
memorization by repetition, in fact, there is no need to organise past experiences 
- as Bergson (2005, p. 7) ensures - “the past is preserved by itself.” 
Transdisciplinary knowledge is preserved by being lived rather than recorded, 
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represented, filed and classified. Transdisciplinary “communication” can only 
happen inadvertently, if the thought torrent of a transdisciplinary researcher is 
spoken out loud.  “An idea is something that grows, buds, blossoms and ripens 
from the beginning to the end of a speech. It never halts, never repeats itself. It 
must be changing every moment, for to cease to change would be to cease to 
live.” (Bergson, 2008, p. 12a) Knowledge that ceases to live becomes a laughing 
matter. 
The transdisciplinary researcher is not to write down a final thought – if it is to 
be kept alive, it must ceaselessly change – it must keep being rewritten.  Avoiding 
the need for writing down, escaping the culture of print, culture of reproduction 
and representation, at the extreme, exiting the visual culture and the retinal art 
altogether, is a shift from disciplinary to transdisciplinary research.  This cultural 
and scientific paradigm shift that is already sporadically occurring, has not been 
and cannot be formalised within scientific disciplines, even though it has been 
noticed by thinkers that transcend the disciplinary domains. McLuhan (Picnic in 
Space, 1967) observed the pseudo-return of science to the non-repetitive and non-
representational:   
If you can do it again then you’ve got a proof - scientific proof - 
can you do it again - that is visual space - anything that can be 
exactly repeatable is visual. As science gets more sophisticated it 
realizes that all experiments are subtly non-repetitive, and that 
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repetition is not a proof, and no two experiments are ever alike, 
and visual space, in fact, has disappeared from science.i 
Whilst disciplinary science supposedly relies on repetition of results to ensure 
the advancement of knowledge, transdisciplinarity, avoiding repetition, has 
nowhere and no intention to advance, it merely intensifies the experience of 
knowing. Transdisciplinarity is a comical corrective to the machinery of 
repetition that is aiming at interpretation of unrepeatable phenomena. The 
methods based on repetition are clearly not the means of progress, on the 
contrary, the major discoveries are disruptive to the existing disciplinary 
methodologies. The advancement after such disruption is customarily merely a 
re-adjustment of disciplinary protocols to a different direction. The researchers 
are not freed from habits, but trained to follow altered habits, by shifting their 
opinions rather than their awareness. 
Laughter on its own does not provide instructions on how to set up an 
experiment that yields only exceptions and never a repetitive, generalizable 
result, or how to set up the apparatus that never reproduces or recognises 
identity. And yet, laughter is induced with the very idea of such apparatus - 
laughter therefore consists in correcting the apparatus for experiments in the field 
of physics, for instance, by imagining an upgraded apparatus for 
experimentation in the realm of ‘pataphysics, the realm of the unique and 
                                                 
i see also chapter 3.3.2.  
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exceptional. The apparatus that crosses over the threshold of physics into 
‘pataphysical domain is fuelled by the comicali. The laughter is therefore the 
catalyst for imaginary solutions. While bursting in laughter the imagination 
blossoms.  
There is a logic of the imagination which is not the logic of 
reason, one which at times is even opposed to the latter, with 
which, however, philosophy must reckon, not only in the study 
of the comic, but in every other investigation of the same kind. It 
is something like the logic of dreams, though of dreams that have 
not been left to the whim of individual fancy, being the dreams 
dreamt by the whole of society. In order to reconstruct this 
hidden logic, a special kind of effort is needed, by which the 
outer crust of carefully stratified judgments and firmly 
established ideas will be lifted, and we shall behold in the depths 
of our mind, like a sheet of subterranean water, the flow of an 
unbroken stream of images which pass from one into another. 
This interpenetration of images does not come about by chance. 
It obeys laws, or rather habits, which hold the same relation to 
imagination that logic does to thought. (Bergson, 2008, p. 15a)  
By relating the comical and the imaginary in this important passage of his essay 
on laughter, Bergson crosses over to the ‘pataphysical domain, where imaginary 
solutions emerge from serious humour. Just as Shattuck (1960, p. 27) measures 
the distances on the map of sciences: “‘pataphysics lies as far beyond metaphysics 
as metaphysics lies beyond physics - in one direction or another,” Bergson maps 
the “logic of imagination” closer to “logic of dreams” than to the “logic of 
reason.”  
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.3. for more on upgrading the apparatus of physics to ‘pataphysics and beyond 
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Bergson differentiates between the inattentive dreams of an individual and the 
dreams in a coherent self-awareness of a collective. A monophibian, unprepared 
for a polyphibic transformation, that loses the thread, drifts off with the dream, 
in an eccentric, inelastic manner, not able to return to the centre. The trained 
polyphibian dreams not as an individual, but as multiple dividuals, as a coherent 
multiplicity of points of being, not losing the thread to the centre of the dream, 
but relocating it in dynamics of polyphibianism.  
To operate within the “logic of dreams” Bergson suggests the judgement is to be 
lifted. Without securing the interval of suspended judgementi there is no flow, 
no “stream of images,” no turbulent imaginary solutions. Bergson finds in the 
“interpenetration of images” a certain principle of self-organisation, an emergent 
pattern from which arise imaginary solutions that could be related to the way 
thinking structures arise from the rules of logical reasoning.   
Composing the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, Nicolescu (2002, p. 28) proposes 
a shift in the rules of reasoning - from classical logic to a logic of included middle, 
in which a solution to unresolvable dichotomies in disciplinary research could 
emerge within transdisciplinary research. If laughter is that necessary trigger for 
spontaneous imaginary solutions to tensions caused by the rigidity of “exclusive 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. for more on the Interval of Suspended Judgement 
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logic,” then a “Manifesto of Laughter” should, in accordance with Bergson’s and 
Nicolescu’s suggestions, accommodate a kind of “logic of inclusiveness:” 
Many a comic form, that cannot be explained by itself, can 
indeed only be understood from its resemblance to another, 
which only makes us laugh by reason of its relationship with a 
third, and so on indefinitely. […] Where does this progressive 
continuity come from? What can be the driving force, the strange 
impulse which causes the comic to glide thus from image to 
image, farther and farther away from the starting-point, until it 
is broken up and lost in infinitely remote analogies? But what is 
that force which divides and subdivides the branches of a tree 
into smaller boughs and its roots into radicles? An inexorable 
law dooms every living energy, during the brief interval allotted 
to it in time, to cover the widest possible extent in space. Now, 
comic fancy is indeed a living energy, a strange plant that has 
nourished on the stony portions of the social soil, until such time 
as culture should allow it to vie with the most refined products 
of art. (Bergson, 2008, p. 22a) 
The relation between transdisciplinary living knowledge and laughter is 
revealed in this significant passage, in which the drive in propagation of the 
comical and the imaginary is compared to the drive of propagating life. The 
bursts of laughter on the periphery of a bounded scientific discipline ruptures 
the boundaries, so as “to cover the widest possible extent,” the entire 
transdisciplinary zone. The comical gives the conserved knowledge a “living 
energy,” it awakens the knowledge into life by dynamics of dispersion, division, 
and differentiation. 
In fertile conditions of laughter the living knowledge grows as a lush tropic 
vegetation, spreading by method of suggestion, association and resonance, 
rhizomatically “subdividing […] its roots into radicles.” The rhizomatic tendency 
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of the comical to “cover the widest possible extent in space” ensures efficiency as 
a social corrective to reach the widest possible audience. Considering the 
differences in sense of humour within society the comic idea needs to spread via 
incremental analogies. The comic effect propagates by slight variations.  
Bergson is convinced that comic “is a strange plant,” competing with other 
strands of art. The artistry of rhizome-like spreading of laughter resembles the 
fractal geometry, able to remain self-affine across several scales and therefore to 
reach the most remote and minute spots in the territory. The sensibility of an 
artist relies on mastery of such geometry to scan the territory as a Distant Early 
Warning System (McLuhan, 1994, p. 22).  The broadcasting of laughter by free 
association on all scales and orders awakens a synaesthesia between organs of 
knowing.  
Free association, or “the flow of an unbroken stream of images which pass from 
one into another,” is the avalanche that occurs on the top of the pile as soon as 
the protection net of reasoning is removed: “a special kind of effort is needed, by 
which the outer crust of carefully stratified judgments and firmly established 
ideas will be lifted” (Bergson, 2008, p. 15a). The schemas of judgement are 
providing the resistance to osmosis. Once the schemas are removed osmosis 
releases the energy that fuels associations.  
Free associations multiply and proliferate growth of the organism of living 
knowledge within itself, by swelling, inflating, and imploding in fractal 
rhizomatic networks of all possible mutations and innovations of organs of 
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knowing. But the differentiation in this growth is not random, just as 
“interpenetration of images does not come about by chance” (Bergson, 2008, p. 
15a). Only clear-cut incisions, following the particular articulation in the 
organism of knowledge, encourage growth into a resilient network of 
knowledge.   
Bergson (2008, p. 20b) briefly sketches the “method of suggestion” and the “logic 
of imagination,” noting how one brings out from “this state of mental chaos the 
precise form of the object of which he wishes to create a hallucination.” The 
protoplasmic transdisciplinary zone is chaotic, but in spite of the turbulence, for 
a polyphibian on the way back to the monophibic reality, it is effortless to pick 
up with precision the proto-forms that will induce “hallucination” among 
monophibians. 
Proceeding by suggestion, according to Bergson (2008, p. 21a), drives one into a 
drowsy state where one is losing consciousness and suspending judgement: 
“they see those coloured, fluid, shapeless masses, which occupy the field of 
vision, insensibly solidifying into distinct objects. Consequently, the gradual 
passing from the dim and vague to the clear and distinct is the method of 
suggestion par excellence.” A polyphibian exits the dynamic heterogeneous 
protoplasmagora into a static monophibic archive with a lucid and clear, but 
ephemeral vision, only to submerge again in the protoplasm.  
Bergson (2008, p. 21a) will attribute this lucid vision, these precisely distilled 
ideas and meanings, to “a certain arrangement of rhythm, rhyme and 
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assonance,” by which “it is possible to lull the imagination, to rock it to and fro 
between like and like with a regular see-saw motion, and thus prepare it 
submissively to accept the vision suggested.” The imaginary solution is realised, 
it gains reality, by resonance. The monophibic mind comprehends the polyphibic 
wisdom as long as the frequency of hypnotism is maintained.  
4.1.2. Essay on dreams: awakening imaginary knowledge 
Bergson’s essay on dreams is yet another report from the periphery of the 
intellect. Dreaming is knowing internally - dream is immediate experience of 
interior sensations through the dreamer’s viscera (Bergson, 1914, p. 26) -
vibrations in the internal organs of the dreamer are transforming, transmuting 
them into organs of knowing. Through dreams the polyphibian is newborn. 
Living this internal knowledge does not require any external representation, 
nothing in dreams is to be exactly repeated, fixed or frozen for examination. The 
details of the dream escape the dreamer by providing new details. The movement 
towards more detailed living knowledge is therefore the movement of dreaming, 
imagining and inventing – polyphibianism. Dreamers communicate only 
internally within the dream, living the same protoplasmic experience from 
different points of being, cohabiting and co-creating protoplasmic agora of 
inexistent conversations: 
To dream a whole conversation, and then, all of a sudden, a 
singular phenomenon strikes the attention of the dreamer. He 
perceives that he does not speak, that he has not spoken, that his 
interlocutor has not uttered a single word, that it was a simple 
exchange of thought between them, a very clear conversation, in 
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which, nevertheless, nothing has been heard. (Bergson, 1914, p. 
22) 
In the dreams there is no need to speak out, no need for intermediary signifiers 
and outwardly signalling systems, since the in-formation is immediate. It is 
digested and metabolised by the transformed visceral organs into always already 
new meaning – there is no need to preserve the meaning or to memorize, to store 
the message. In dreams the message is indeed the medium, as McLuhan (1994, p. 
7) phrased it. Dreaming is communicating within oneself as the organism of 
living knowledge – dreams are communication between different organs of 
knowing, comprehending and metabolising information at different speeds. 
Protoplasm-agora, where conversations are taking place, is phantasm-agoria, the 
place of varying, shifting scenes of phantasms. Protoplasmagora is privately, 
introspectively accessible public space for emphatic exchange of thought.  
The method of introspection is as spontaneous as falling asleep - turning 
attention away from social apparatus back towards personal immediate 
perception. Bergson (1914, p. 26) observes: “We live outside of ourselves. But 
sleep makes us retire into ourselves.” One thus falls asleep outwardly, and 
awakens internally. In dreams the subtlest sensation from one’s environment 
vibrates through one’s senses and, instead of reacting by habit, one is newborn 
with original actions and blossoms into myriad of imaginary solutions. The body 
suddenly gains in degrees of refined sensibility and is able not only to amplify 
but also to actualize within itself any among the vast potentiality of meanings. 
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Knowledge grows from infinitesimal amounts of input, metamorphosing 
existing sensory organs into ephemeral new organs of knowing.  
Bergson (1914, p. 26) refers to the bodily sensations that induce imaginary 
solutions in the dreamer as “internal touch, deep-seated sensations emanating 
from all points of the organism and, more particularly, from the viscera. One 
cannot imagine the degree of sharpness, of acuity, which may be obtained during 
sleep by these interior sensations.” Indeed, from infinitesimal environmental 
input the dreamer imagines infinitely intricate output, which is not in fact an 
output back to the environment, as it cannot be examined externally, because the 
dreaming process cannot be halted in order to inspect a snapshot of the dream. 
Once one tries to focus onto a detail in a dream, the detail morphs with every 
approaching step. The sharpness that Bergson mentions is not in fixity, but rather 
in fluidity of the detail - the detail always escapes us - deeper and deeper one 
looks the more astonishing details are invented, generated on finer and finer 
scales.  
The introspective method practiced by Bergson in his investigations of dreaming 
activity in human beings could be hastily condemned and dismissed as a 
subjective method that fails to secure reproducibility of results. Objective studies 
of dreams tend to be conducted with the purpose of finding the general 
properties of human dreams, properties that do not change from human to 
human, that are measurable and can be measured in an average healthy human 
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individual.i In such studies only external signs of the dreaming process would be 
observed.  With the advancements in technology it is conceivable how the raw 
content of the dream could be registeredii and represented. A possibility of such 
extraction and objectification of the dream by the ever more invasive technocratic 
apparatus, intrudingiii into the utmost private worlds in order to control the will 
of the individual, is a warning sign and the last call to experiment with alternative 
methods.  
Bergson, although approaching the dreams as a unique individual, narrates his 
introspective discoveries with a confidence that there is some generality to his 
dreaming experience. Furthermore, Bergson infers from his observations causes 
of such experiences. The so-called scientific valueiv of his reasoning on dreams 
could be determined by rigorous scientific testing, but there are other values of 
such intuitive method that should not be overlooked, outcomes that match the 
scientific results in precision, as Bergson often reassures the reader. To ensure 
comparability between the intellectual and the intuitive, Bergson wrote his essay 
on dreams as a classic observer’s account on the observed while, in fact, the 
                                                 
i studies with such general scope become problematic already when considering what is an 
average healthy dreaming specimen  
ii for instance, by processing the data of neural activities during sleep and comparing them with 
previously collected sense impressions in awaken state, meticulously linked to neural imaging 
iii falling asleep is the last retreat from the invasive technocratic apparatus and even that is 
imminent to disappear with technological advancements 
iv “scientific value” of a research through intuitive subjective introspection, rather than through 
objective observation, remains as questionable as a ‘pataphysical experiment always yielding an 
exception, rather than ensuring repeatability of results expected from a physical experiment, and 
yet, Bergson is able to demonstrate that the level of precision required in physics can be also 
achieved in metaphysics 
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observer and the observed were merged. Report therefore differs greatly from 
the method itself. Report following research of this kind can only serve as an 
invitation for the reader to complete the creative acti, to relive the experience. 
By observing closely the acuity of senses in the somnolent state, Bergson (1914, 
p. 28) finds the “faculty of sense perception, far from being narrowed during 
sleep at all points […] on the contrary [it is] extended, at least in certain directions, 
in its field of operations.  It is true that it often loses in energy, in tension, what it 
gains in extension.” Relaxing the intellect, losing in tension and gaining in the 
extension of the intuitive field is the opening up to protoplasmagora.  For 
Bergson (1914, p. 28), the sensations from the environment in the somnolent state 
are “the materials of our dreams.” From such “vague and indeterminate” 
material grow immensely detailed creations. 
When the mind creates, I would say when it is capable of giving 
the effort of organization and synthesis which is necessary to 
triumph over a certain difficulty, to solve a problem, to produce 
a living work of the imagination, we are not really asleep, or at 
least that part of ourselves which labours is not the same as that 
which sleeps. We cannot say, then, that it is a dream. (Bergson, 
1914, p. 30)  
Dreaming, creating “a living work of the imagination,” is therefore achievable by 
the intermediary apparatuses and awakening towards certain aspects of directly 
perceivable reality. Polyphibianism is the movement away from such 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.1. for more on how to complete the creative act  
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apparatuses. Woken out of monophibic hypnosis, polyphibians keep direct 
contact with the medium, disregarding all sorts of mediation, assertively 
trespassing the interfaces. While a dreamless monophibian simply shuts the eyes 
and inserts the earplugs to diminish the stimulation of senses, a monophibian 
transmuting into a polyphibian, on the contrary, increases the alertness to 
stimuli, by removing the filters of conventions, by falling asleep towards 
conventional reality.  
The entryway into protoplasmagora, into a state of hyper-creativity and hyper-
awareness, is seemingly drowsy, inaccurate and lacking automatism from the 
monophibic point of view. Polyphibian entering the protoplasmic environment 
utilizes the indeterminacy of the point of being as a leverage in most precise 
inventions for the most accurate adaptations. For Bergson (1914, p. 31), the acuity 
of intellect is not diminished in somnolence, “far from surrendering the 
reasoning faculty during sleep,” new orders of reasoning emerge from dynamics 
of protoplasmagora.  Furthermore, Bergson (1914, p. 34) generalises somnolence 
to any form of indifference, any retirement of interest: “suppose that, at a given 
moment, I become disinterested in the present situation.”  
Paradoxically, indifference to present situation means to be fully in the present, 
that is, to be interested and engaged in the entire present, gaining the universal 
access rather than superficially engaging with the interface. Bergson (1914, p. 37) 
alleges that dreams emerge out of utterly integrated present and past, sensation 
and memory: “The sensation is warm, colored, vibrant and almost living, but 
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vague. The memory is complete, but airy and lifeless. The sensation wishes to 
find a form on which to mold the vagueness of its contours.” The lifeless memory 
is archived in the apparatus. The living, sensed memory, on the other hand, 
preserves itself by being incessantly newborn.  
Integrating lifeless memory with the living sensation, as suggested by Bergson, 
resembles the transdisciplinary flow in between the memoirs of disciplinary 
research. With the imagination of the transdisciplinary dreamer, the disciplinary 
knowledge is metabolized into new organs of knowledge through anabolism, or 
into energy supply for transdisciplinary movement through catabolism. The 
process of digesting and dissolving the structure of disciplinary apparatus in a 
somnolent transdisciplinary state of mind causes drowsiness, the figure – ground 
relations alternate, the environment is filled with dynamic substance of life: 
protoplasmagora yields the living knowledge. 
By practicing indifference to the disciplinary apparatus, polyphibians return to 
the essence of life, beginning a protoplasmic, nondeterministic discourse, imbued 
with potentialities of living organisation. In spite of lack of symbols and systems 
for communication, the knowledge grows consistently into a coherent organism. 
Like in dreams, polyphibic discourse is not an ordinary conversation – unlike 
disciplinary researchers, transdisciplinarians do not publish the results of their 
research, they do not speak out publicly. Rather, the conversation is held 
privately, internally, in a personal undetermined, continuously evolving 
language, a proto-language that is in itself an imaginary solution.  
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The technocratic apparatus built from disciplinary knowledge is increasing in 
complexity and is outgrowing the original scope allocated by its inventors, 
feeding on its inventors. One could even hypothesise that this disciplinary 
apparatus will take life of its own, acknowledging or not the free flow of 
transdisciplinary knowledge. The problem of this apparatus is first and foremost 
that its users are not awakening with it into another order of life, but are 
consumed by it.  
For this reason this thesis proposes firstly the awakening of the researcher into 
polyphibic awareness and growing within and into the living organism of 
knowledge, instead of separating oneself from knowledge production.  The 
imagined evolution of transdisciplinarity therefore reverses the tendency in the 
existing apparatus coming to life by reducing the life-form of its users. The 
imaginary organism of living knowledge enables the user to experience itself in 
a myriad of life-forms by being incessantly newborn into a new solution.    
To reconcile the memory with the sensations in conventional reality, Bergson 
(1914, p. 47) maintains, one needs to invest effort to keep up with the common 
sense, effort that far exceeds that of dreaming, since everything must fall in its 
common place. Apparatus of disciplinary knowledge propagates the use of 
common sense, optimizing the arduous tasks with automation.  The price the 
user pays for the habitual, automated action is a loss of all potential solutions, of 
the potential in the individual.  
196 
 
Giorgio Agamben (2009, p. 21), in his essay ‘What is apparatus?’, highlights the 
process of “desubjectification” of the user that is not compensated by a new 
subject, rather, the subject simply disappears. Likewise the individuality of the 
researcher is consumed but not replaced by the apparatus of disciplinary science. 
While Nicolescu’s (2002, p. 21) ‘Manifesto of transdisciplinarity’ identifies the 
“transubjective,” this thesis imagines evolution of the transdisciplinary organism 
that rather than simply consuming individuality, multiplies the individual 
through infinite series of transmutations. 
While the apparatus of disciplinary knowledge has been assembled as a discrete, 
disconnected structure, the organism of transdisciplinarity connects knowledge 
in between and beyond disciplines.  The advancements in technology are forcing 
the user to adapt rapidly to changes in the apparatus. Although the hastened 
varying of habits is beneficial to break the old habits, the newly invented instincts 
to survive under technocracy of apparatus are learnt from apparatus, rather than 
innate in a reborn user. The user is never integrated in the apparatus as a living 
being - by taking away the subjective individuality, the apparatus only connects 
lifeless data. 
Dreams, as the last retreat from the apparatus, provide the test ground for 
integration of the unique subjective research within the knowledge production. 
Bergson (1914, p. 45) is aware of the importance of this individual introspective 
approach that should complement the archived knowledge: “Something else is 
essential. We need something more than theories. We need an intimate contact 
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with the facts. One must make the decisive experiment upon oneself.” One must 
experiment with one’s own equipment for awaking without being hypnotised by 
the apparatus.  
For the purpose of dream explorations Bergson (1914, p. 45) gives specific 
instructions: “It is necessary that on coming out of a dream, since we cannot 
analyse ourselves in the dream itself, we should watch the transition from 
sleeping to waking, follow upon the transition as closely as possible, and try to 
express by words what we experience in this passage. This is very difficult, but 
may be accomplished by forcing the attention.” After guiding the reader to the 
threshold in theory Bergson (1914, pp. 45-50) asks the reader for permission to 
narrate his own personal experience of crossing the threshold: 
Now the dreamer dreamed that he was speaking before an 
assembly, that he was making a political speech before a political 
assembly. Then in the midst of the auditorium a murmur rose. 
The murmur augmented; it became a muttering. Then it became 
a roar, a frightful tumult, and finally there resounded from all 
parts timed to a uniform rhythm the cries, “Out! Out!” At that 
moment he wakened. A dog was baying in a neighboring 
garden, and with each one of his “Wow-wows” one of the cries 
of “Out! Out!” seemed to be identical. Well, here was the 
infinitesimal moment which it is necessary to seize. 
The waking ego, just reappearing, should turn to the dreaming 
ego, which is still there, and, during some instants at least, hold 
it without letting it go. “I have caught you at it! You thought it 
was a crowd shouting and it was a dog barking. Now, I shall not 
let go of you until you tell me just what you were doing!” To 
which the dreaming ego would answer, “I was doing nothing; 
and this is just where you and I differ from one another. You 
imagine that in order to hear a dog barking, and to know that it 
is a dog that barks, you have nothing to do. That is a great 
mistake. You accomplish, without suspecting it, a considerable 
effort. You take your entire memory, all your accumulated 
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experience, and you bring this formidable mass of memories to 
converge upon a single point, in such a way as to insert exactly 
in the sounds you heard that one of your memories which is the 
most capable of being adapted to it. Nay, you must obtain a 
perfect adherence, for between the memory that you evoke and 
the crude sensation that you perceive there must not be the least 
discrepancy; otherwise you would be just dreaming. This 
adjustment you can only obtain by an effort of the memory and 
an effort of the perception, just as the tailor who is trying on a 
new coat pulls together the pieces of cloth that he adjusts to the 
shape of your body in order to pin them. You exert, then, 
continually, every moment of the day, an enormous effort. Your 
life in a waking state is a life of labor, even when you think you 
are doing nothing, for at every minute you have to choose and 
every minute exclude. You choose among your sensations, since 
you reject from your consciousness a thousand subjective 
sensations which come back in the night when you sleep. You 
choose, and with extreme precision and delicacy, among your 
memories, since you reject all that do not exactly suit your 
present state. This choice which you continually accomplish, this 
adaptation, ceaselessly renewed, is the first and most essential 
condition of what is called common sense. But all this keeps you 
in a state of uninterrupted tension. You do not feel it at the 
moment, any more than you feel the pressure of the atmosphere, 
but it fatigues you in the long run. Common sense is very 
fatiguing.”  
“So, I repeat, I differ from you precisely in that I do nothing. The 
effort that you give without cessation I simply abstain from 
giving. In place of attaching myself to life, I detach myself from 
it. Everything has become indifferent to me. I have become 
disinterested in everything. To sleep is to become disinterested. 
One sleeps to the exact extent to which he becomes disinterested. 
A mother who sleeps by the side of her child will not stir at the 
sound of thunder, but the sigh of the child will wake her. Does 
she really sleep in regard to her child? We do not sleep in regard 
to what continues to interest us.” 
“You ask me what it is that I do when I dream? I will tell you 
what you do when you are awake. You take me, the me of 
dreams, me the totality of your past, and you force me, by 
making me smaller and smaller, to fit into the little circle that 
you trace around your present action. That is what it is to be 
awake. That is what it is to live the normal psychical life. It is to 
battle. It is to will. As for the dream, have you really any need 
that I should explain it? It is the state into which you naturally 
fall when you let yourself go, when you no longer have the 
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power to concentrate yourself upon a single point, when you 
have ceased to will. What needs much more to be explained is 
the marvellous mechanism by which at any moment your will 
obtains instantly, and almost unconsciously, the concentration of 
all that you have within you upon one and the same point, the 
point that interests you. But to explain this is the task of normal 
psychology, of the psychology of waking, for willing and 
waking are one and the same thing.”  
This is what the dreaming ego would say. And it would tell us a 
great many other things still if we could let it talk freely. 
The report on the encounter between the “waking ego” and the “dreaming ego,” 
which Bergson (1914, p. 46) experiences for an infinitesimal moment, is examined 
in this thesis as an important document of introspectioni. Namely, the passage 
above recounts the indecisiveness experienced in a somnolent state, on the 
threshold where one awakens into a dream or back into conventional reality, or 
both – when one awakens into a lucid dream awareness. Bergson manages to 
maintain the balance on the threshold to the dream, thus turning it for a moment 
into a lucid dream, where two realities are intricately unfolding in parallel. A 
lucid dreamer could be defined as an amphibian, aware of both realities, but since 
every dream is by default a multiplicity of potential dreams – a dreamer that is 
awaken into this plurality is therefore awaken into polyphibic awareness.  
                                                 
i the quoted passage of introspection is important for the three cases studied in this thesis - 
Duchamp, Bergson and Poincaré - see chapter 3.2.1 for example of Poincaré’s introspection into 
the process of mathematical discovery and chapter 4.2.1 for example of Duchamp’s introspection 
in the process of creative act  
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In this infinitesimal moment, when the polyphibian becomes aware of its 
plurality, a single question is posed by individual to its dividual self: “just what 
were you doing?” The answer that follows from Bergson (1914, p. 46) on the other 
side of the threshold, that is, from protoplasmagora, is simple: “I was doing 
nothing.” This is the typical answer of a polyphibian. Duchamp was known to 
proclaim himself as a do-nothing, “the public began to take literally Duchamp’s 
pronouncement that he preferred ‘living rather than working’, by accepting his 
self-description ‘I am a breather’” (Judovitz, 1995, p. 196), but there is more to it. 
Dreaming happens with no effort, no energy investment, one finds oneself in a 
dream spontaneously, as if by osmosis. Duchamp worked in the same manner, 
effortlessly but carefully, not to prevent the osmosis from happening. 
What is a polyphibian abstaining from by doing nothing? Bergson (1914, p. 48) 
compares the energy invested by the non-dreamer in “a state of uninterrupted 
tension,” trying to prevent osmosis into a dream, to “the pressure of the 
atmosphere,” not unlike the so-called osmotic pressure that inhibits the 
spontaneous inward flow through the semi permeable membrane. A polyphibian 
is adjusting the permeability of the interfaces. Bergson reveals how the common 
sense, with all the conventions of the technocratic apparatus, is continually 
exhausting the monophibians, without them being aware of it. Polyphibians 
release this pressure, remove the apparatus, to breathe freely.  
Bergson (1914, p. 48) formulates with precision: “To sleep is to become 
disinterested. One sleeps to the exact extent to which he becomes disinterested.” 
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By becoming disinterested to the noise of the apparatus, one’s innermost interests 
surface.  The dreamer that remains interested in a certain aspect of a certain 
phenomenon invents by dreaming up the solution. Such solution lies exactly at 
the intersection of all involved realitiesi and follows the logic of the intellect at its 
periphery – where “relaxed reasoning” applies. Dreaming relaxes tensions, 
resolves problems into solutions that are otherwise inconceivable by strict 
rationality.  
By making a distinction between the effort “to concentrate […] on a single point” 
and inability or unwillingness to do so in dreams, Bergson (1914, p. 49) prepares 
the analogy to be drawn in distinguishing monophibic and polyphibic 
awareness. A dreamer lets herself go, dispersing herself all over 
protoplasmagora, while the awaken person will concentrate, condense her entire 
past to solve a single isolated problem at hand. Evolutionary transmutation into 
a polyphibian is driven by the original impetus – pure curiosity – the individual 
spontaneously dissolves into a multiplicity of points of being because a single 
viewpoint does not satisfy the urge to know.  
While the monophibian updates and downloads instructions and requirements 
for new instincts issued by the apparatus, the polyphibian discards all warnings 
to upgrade to new versions and decides to follow “low-tech” intuition instead. 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. for a practical example of such solution, determined at the precise threshold 
between physics and ‘pataphysics that abides by the principles of both domains  
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Polyphibian is a self-evicted outcast that by passive indifference disassembles the 
apparatus. Monophibian is working hard to keep up, polyphibian is a 
Duchampian do-nothing. Polyphibianism is therefore the tendency to detach 
oneself from implanted and imposed instincts only to plunge oneself intuitively 
into protoplasmagora. 
Studying the faculties of a dream Bergson (1914, p. 50) summarises: “we perceive 
still, we remember still, we reason still. Abundance, in the domain of the mind, 
does not mean effort. What requires an effort is the precision of adjustment.” 
While opening to the wholeness in protoplasmagora is a spontaneous osmotic 
event, closing into a detail, concentration, fixation on a single point is working 
against osmosis. No detail is revealed in protoplasmagora without a mesmerising 
revelation of infinitely intricate structure beneath it. Polyphibianism, just as 
dreaming, is a flux, it is not to be interrupted for the observer to observe – any 
such inquiry is a waste of energy. There is no need for confirmation of 
observation, for adjustment of perception to conventional conception.  
Apparent incoherence in a dream is not to be mistaken as imprecision, on the 
contrary, it is an intricate opening, elaborated stratifying into a multiplicity of 
dreams. Polyphibian does not aim for precise attunement with a single strata but 
attempts to coexist coherently in a plurality of realities. The term precision in 
protoplasmagora is analogous to coming into resonance – a polyphibian fine-
tunes the fluctuations of layered dreams until a new order emerges. Unlike 
monophibic precision in measurement, such as accurate comparisons in terms of 
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congruence, a polyphibic precision does not compare from a single point of view, 
but experiences plurality in resonance from incomparable points of being.   
A dreamer is incapable of “that attention to life which is necessary in order that 
the inner may be regulated by the outer.” The attention to life that Bergson (1914, 
p. 53) mentions is the regulator between arbitrary realities and the apparatus. A 
monophibian regulates the precise adjustment to mono-reality approved by the 
apparatus. A polyphibian is not fully attentive to the ordinary life, to this order 
of life, but disperses over many orders, experiences the imaginary living 
organisations, multiplies and intensifies the life. Dreams often seem more intense 
than “life.”    
Bergson (1914, p. 54) observes that attention of the dreamer is not towards the 
most relevant issues in life – quite the opposite, dreams for Bergson (1914, p. 55) 
“concern themselves,” dreams are made of stuff one disregards and ignores 
during the day: “the events which reappear by preference in the dream are those 
of which we have thought most distractedly.” Indifference to waking life is where 
the data leaks in – paying attention by not paying attention, in other words, 
effortless attention is what absorbs the dreamer through osmosis: “The ego of the 
dream is an ego that is relaxed; the memories which it gathers most readily are 
the memories of relaxation and distraction, those which do not bear the mark of 
effort” (Bergson, 1914, p. 55). 
A successful dreamer masters relaxation into attention - the more relaxed become 
the boundaries of a dream, the more the dreamer awakens. Bergson (1914, p. 55) 
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assumes the experiences in most “profound slumber” are so alien, that they are 
forgotten and discarded after waking back to conventional reality. “Sometimes, 
nevertheless, we recover something of them. And then it is a very peculiar 
feeling, strange, indescribable, that we experience. It seems to us that we have 
returned from afar in space and afar in time” (Bergson, 1914, p. 55). The 
indescribability of such dreams is due to the fact that no interface is available to 
represent the knowledge that was grasped directly. No language within the 
technocratic apparatus will suffice to report on such experiences - it is only by 
inventing new organs of knowing that this knowledge can be shared, grown and 
evolved.   
This thesis relies on the human ability to relax and expand the limits of 
disciplinary research and to confidently dream up, imagine, concoct and 
conceive the organism of living knowledge through which the inexpressible in 
transdisciplinarity could evolve and propagate the experience among 
researchers. Polyphibianism is the movement of such dreamers that 
communicate their transcending experiences, in a sense, telepathically – through 
imaginary organs of knowingi - their experiences are emphatically absorbed and 
lived in non-local protoplasmagora. Bergson alleges the possibility of shared 
dreams that lead to other orders of awareness, and yet, for the time being, he 
                                                 
i while the imaginary is, in general, considered as the domain of imagination of the individual, in 
this thesis the imaginary organs are shared among individuals that have divided into dividuals, 
as in a shared dream – see chapter 4.1.3.4. for more on the notion of individual and dividual 
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remains reserved about describing it further, perhaps simply because it is 
indescribable: 
I do not dare express an opinion upon phenomena of this class, 
but I cannot avoid attaching some importance to the 
observations gathered by so rigorous a method and with such 
indefatigable zeal by the Society for Psychical Research. If 
telepathy influences our dreams, it is quite likely that in this 
profound slumber it would have the greatest chance to manifest 
itself. But I repeat, I cannot express an opinion upon this point. I 
have gone forward with you as far as I can; I stop upon the 
threshold of the mystery. To explore the most secret depths of 
the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of 
consciousness, that will be the principal task of psychology in 
the century which is opening. I do not doubt that wonderful 
discoveries await it there, as important perhaps as have been in 
the preceding centuries the discoveries of the physical and 
natural sciences. That at least is the promise which I make for it, 
that is the wish that in closing I have for it. (Bergson, 1914, p. 56) 
4.1.3. Creative evolution of living knowledge 
4.1.3.1. Theory of knowledge – theory of evolution 
Living knowledge is to be born out of Creative Evolution, yet another work by 
Bergson (2005). Just as life begins in protoplasm, to give birth to a living 
knowledge, a protoplasmic stage termed protoplasmagora is set up, for the 
purposes of this thesis. This term was already briefly introducedi, where the 
resemblance of a protoplasmic, pre-conventional states of awareness to the 
various states of dreams was pointed out in Bergson’s (1914) essay on dreams. 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.1.2. and appendix A for more on protoplasmagora 
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Just as a figure needs a ground, or just as the animal cannot exist without the 
environment, so does the polyphibian require a protoplasmic medium.  
Polyphibianism as a movement cannot be suitably defined without a background 
- the polyphibian explores the transdisciplinary territory. 
If protoplasm is considered to be the primordial living substance, then 
protoplasmagora is the primordial generator of the living knowledge. 
Polyphibian is conceived as a being-solution, a being that is coming into knowing 
through adaption. The self-organising experiences of the polyphibian are 
forming an ever new organism that is born in front of every new problem. 
Polyphibian is the living knowledge incarnated – it has the impetus required to 
reorganise itself wherever there is a fertile territory. It is this mutual dependence 
with its environment that defines the polyphibian. To comprehend the living 
knowledge it needs to be non-arbitrarily dissected in two agents – each of them 
alternating between active and passive role, in other words, assuming in turn the 
role of agent and ambient.  
From a previous line of discussion on methodologyi a question arises: can a 
newly invented concept operate on its own, without a context? In organic terms: 
can a newly conceived organism survive on its own, without the environment? 
The interdependence here is not simply complementary, one is not merely the 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.3. for more on distinction between inventing concepts and conceiving  organisms 
207 
 
opposite of the other, but rather a heterogeneous amalgam of one and the other. 
A clear cut separation of a polyphibian and protoplasmagora into a 
homogeneous agent and ambient would be artificial and restrictive, just as a 
division between the observer and the observed prevents certain problems to be 
resolved.  To start the evolution of these terms either agency could be defined by 
both: [polyphibian = polyphibian + protoplasmagora] and [protoplasmagora = 
protoplasmagora + polyphibian]. 
Protoplasmagora is therefore as much auxiliary to a polyphibian, as is 
polyphibian auxiliary to protoplasmagora, both are organisms at the service of 
each other. In simple terms, the protoplasm, as a proto-living substance, already 
differentiates its metabolism into anabolic processes that internalise the material 
input, transforming the material into organism’s own vital substance, thus the 
material becomes alive, and catabolic processes that externalise the input into a 
lifeless substance output, serving the organism as a prosthesis. In the same 
manner one might imagine an organism of knowledge metabolising its material 
into living internalised substance and external lifeless substance that can be worn 
as prosthetic apparatus until it becomes obsolete and is simply cut off, as hair or 
nails, and archived. 
Polyphibians, regarded as a product of anabolism within the protoplasmic 
transdisciplinary metabolism, are intricately integrated and internalised by 
protoplasmagora. By-products of catabolism, on the other hand, are monophibic, 
mechanical and lifeless, and therefore externalised, expelled to the periphery, 
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where they are subject to comical corrective, as discussed beforei. Although 
monophibians lose touch with living knowledge and, at best, simulate it with 
crude approximations, they can be born again into the living knowledge if 
digested by protoplasmagora. Laughter facilitates metabolism of living 
knowledge through contractions and relaxations of a constipated reasoning – the 
spasms of a comical corrective. Nonetheless laughter does not simplify 
metabolism – the products of a metabolic equation that operates on 
monophibians are complex, retaining both monophibic and polyphibic 
components. Upon entering the transdisciplinary territory one is consumed by 
this territory – one’s energy dissipates and is redistributed in both disciplinary 
and transdisciplinary research.  
Transdisciplinary metabolism can only gain momentum with the growing 
number of disciplines - rupturing borders of disciplinary domains yields new 
disciplines. This continuous supply of new disciplines is crucial to maintain the 
dynamics of the metabolising disciplinary knowledge into a living knowledge, 
which is only possible at the ruptures, the cracks, the thresholds. Living 
knowledge in turn generates more knowledge to be archived in auxiliary 
disciplines. Transdisciplinary territory cannot therefore be simply associated 
with non-disciplinary products, knowledge captured in disciplines is just as well 
part of transdisciplinary metabolic process. Defining transdisciplinarity or 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.1.1. on comical corrective of the mechanical intellectual habits 
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protoplasmagora in this recursive process ensures the protoplasmic instability, 
the ceaseless change, the state of flux, and sustains life in the knowledge.  
The introduction to Bergson’s book Creative Evolution contains a daring 
statement that equates comprehension of life with comprehension of knowledge: 
“theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable” (Bergson, 2005, 
p. xxiii). As inspiring as this conjecture sounds, it raises doubts – one could argue 
about the accuracy of this proposition by simply comparing the size of theory of 
knowledge to that of life. On the one hand, the arguments would abound that 
knowledge of life, however life is defined, is but reduction of life, that knowledge 
cannot encompass all life in its entirety, that it cannot be bigger than life. On the 
other hand, theory of knowledge could be argued to be bigger than theory of life 
if knowledge is to encompass both the living and the non-living.  
Once the domain of one theory is at the same time shown to be bigger and smaller 
than the domain of the other, the doubts on the unequal size of domains become 
redundant – both must be of the same size. Further doubts on the structural 
incompatibility of both domains are carefully swept away by Bergson, as the 
reader learns how evolution of life and that of intellect intertwine. From “the 
perfect fitting of our body to its environment” Bergson (2005, p. xix) 
demonstrates how intellect evolved for the purpose “to think matter,” and yet 
intellect is only one strand of evolution: 
[…] the line of evolution that ends in man is not the only one. On 
other paths, divergent from it, other forms of consciousness have 
been developed, which have not been able to free themselves 
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from external constraints or to regain control over themselves, as 
the human intellect has done, but which, none the less, also 
express something that is immanent and essential in the 
evolutionary movement. Suppose these other forms of 
consciousness brought together and amalgamated with intellect: 
would not the result be a consciousness as wide as life? And such 
a consciousness, turning around suddenly against the push of 
life which it feels behind, would have a vision of life complete 
[…] (Bergson, 2005, pp. xxii - xxiii)  
Taken from this standpoint, all potential forms of awareness are immanent in 
evolution and would therefore, if operating in unison, be able to grasp life 
immediately. How is such potentiality to affect a human being that is merely one 
of evolutionary “experiments” on modes of awareness – the human 
consciousness? How can human intellect reconnect with other modes of 
awareness? The comical corrective to the limitations of bare intellectual self-
awareness through spasms of laughter might bring intellect in resonance with 
otherwise intellectually unavailable types of consciousness, amplifying and 
modifying the intellectual features to a critical point where new patterns of 
knowing emerge – organisation of knowledge that is aware as both the primary 
intellectual organism and its mutations. Bergson imagines a variety of 
awarenesses surrounding and complementing the intellect, modes of awareness 
which intellect on its own cannot penetrate but could resonate with and harness 
their power:  
“ [...] we do not transcend our intellect, for it is still with our 
intellect, and through our intellect, that we see the other forms 
of consciousness. And this would be right if we were pure 
intellects, if there did not remain, around our conceptual and 
logical thought, a vague nebulosity, made of the very substance 
out of which has been formed the luminous nucleus that we call 
the intellect. Therein reside certain powers that are 
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complementary to the understanding, powers of which we have 
only an indistinct feeling when we remain shut up in ourselves, 
but which will become clear and distinct when they perceive 
themselves at work, so to speak, in the evolution of nature. They 
will thus learn what sort of effort they must make to be 
intensified and expanded in the very direction of life.” (Bergson, 
2005, p. xxiii) 
From Bergson’s essay on laughter it could be inferred that a comical corrective is 
to be triggered at the periphery of intellect, that this “vague nebulosity” could 
somehow cause the spasms of laughter. Intellect is awaken into new orders of 
self-awareness at its very fringes, where it comes in touch with other 
evolutionary strands of consciousness. Evolved primarily “to think matter” 
(Bergson, 2005, p. xix), intellect has organised matter to such sophisticated stage 
of technology that it cannot “think its innovations” on its own. The 
computational complexity of intellectual gadgetsi has long escaped the scope of 
raw intellect and so did the impact of these gadgets on the environmental matter 
escape the intellectual models of control.ii  To catch up with rapid changes in the 
environment, the intellect has to get involved with modes of imagination that 
was potential in the evolution but was not sufficiently realized in human beings. 
                                                 
i intellectual gadgets are parts of technology apparatus that abstracts a solution to a particular 
problem and applies it as a model to ever more general category of problems – the abstraction 
increases and  surpasses the ability of raw human intellect to innovate – ever more sophisticated  
tools are required to upgrade tools 
 
ii rather than getting to know the environment intuitively by participating in it, a civilization 
driven by technological progress aims to conquer the unknown through intellectual models of 
control, thus separating the observer from the observed and impeding participation by disabling 
immediate communication with the environment 
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According to Bergson’s suggestion, any being is potentially just as creative as the 
entire evolution of beings. As a by-product of evolution it virtually includes 
enfolded all the imagination necessary to diversify and to empathise with strands 
of evolution that diverted away from it.  To harness such potentiality would be 
to learn immediately, without symbolic interfaces, to self-organize without a 
blueprint.  The schematic intellectual knowledge is growing in quantity but not 
evolving in quality, losing ability to adapt even to increasingly complex 
conditions that it creates itself.   
By showing how the theory of knowledge and the theory of life cannot reach their 
full potential one without the other and how their interpenetration is inevitable, 
Bergson encourages participation beyond that of Bergsonism, a participatory 
imagination of evolution of living knowledge. A successful merging can, 
according to Bergson, take place on the basis of mutual quality control (Bergson, 
2005, p. xxiii). The theory of life cannot just blindly take on the categories and 
concepts as made readily available by the theory of knowledge: “It thus obtains 
a symbolism which is convenient, perhaps even necessary to positive science, but 
not a direct vision of its object” (Bergson, 2005, p. xxiii).  
The theory of knowledge cannot by itself explain the evolution of knowledge. By 
contemplating the limitation of knowledge, it is therefore imperative to 
implement the theory of life from the very beginning. “It is necessary that these 
two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, 
by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly” (Bergson, 2005, p. xxiv).  
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This is where this thesis picks up and takes Bergson’s proposition to extreme (one 
of many possible extremes) as already announcedi. This thesis is examining an 
imaginary solution for transdisciplinary research, imaginary in the sense it takes 
on any of the possible paths of evolution of consciousness.  
If the theory of knowledge does not involve the incessant change of methods of 
knowing, of ways to be in the know, to live, experience and invent the knowing 
organism, then only a finite quantity of knowledge can be produced, with a finite 
resolution – neither additions to the knowledge nor additional refinement will 
increase certainty or validity of the given knowledge. Knowledge needs to be an 
open structure, as the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity requires and demands 
(Nicolescu, 2002). The living knowledge does not oppose the traditional forms of 
knowledge, in fact, it builds upon them or rather metabolises them into its own 
internal or external by-products.  
4.1.3.2. Coming into being – growing into knowing 
“For our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if 
it were, there would never be anything but the present, no 
prolonging of the past into the actual, no evolution, no concrete 
duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which 
gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as 
the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its 
preservation.” (Bergson, 2005, pp. 6,7) 
                                                 
i see chapter 3.3. Bergson, Bergsonism, Polyphibianism 
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Disciplinary knowledge is acquired, experienced in the past as well as ready to 
be reused, reapplied in the present, but the past disciplinary research needs to be 
externalised, compartmentalised, conceptualised and artificially preserved for 
future application. To imagine an evolution of living knowledge in the 
transdisciplinary zone, Bergson (2005, p. 7) hints at the possibility of internal self-
preservation: “the past is preserved by itself, automatically.” Could the living 
knowledge be preserved in itself, in its own self-organised organism?   
To survive independently of archiving schemas for retrieving information, 
knowledge must be spontaneously relived, revived and grown – the ability to 
grow by self-organisation must be inherent in the evolutionary structuring of the 
living knowledge. A limited archive cannot accommodate unlimited amount of 
knowledge - with accumulation of compartmentalised disciplinary data the 
archive clutters and information retrieval becomes obstructed. Addition of new 
specialised disciplinary compartments merely postpones the cluttering – the 
stagnating disciplinary knowledge eventually dies off. On the contrary, 
transdisciplinary zone, as envisioned in this thesis, might as well be finite – the 
incessant intricate growth of living knowledge prevents the death of knowledge.  
To imagine an organism of finite area that could grow indefinitely, is to imagine 
it in duration - the living knowledge “swells as it advances” - to borrow Bergson’s 
(2005, p. 7) expression. Living knowledge does not grow beyond itself into 
something else, into another category of knowledge – it does not divide and 
disintegrate itself into predetermined compartments.  Living knowledge grows 
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within itself. This growth is not necessarily an expansion, as it is an increase in 
its vitality. Infinite potential for growth within a finite area can be imagined in 
terms of fractal geometry. The self-organised knowledge is a fractal self-
preserving structure.  
The scope of transdisciplinarity evolved into an organism of living knowledge is 
therefore not to increase the number of disciplines or to enlarge the volume of 
disciplinary domains, but to intensify the zone in between and beyond the 
disciplines – to bring that zone to life. In order to improve the ability to perceive 
an object of interest at a higher resolution disciplinary researchers collaborate in 
taking as many snapshots of the observed object from as many viewpoints as 
possible. Bergson finds that the same problem persists, even at the highest 
resolution: 
All knowledge properly so-called is, therefore, turned in a 
certain direction or taken from a certain point of view. It is true 
that our interest is often complex. And that is why we sometimes 
manage to turn our knowledge of the same object in several 
successive directions and to cause view-points concerning it to 
vary […] This is what, in the ordinary meaning of these terms, a 
“wide” and “comprehensive” knowledge of the object consists 
in: the object, then, is led back, not to a unique concept, but to 
several concepts […] (Bergson, 1992, p. 177) 
Disciplinary knowledge, according to Bergson (1992, p. 177) therefore turns 
objects into concepts. The more the knowledge is comprehensive, the more 
concepts come out of the same object of interest. With increase in quantity the 
quality of knowledge therefore remains the same, but Bergson (1992, p. 173) is 
worried about the naivety of science in multiplying “indefinitely the points of 
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view of that object. It is quickly persuaded that putting all the points of view 
together, it could reconstitute the object.”  
In the continuous tradition of renaissance culture knowledge production relies 
on viewpoints taken, but with the inevitable and irreversible changes in 
conditions brought about by the rise of omnipresent electronic culture Derrick de 
Kerckhove (1997, p. 187) notes the turn from point-of-view to point-of-beingi: 
“My point-of-being is not exclusive but inclusive; it is not a perspective vision 
that frames reality, but rather, is a place defined by the precision and complexity 
of my connections with the world.”  
One cannot live the knowledge by being separated from it through artificial 
division in the observer and the observed. No matter how many fixed viewpoints 
one can occupy, how many snapshots of the same phenomena can be obtained – 
to live the knowledge is to multiply one’s points-of-being rather than points-of-
view. A disciplinary researcher multiplies her or himself externally by invention 
of instruments carefully distributed in relation to the researched phenomena, 
reaching many viewpoints at once. A transdisciplinary researcher evolved into a 
polyphibian multiplies in poly-organic-being, accessing the experience of the 
phenomena through internally invented organs of knowing.  
                                                 
i see appendix for more on term point-of-being 
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Through internalisation of knowledge, coming into being becomes coming into 
knowledge. Instead of knowing through external viewpoints, the knowledge is 
lived internally through the being. But how is such knowledge self-organised 
within the transdisciplinary organism where “there is no register, no drawer; 
there is not even, properly speaking, a faculty, for a faculty works intermittently, 
when it will or when it can, whilst the piling up of the past upon the past goes on 
without relaxation” (Bergson, 2005, p. 7)? 
With this excerpt, where Bergson in fact observes the organisation of past 
memories in an ordinary human organism, a transferal to a transdisciplinary 
organism of living knowledge seems straight-forward. Bergson dismisses the 
necessity to organise the past, by claiming that past organises itself. Past is not to 
be retrieved on demand by some laborious procedure but “[...] it is with our 
entire past [...] that we desire, will and act” (Bergson, 2005, p. 8). 
Polyphibian, as a transdisciplinary organism, moves through the 
transdisciplinary zone - protoplasmagora: an agora of all polyphibic organisms – 
the entire evolutionary past of polyphibianism. Protoplasmagora affects 
polyphibic organs holistically, or in the context of human organs of 
consciousness: “Our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse, 
it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it is only known in the 
form of idea” (Bergson, 2005, p. 8). Polyphibianism, as a movement, gets the 
impulse from the dynamics of the mutual dependency between the figure and 
the ground, the polyphibian and the protoplasmagora. The entirety of that 
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impulse can be compared to transdisciplinary tendency, while only a part of the 
impulse can be distilled into a disciplinary idea that will turn into action: 
In its entirety, probably, it follows us at every instant […] leaning 
over the present which is about to join it, pressing against the 
portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside […] just 
so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of this 
past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast 
light on the present situation or further the action now being 
prepared […] (Bergson, 2005, p. 7) 
4.1.3.3. Newborn in front of every experience 
[… ] before each new object we should be as the new-born babe; 
like it we could only obey our caprices or our needs. […] In such 
a world there would be no science; perhaps thought and even 
life would be impossible, since evolution could not there 
develop the preservational instincts. (Poincaré, 1913, pp. 363, 
364) 
If human actions were not driven by survival, which enables generalisation and 
categorisation of pieces into groups or individuals into species, there would be 
no recognition – with each encountered object the process of getting to know it 
would start from scratch. Without the ability to equate the unequal (or the not 
entirely equal) Poincaré doubts the human species would persist, let alone 
develop either language or science. Herbert Molderings, researching the 
influence of Poincaré’s writings about science on Duchamp’s art, came across the 
citation above from Poincaré’s treatise Science and Method and drew an 
interesting conjecture:  
This was the idea – “before each new object we should be as the 
new-born babe” – that had been guiding Duchamp’s 
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experimental artistic thoughts and actions since 1913. Art should 
no longer be based on social convention over what is “aesthetic” 
or what is “artistic” but should be an activity that makes possible 
the experience of the incomparable, the rare, the unique. 
(Molderings, 2010, pp. 2257-63) 
Duchamp, according to Molderings, solved the conventional restrictions of 
science by reversing the very drive inherent in humans that enables the formation 
of science in the first place. As Poincaré explains in Science and Hypothesis, 
geometry, mathematics, or science in general, is a matter of convention rather 
than truth, striving for maximum functionality and convenience in given 
conditions – it is “[…] by natural selection [that] our mind has adapted itself to 
the conditions of the external world, that it has adopted the geometry most 
advantageous to the species: or in other words the most convenient” (Poincaré, 
1913, p. 91). The price that is paid for this “convenience” has affected several of 
scientific disciplines. Molderings (2010, pp. 2347-53), for instance, comes across 
concerns in letters of quantum physicist Wolfgang Pauli (1996, p. 56) for 
[…] the loss of the unique in the scientific conceptualization of 
nature. What we have experienced in quantum mechanics is the 
occurrence of the essentially unique where it would least be 
expected, namely in (‘non-lawful’) individual observation. 
In this battle between the science of the general and the science of unique 
quantum physics leans inadvertently towards a ‘pataphysical approach. 
Duchamp exhibited severe ‘pataphysical inclinations, long before he was 
officially accepted in the Collège de ’Pataphysique. Departing from Poincaré’s 
observation, Duchamp’s mission became to be new-born in front of every 
phenomenon, with each experience of it. A new-born encountering problems 
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from the same category (that would be ordinarily generalized into the same type 
of problem, in order to be approached the same way) resolves them in a new way 
on each encounter. In 3 standard stoppages a standard length of one meter yields 
a new “standard” for meter each time it is dropped on the floor from the height 
of one meter. His experiment is set up so the results are always unique, never 
repeated and impossible to generalize into a law.  
Duchamp’s pursuit to be relentlessly new-born reverses the very drive of 
generalisation that enabled the formation of any disciplinary science, that is, 
science conducted without compromising the discipline of its prescribed 
methodology. In one stroke the whole disciplinary schema collapses and the 
convention that an artist should not tackle science and vice versa is suddenly 
dismantled. Duchamp crosses the threshold into a transdisciplinary zone. In this 
safety zone any being can survive without generalisation, by approaching any 
problem in unique way over and over, and treating any result as an exception. 
The thriving in this protoplasmic zone depends on the rate of new births. 
Polyphibians are accumulating knowledge and growing with it in the 
protoplasmic environment of transdisciplinary placenta. With growth and 
invention of organs, the tissue of knowledge stiffens, shielding itself from 
transdisciplinary fluctuations on its periphery with a thickening layer of dead 
cells. If polyphibic organism of knowledge is not born anew with every 
protoplasmic turbulence, it coagulates, solidifies and fossilizes into an archive of 
a long forgotten discipline.  
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Polyphibians are practicing eternally youthful knowledge by relaxing the 
structure that they metabolise as external product, therefore with each “breath” 
and “absorption” of new knowledge, of new imaginary solution, the previous 
scaffolding is demolished. Since protoplasmagora is by definition self-
assembling there is no permanent damage inflicted upon the structure of the 
living knowledge. Protoplasmagora serves as a re-usable placenta of never-
ending process of birth. 
With every birth of a polyphibian monophibic individuality is scattered into 
dividuals and ceaselessly reshuffled. A disciplinary individual trespassing the 
threshold into transdisciplinarity is immediately multiplied into a polyphibian, 
a being that is a variable aggregate of multiple dividuals, sharing organs of 
knowledge with a population of other polyphibians, all gathered within the 
protoplasmic agora. Bergson (2005, p. 8) carefully observes how such variability 
is inherent in every individual personality, underlying not only incessant novelty 
in one’s personality but also its unpredictability:  
Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its 
accumulated experience, changes without ceasing. By changing 
it prevents any state, although superficially identical with 
another, from ever repeating it in its very depth. Thus our 
personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its 
moments is something new added to what was before. We may 
go further: it is not only something new, but something 
unforeseeable.  
Namely, Bergson (2005, p. 9) reasserts: “To predict it would have been to produce 
it before it was produced.” From Bergson’s observation it becomes clear that the 
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difference between disciplinary and transdisciplinary knowledge lies in its 
divisibility. If inert matter of knowledge is divided arbitrarily in most convenient 
manner, regardless of its inherent articulation, it remains inert. For the 
knowledge to live, the organism of knowledge must be self-assembled from 
dividuals in an open environment, where dividuals are mutually dependent and 
shared. 
Bergson (2005, p. 11) articulates his idea with an abstract example: “the group 
doesn’t grow old.” A group of elements that does not experience duration, on 
which operations in time are reversible is neither old nor young, but simply 
halted in time. “A group of elements which has gone through a state can always 
find its way back to that state. Any state of the group should be repeated as often 
as desired, and consequently the group does not grow old. It has no history” 
(Bergson, 2005, p. 11). From disciplinary knowledge an entire range of 
consequences of theorems can be constructed following the logic of that 
discipline – the implicit implications can be predicted. The process of resolving 
all the details is foreseeable, because the units form time reversible groups.  
In contrast to the stagnant disciplinary knowledge that never grows old but is 
never young either, the transdisciplinary knowledge must remain young while 
growing and maturing – in Bergson’s (2005, p. 10) words: “to exist is to change, 
to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.” 
Polyphibic maturity comes out of enduring the changing conditions that in turn 
ensures novelty, the birth of the unforeseen.  Youth can be imagined to persist in 
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the organism of living knowledge that is increasingly maturing, if this knowledge 
is lived in duration rather than preserved in time. On the contrary, Bergson 
observes, in the never young and never old knowledge duration plays no role 
and time is a mere convention: 
Therefore the flow of time might assume an infinite rapidity, the 
entire past, present, and future of material objects or of isolated 
systems might be spread out all at once in space, without there 
being anything to change either in the formulae of the scientist 
or even in the language of common sense. (Bergson, 2005, p. 12)  
To think the knowledge, the pace of time can be chosen arbitrarily, to live the 
knowledge, duration is of essence. Bergson (2005, p. 13) observes the experience 
of duration in the human subject: “[…] my own duration, which I cannot protract 
or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived. It is 
no longer a relation, it is an absolute.” This protraction or contraction is the wave 
form of the living knowledge – the rhythm that brings the organs of knowledge 
in resonance. For Bergson (2005, p. 14) “duration means invention, the creation 
of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.”  
4.1.3.4. Undefinable individuality  
If the method of disciplinary research is to cut out systems, the transdisciplinary 
approach must fold them back in. “The bodies we perceive are, so to speak, cut 
out of the stuff of nature by our perception, and the scissors follow, in some way, 
the marking of lines along which action might be taken” (Bergson, 2005, p. 15). 
Cutting out and isolating systems for disciplinary compartments can only be 
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interrupted by removing the interest in action, by cultivating indifference to 
control, by trespassing into transdisciplinary zone, where systems are reunited 
“reabsorbed in the universal interaction which, without a doubt, is reality itself” 
(Bergson, 2005, p. 15). It is to the act of cutting out, that Bergson attributes the 
notion of individuality. He finds in bodies that we individuate, as well as within 
our own body, the outlines that reveal the potential actions that give the body its 
individuality, making from the living body a superior example:  
The living body has been separated and closed off by nature 
herself. It is composed of unlike parts that complete each other. 
It performs different functions that involve each other. It is 
individual, and of no other object, not even of the crystal, can this 
be said, for a crystal has neither a difference of parts nor diversity 
of functions. (Bergson, 2005, p. 15)  
But even if individuality seems an important feature of life, Bergson admits this 
concept evades every attempt to grasp it: “it is hard to decide, even in the 
organized world, what is individual and what is not.” (Bergson, 2005, p. 15) 
Elusiveness of individuality reveals an intricate dichotomy that is uncovered by 
Bergson while pondering on “our inability to give a precise and general 
definition of individuality.”  
Bergson (2005, p. 16) first specifies ideal conditions in which the definition of 
individuality could be concise - in “a complete reality.” Yet Bergson (2005, p. 16) 
is aware that a living system is never complete or closed: “properties are never 
entirely realized, though always on the way to become so; they are not so much 
states as tendencies.” Individuality is a seemingly independent concept and yet 
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it cannot be comprehended by method of isolation.  To comprehend this concept 
is to reintegrate it and absorb it in the living knowledge where it will never be 
resolved into a state but maintained as a tendency. To maintain a tendency, there 
must be an irreconcilable dichotomy implicit in individuality: 
How, then, could this occur in the domain of life, where, as we 
shall show, the interaction of antagonistic tendencies is always 
implied? In particular, it may be said of individuality that, while 
the tendency to individuate is everywhere present in the 
organized world, it is everywhere opposed by the tendency 
toward reproduction. For the individuality to be perfect, it 
would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could 
live separately.  But then reproduction would be impossible. For 
what is reproduction, but the building up of a new organism 
with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality therefore 
harbors its enemy at home.  Its very need of perpetuating itself 
in time condemns it never to be complete in space. (Bergson, 
2005, p. 16) 
Polyphibian is a lived coherent individuality emerging from and returning to 
multiplicity of dividuals. If the definition of polyphibians was “polyphibiani = 
polyphibiani-1 + protoplasmagora” the recursive definition of an individual 
would be “individuali = individuali-1 + dividuals.” Polyphibian enters 
protoplasmic agora each time as a unique newborn being, an organism-solution 
to a conundrum that was encountered. From one organism-solution new organs 
of knowledge are grown, new organisms are born with new exceptional 
perception and experience. The living knowledge is a perpetuation of exceptional 
results to the same experiment, evading generality and defying definitions.  
The characteristic property of life that Bergson highlights is not individuality per 
se, but the chaotic intertwining of two opposing orders, two tendencies, one 
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towards individuation, and the other towards reproduction. The “organised 
world,” the world of the organisms, is a system of systems separated from each 
other and from the environment in order to address their action towards the 
other organisms, organisations of organisms and environment in general. 
Environment needs agents to animate it and vice versa, agents depend on 
environment to develop their agency. Just as figures are discerned out of ground, 
individuation of organisms makes them into agents and therefore facilitates their 
activity. In the same manner, living knowledge could not survive if not 
differentiated into agencies.  
Protoplasm, as a biological term, has many definitions and none of them is 
definite. A scientific dispute continues over appropriate approach to protoplasm 
– allowing for multiple descriptions, custom tailored to the convenience of every 
specific scientific problem. For the same reasons it is a matter of agreement to 
allow ambiguity in the term protoplasmagora. Just as dichotomy of 
individuation and reproduction drives the evolutionary movement, so 
polyphibianism is the evolutionary movement propelled through 
protoplasmagora. The opposing tendencies in the living knowledge should never 
be arbitrarily interrupted or cut – a fatal incision would result in archive or 
cemetery of knowledge.  
In the organised matter Bergson therefore recognises two tendencies – 
individuation and its opposite – reproduction – none of which is able to realise 
itself completely. If individuation would succeed to reach an ideal state, then no 
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part of an individual could lend itself to environment and begin life anew. This 
would prevent the spread of life.  For living substance to survive and thrive it 
cannot occupy the entire space – space for the non-living is required. Protoplasm 
– “the substance of life” itself is composed of living and non-living components 
intermittently being metabolised and switching their agency from animated to 
inactive. 
The prerequisite for dynamics of the living systems is for the system to contain a 
conflict, a counteracting agency. The same goes for the living knowledge. Time 
dynamics of a specific organism of living knowledge is a unique heterogeneous 
rhythm - a specific duration with which that organism lives. If one is to take a 
step further and allow time to unfold with infinite speed, as was suggested and 
permitted in an earlier thought experiment, the dynamic substance that contains 
itself and its adversary would happen all at once. In this “allatoncenessi” the 
process would be depicted in one state space, that is, as an intricate fractal that 
meanders infinitely densely but never fills the space entirely. Transdisciplinarity 
can be imagined as a folding interstitial tissue bringing dichotomies 
intermittently together and apart.  
The environment that does not succumb to artificial cut-outs remains indivisible, 
therefore an individual. Because it fills the space by definition, there is nothing 
                                                 
i term allatonceness is borrowed from McLuhan (1967, p. 63) 
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outside environment that would stir up dynamics – dynamics can only come 
from within, from dividuals constituting the individual. Protoplasmagora is 
therefore an individual with dividual intervals. No living individual in time can 
be complete in space: “Its very need of perpetuating itself in time condemns it 
never to be complete in space” (Bergson, 2005, p. 16). Individuality is a non-local 
connectivity, entanglement at a distance: it requires intervals between 
connectivity for dynamics of coexisting opposing orders to develop locally while 
it remains entangled non-locally. 
After enumerating some examples of imaginary and real organisms that from 
their own detached parts grow new independent organisms, Bergson (2005, p. 
17) assumes “because there are several individuals now, it does not follow that 
there was not a single individual just before.” From one individual monophibian 
that trespasses into transdisciplinarity multiple polyphibians grow. A single 
individual matures into poly-individuals. Bergson (2005, p. 17) contrasts this fact 
of life with non-living matter: for “unorganized bodies […] the present contains 
nothing more than the past, and what is found in the effect was already in the 
cause.” It is unforeseeable to find inorganic matter composed of many parts of 
different kind if a moment before it was just one – those parts would then be 
immanent in its oneness.  
But suppose that the distinctive feature of the organized body is 
that it grows and changes without ceasing, as indeed the most 
superficial observation testifies, there would be nothing 
astonishing in the fact that it was one in the first instance, and 
afterwards many. (Bergson, 2005, p. 17) 
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Convinced by single cell organisms, that by simple division create more 
unicellular organisms, and even multicellular organisms, where the faculty of 
reproduction on a cellular level becomes regeneration of single cells, Bergson is 
prepared to reconcile dichotomy of individuality and reproduction in the context 
of systematization, of organised structure: 
In truth, that I may have the right to speak of individuality, it is 
not necessary that the organism should be without the power to 
divide into fragments that are able to live. It is sufficient that it 
should have presented a certain systematization of parts before 
the division, and that the same systematization tend to be 
reproduced in each separate portion afterwards. (Bergson, 2005, 
p. 18) 
In transition from a monophibian to a polyphibian the structure of knowledge is 
reorganised into a living being with faculty of reproduction and regeneration of 
knowledge, that is, further self-organisation of bodies of knowledge. A 
polyphibic organism within protoplasmagora comes in resonance with 
protoplasmic patterns of organisation.  Any fragment of knowledge that detaches 
from a living organism of knowledge maintains the consistency and coherent 
structure that will enable it to awaken into life and therefore to multiply into new 
coherent forms of living knowledge.  
4.1.3.5. Beyond fractals – phractals  
To imagine what transdisciplinarity is or could be, the limits in disciplinary 
production of knowledge and what prevents it from awakening into living 
knowledge must not be ignored. Following Bergson’s line of thought in 
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comparing the organic and the inorganic, the organised and the unorganised, the 
living and the non-living, the conclusion is drawn that only the whole of the 
material universe can match the living being in its quality. Just as no inorganic 
thing in particular can compare to an organism, so the individual 
transdisciplinary knowledge cannot find comparison in any fragment of 
disciplinary knowledge. Only all possible knowledge, if it could be accumulated 
all at once, would compare to an organism of living knowledge.  
Bergson (2005, p. 18) dismisses the feasibility of such comparison immediately. 
He notices that to examine the whole of the universe is, to the contrary of 
observing the living being, impossible in principle: “whilst the whole of the 
universe is constructed or reconstructed as a thought ... the organism which lives 
is a thing that endures.” The distinction between the two ways of knowing 
therefore lies in the way the object is (re)constructed or the subject is (re)lived. If 
disciplinary knowledge production is inadequate to encompass entirely the 
living systems, is transdisciplinarity, on the other side, inappropriate to deal with 
non-living systems? Is transdisciplinarity just an excessive use of resources when 
dealing with isolated inert systems?  It is far more convenient for a problem that 
calls for immediate and habitual reaction to simply follow the “mechanistic 
instinct” that Bergson (2005, p. 20) blames as responsible for the utilitarian urge 
to isolate systems.    
In vain does reason prove to us that the more we get away from 
the objects cut out and the systems isolated by common sense 
and by science and the deeper we dig beneath them, the more 
we have to do with a reality which changes as a whole in its 
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inmost states, as if an accumulative memory of the past made it 
impossible to go back again. The mechanistic instinct of the mind 
is stronger than reason, stronger than immediate experience. 
(Bergson, 2005, p. 20)  
It is a mechanistic drive that conserves and constrains intellect, impeding it to 
self-organise into organs of knowing. How could these constrains be corrected so 
the intellect could envision and navigate open systems? With serious humour 
and method of indifference towards habitual reactions a monophibian gets 
prepared to become polyphibic. The movement of polyphibianism – the way of 
the polyphibian or the navigation within the living knowledge – is not driven by 
automatic reaction, or action that could be automatized. Polyphibianism is 
teaching the low maintenance, minimal effort without the need to reduce, 
fragment and cut off the world from the living essence. Polyphibians do not 
distinguish between the living and non-living knowledge. The definition of 
living knowledge is dynamic to a monophibian precisely because of this 
dichotomy: the living knowledge comprises of living and non-living.    
Bergson (2005, p. 21) holds responsible the “fixed requirements,” “ready-made 
explanations,” and “irreducible propositions” that stand in the way of living the 
knowledge. He finds the flaw in demands of scientific measurement that the 
“change must be reducible to an arrangement or rearrangement of parts; the 
irreversibility of time must be an appearance relative to our ignorance; the 
impossibility of turning back must be only the inability of man to put things in 
place again.” As a remedy he proposes for the systems of any kind (organic or 
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inorganic, an individual or an organism of organisms) to “grow old” within, 
while at the same time generating youth at its periphery:  
A tree never grows old since the tips of its branches are always 
young, always equally capable of engendering new trees by 
budding. But in such an organism – which is, after all, a society 
rather than individual – something ages, if only the leaves and 
the interior of the trunk. (Bergson, 2005, p. 20)  
The knowledge should be organised as life if it is to be lived, which involves the 
experience of duration. Knowledge cannot be brought to life through time. Time 
is too abstract, symmetrical and therefore reversible, to have a true impact – it 
can be speeded up or slowed down and the entire system closed safely within 
itself would remain the same. Duration, on the other hand, is a heterogeneous 
unfolding of the process of growth of knowledge that at the same time matures 
and rejuvenates.     
Models for imaginary living knowledge are abundant in life but are there 
intellectual models that could come anywhere near the real life models?  A 
geometry, perhaps, so infinitely intricate that reaches far towards periphery of 
intellect and could be corrected with laughter and awakened into a living 
knowledge? To imagine a geometry that could grasp the complexity of life one 
could start with fractal geometry and apply a comical corrective by ‘pataphysical 
method of serious humour. Just as ‘pataphysics corrects finances into phynances 
(Jarry, 1994, p. 58) – fractals become phractals. Fractal geometry is already a better 
fitting, corrected Euclidian geometry in regards to nature – corrected twice – 
could it awaken to life? 
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In an imaginary species of geometry that evolved by mutation from geometry of 
elaborate fractal sets, such as strange attractors, seemingly forming surfaces that 
never intersect - trajectories folding in and coming infinitely close but never 
intersecting with their past traces - there is always enough interstitial space for 
time to grow old and wrinkled, to mature from a uniform arbitrarily divisible 
matrix to an individual experience. Bergson’s writings preceded the formulation 
of fractal geometry but he anticipated a need for infinite intricacy to describe life: 
“what is properly vital in growing old is the insensible, infinitely graduated, 
continuance of the change of form.” (Bergson, 2005, p. 23)  
To emphasise the distinction between systems growing old and systems 
undergoing reversible changes, Bergson (2005, p. 21) explains that growing old 
cannot be simplified into “gradual gain or loss of certain substances.” He further 
criticizes attempts to explain the living changes in terms of reversible changes: 
“in affirming the constant accumulation or loss of a certain kind of matter, even 
though they have little in common as to what is gained and lost, shows pretty 
well that the frame of the explanation has been furnished a priori” (Bergson, 2005, 
p. 22).  
Returning back to the simplest essences of life, Bergson considers the protoplasm 
as an example. At the time of his writing the current understanding of what 
“growing old” in the context of protoplasm could mean was a theory “according 
to which the diminution bears on the quantity of nutritive substance contained 
in that ‘inner environment’ in which the organism is being renewed, and the 
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increase on the quantity of non-excreted residual substances which, 
accumulating in the body, finally ‘crust it over’.” (Bergson, 2005, p. 21)  
Already from this theory of protoplasm (preferred by Bergson as one of the most 
refined at the time), the metabolism of protoplasmagora can be imagined: 
nutrition in the inner environment of protoplasmagora renews the organs of 
knowledge while the excess of nutrition accumulates on the outer periphery of 
the organism of living knowledge, forming a crust of archived knowledge. 
Protoplasmagora is internally transdisciplinary, while disciplinary on the 
periphery, where it deposits the residual substances in form of disciplinary 
compartments, categories, matrices and schemas. 
Can mathematics, as we know it, operate in the terms of living knowledge? “The 
world the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every 
instant,” while Bergson (2005, p. 27) points out what needs to be dealt with is the 
continuous duration in between the instants:  “To know a living being or natural 
system is to get at the very interval of duration, while the knowledge of an 
artificial or mathematical system applies only to extremity.” For Bergson 
mathematics, and more specifically, differential equations, are unable to grasp 
the wholeness of life present in the organism: 
Organic creation, [...] the evolutionary phenomena which 
properly constitute life, we cannot in any way subject to a 
mathematical treatment. It will be said that this impotence is due 
only to our ignorance. But it may equally well express the fact 
that the present moment of a living body does not find its 
explanation in the moment immediately before, that all the past 
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of the organism must be added to that moment […] (Bergson, 
2005, p. 24) 
If ‘pataphysics is, in contrast to physics, the science of exceptions, can it correct 
and redirect the main preoccupation of physics, from the results at the end of the 
intervals – at the very reference of measure – to the unmeasurable in between? A 
fractal builds its identity in a continuous connected self-affine pattern, from one 
end of the interval to the other where the interval remains infinitely divisible and 
uniformly seeded. To correct that identity, to rupture it in a ‘pataphysical 
laughter a phractal divides fractals to generate a new kind of beings. As was 
shown above, individuality cannot exist without dividing into new individuals. 
Can continuity of a fractal be broken off where fragments would detach and live 
as new individuals – similar, affine or even as a mutation into a new species? 
Perhaps self-similarity should be complemented with self-diversity. If fractals 
exist in uniform time, can phractals restructure homogeneous time in 
heterogeneous duration? 
 “Continuity of change, preservation of the past in the present, 
real duration the living being seems, then, to share these 
attributes with consciousness. Can we go further and say that 
life, like conscious activity, is invention, is unceasing creation?” 
(Bergson, 2005, p. 27) 
Phractals are infinite monster fractals awaken into self-awareness, unceasingly 
creating and inventing new individuals out of their own individuality in a 
continuity of change that is self-organising into consciousness. Phractals, as well 
as their cousins fractals, access from any present moment the entire past, but 
unlike fractals, phractals derive from all possible memory a fresh flow of memory 
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that was not dried out yet into a set of replicating recursive formulas. Phractals 
do not remain affine to one species but invent and create new species not unlike 
evolution. If fractal is self-affine species-bounded family-tree of minor variation, 
phractal is the trans–species evolution.  
Bergson compares the creativity of life directly to the creativity of consciousness. 
For polyphibians there is no essential difference between living reality, 
imagining reality or knowing reality. Like recursive equations generating 
fractals, phractals are recursive transdisciplinary formulas that in order to live 
the knowledge need to re-new, re-create knowledge in continuity of change – 
that is the living knowledge is ceaselessly evolving: evolution of living 
knowledge = growing old + being newborn = keeping past alive + being 
indifferent to the past. Phractal growth is bending the rules and enfolding 
exceptions within the pores. 
4.2. Participating in a creative act 
This chapter serves as a guide to art research practice or rather a participation in 
creative act initiated by Marcel Duchamp. In his talk entitled Creative Act, given 
at the meeting of American Federation of Arts in Huston, in 1957, Duchamp 
reveals the strategy for participating in a work of art – claiming that artist’s work 
is not completed without the participation of the spectator: “the creative act is not 
performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the 
external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification and thus 
adds his contribution to the creative act.” (Duchamp, 1983, p. 140)  
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In the following subchapter the artist-spectator interaction is explored in a 
broader sense. By recognising the animal-ambient-like mutual dependence 
between the artist and the medium, the ability to survive and thrive in two media, 
as observed in amphibians is transferred to polyphibic ability of artistsi to thrive 
among multiple media. Namely, the artwork is considered as a trace, a side effect 
of the artist moving in between the media. If the artwork is considered as a 
manifestation of a side effect, of a trace that the artist leaves behind by disrupting 
the interfaces whilst moving in between the media, then the real challenge shifts 
to the spectator that is completing the creative act. The spectator “brings the work 
in contact” with the medium she or he is inhabiting “by deciphering and 
interpreting” the new medium in the terms of the old. 
In the succeeding subchapter a third link joins the chain: artist – curator – 
spectator. With flourishing intellectual engagement of the early 20th century 
artists, questions were raised about other means of transference of ideas to the 
audience. Creative act was not merely Duchamp’s preoccupation – his 
“unconventional artistic mentor” (Henderson, 2005, p. 3) František Kupka, for 
instance, who introduced Duchamp to the scientific and esoteric revolutions,ii 
was searching for means that would enable a “direct transfer of thought” 
(Henderson, 2005, p. 67). With the difficulties revealed in the first subchapter, in 
                                                 
i in Creative Act Duchamp (1989, p. 138) refers to the artists as a mediumistic being trying to 
escape the conventional medium of space-time 
ii such as findings in electromagnetism “applied to” telepathy, see more in (Henderson, 2005) 
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transferal between a polyphibic artist and monophibic audience, there is a need 
for a special kind of curator that is to be added as a catalyst to the chain reaction, 
speeding up the process of “transubstantiationi,” “transmutationii,” and 
“polyphibianisation.” 
As soon as Duchamp declares his work Large Glass officially unfinished, the 
work opens up to spectators, to be completed in specific interactions, possibly 
resulting in another open work. Large Glass and all complementary Duchamp’s 
endeavours remain open to his posterity to reuse and reutilize his apparatuses. 
The art research in this thesis begun as a participation in Duchamp’s work by 
imagining an organism of living knowledge that could perform all three roles of 
artist, curator and spectator, through interventions, under the licence of R. Mutt, 
from pseudoscientific resolving of conundrums in physics and ‘pataphysics, to 
curating the results of the research in a box of notes declaring the work again 
“unfinished” within a new context and in anticipation of all new possible 
completions.  The ideas realised and in realisation are described in the following 
subchapters as published articles and not yet publicised work.  
                                                 
i Duchamp (1989, p. 140) uses the term “transubstantiation” for description of “the change of inert 
matter into a work of art” 
ii Duchamp (1989, p. 139) uses the term “transmutation” to describe the experience of the spectator 
when participating in creative act 
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4.2.1. Artist – spectatori 
According to J. J. Gibson (1986) the animal implies the environment just as the 
environment implies the animal. They are mutually dependent, and this 
dependence is implicit in their structure. Gibson argues this mutuality is not 
effectively described by physical sciences and in terms of basic concepts such as 
space, time, matter and energy. The physical reality without life does not yet 
constitute the environment. Gibson therefore decides to rethink this 
interdependency in a more adequate terminology comprising media, substances 
and surfaces rather than abstract planes and spaces.  
The medium is not isotropic as is the abstract space, it does not rely on arbitrary 
axes and units, it has its own intrinsic polarities, gradients and features, yet it is 
stochastically homogeneous, it tends to be so in order that the substances 
emanating from their sources can be differentiated by the animal. While abstract 
points in space are equivalent to each other, the movement of the animal in a 
medium, the shifting of its viewpoint, makes each vantage point unique. The 
animal has thus developed more than ambient awareness. What distinguishes 
the animal from the vegetative life forms is its ambulatory perspective on the 
medium. Furthermore a highly evolved conscious animal is aware of the medium 
                                                 
i as presented at the 11th Consciousness Reframed Conference: Presence in the Mindfield, Lisbon 
2011 and published in conference proceedings (Ljubec, 2011) 
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on different levels; it can reflect on its relationship towards the medium and even 
transcend the limitations of involvement in the medium.  
Within Gibson’s vocabulary the high degree of interdependence between the 
being and the medium, that was not self-explanatory in abstract spatio-temporal 
terminology, becomes evident. Now the body of a being is understood as totally 
immersed in its environment, so much so, that ‘‘the motion of the body changes 
the overall surface layout’’, it represents ‘‘a change in the shape of the 
environment’’, while in ‘‘abstract geometry the motion of a body is’’ merely ‘‘a 
change of position along dimensions of space or rotation on these axes.’’ (Gibson, 
1986, p. 35)  
How is a being so involved and dependent able to transcend a medium, explore 
other media, swiftly switching, trespassing and surviving? The animal 
transcended the aquatic medium by moving to the firm ground, adapting its 
body entirely to the new conditions and neglecting the old - yet there are animals, 
the amphibian beings, that are able to return to the water at any time. The term 
amphibian relates to both modes of existence, life on both sides, life of indecision.  
In a similar manner a highly evolved conscious animal that is able to move 
between the planes of consciousness and to maintain coherent awareness on 
many levels could be termed a polyphibian being. What would be the nature of 
such a polyphibian, that is able to survive and thrive in multiple media, and in 
particular, how does the polyphibian trespass from one media to another, 
overcome the involvement, break the bond? In other words, what happens on the 
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interface of the two adjacent media in the act of trespassing, at the moment of 
breakthrough?  
For the purpose of this investigation let us start with the assumption that the act 
of trespassing into a new medium, into the next modality of awareness is a 
‘creative’ act – creative in a sense of novel configuration of attention, creation of 
new conditions by liberation from the old. But this act would have to be an 
indivisible process including the existent and the next modality, the trespasser 
and the witness of trespassing that is left behind.  
This argument was presented already in 1957 by Marcel Duchamp (1989, p. 138) 
in his lecture entitled “Creative Act,” where both the artist and the spectator are 
found to be accomplices. Both are implicated in such a complex manner that the 
artist is able to act without conscious awareness. The conscious, conceptual and 
critical awareness or the ‘critical reaction’ in Duchamp’s words can be assigned 
to the spectator that remains the inhabitant of the old medium. Duchamp (1983, 
p. 138) thus defines the artist as a: 
[…] mediumistic being who, from the labyrinth beyond time and 
space, seeks his way out to a clearing. If we give the attributes of 
a medium to the artist, we must then deny him the state of 
consciousness on the esthetic plane about what he is doing or 
why he is doing it. All his decisions in the artistic execution of 
the work rest with pure intuition and cannot be translated into a 
self-analysis, spoken or written, or even thought out.  
Considered in the context of trespassing the media Duchamp’s denial of any 
conscious awareness to the artist does not seem so controversial anymore. What 
242 
 
becomes clear is that in the act of trespassing the artist’s attention shifts, the 
modality of awareness changes, adapts to the new conditions. Therefore the 
modified awareness of the artist cannot be analysed within the modality that the 
artist just abandoned with indifference, that is, within the default modality of the 
spectator that the artist just walked out of unconsciously.  
The spectator is left only with the traces of breaking through the interface with 
the next medium. The art itself is merely the side effect of the polyphibian artist 
disrupting the surface tension. From the standpoint of the spectator there is no 
sight of the interface, no surface separating diverse media. The spectator is not 
aware of potential modality that differs from the conventions of the currently 
inhabited medium. The artist on the other hand, equipped with polyphibic 
sensors, is always attentive to the unknown, the uninhabited.   
While the spectator and its native medium are continuously mutually dependent, 
the involvement of the artist with the surrounding medium varies greatly – down 
to the degree of zero involvement, that is, to complete indifference. Involvement 
in a system of conventions, conforming to the standards of the medium, ties the 
inhabitant to that medium even on the emotional level. A polyphibian, on the 
other hand, can survive without preferences, always able to alternate conformity.  
Duchamp, the artist who himself strived for indifference, used to say: ‘‘I force 
myself to contradict myself in order to avoid conforming to my own taste’’ (Janis 
& Janis, 1945, p. 258). In his lecture Apropos Readymades, held in 1961, this 
neutral involvement is described as ‘‘total absence of good or bad taste – in fact 
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a complete anaesthesia’’ (Duchamp, 1989, p. 141). Being recognised as a visual 
artist Duchamp only practiced visual indifference. The aesthetic anaesthetics 
were administered in context of the retinal art alone – Duchamp used this phrase 
to distinguish it from non-retinal art.  By regulating emotional reaction to the 
visual stimuli, to the unwritten rules of visual seduction Duchamp was able to 
absorb the invisible ideas.   
When a visual artist becomes indifferent to the visual medium the outcome of the 
artistic action becomes peculiarly alien to the spectator. While the artist 
transcends the retinal, that is, penetrates beyond the retinal sensibility, the raw 
material that is to become art succumbs to transformations defined in an alien 
medium, that is, transformations under incompatible rules, inappropriate 
conventions. The exotic shock to the spectator invokes a critical reaction, a 
criticism that at first targets the artwork alone and only through detailed in-depth 
analysis slowly turns towards its own means. The spectator develops critical 
awareness of the means of critical thought, of the medium in which the thinking 
is conducted.   
Critical awareness of the medium one inhabits has been substantially raised since 
1964’s publication of Marshall McLuhan’s book Understanding Media, The 
Extensions of Man. McLuhan (1994, p. 18) explores how encounter with a new 
medium changes scale and pace of human affairs, how ‘‘effects of new 
technology do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios 
or patterns of perception.’’ The new conditions due to new technology are not 
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felt on the conceptual level because they are not compatible with the existent 
conceptual structure.  The awkward alienation is sensed as altered speed or 
escalation out of proportion.  
McLuhan (1994, p. 18) claims ‘‘the serious artist is the only person able to 
encounter technology with impunity, just because he is an expert aware of the 
changes in sense perception.’’  This expertise is gained by alert indifference – 
alertness to different kind of differences. The waking up from aesthetic 
anaesthesia into new sentience is achieved by being sensible to changes in 
sensing. To measure the change of flow rate one imagines a surface 
perpendicular to the flow and plugs in the differential equation the area of that 
surface. Similarly the artist alert to subtle changes in perception spots the 
opportunity for trespassing into the new modality by setting up an abstract 
surface, an interface where the old medium will meet the new, where the flow 
rate will be changed by modulating the permeability of the interface.    
Let us reread McLuhan’s famous statement ‘the medium is the message’ in this 
recursive sense: the message of a medium is yet another medium. His example 
of cascade of media nested in media: ‘the content of telegraph is print, the content 
of print is written word, the content of writing is spoken word, the content of 
speech is thinking process,’ can be translated into derivatives. For instance 
consider the fact that the derivative of distance as function of time is velocity, the 
derivative of velocity is acceleration. Is acceleration the message of velocity, 
245 
 
velocity the message of distance? Just as the message of the telegraph is print the 
telegraph technology is derivative of print.  
Staying in the context of function of time and the change of flow rate of 
information we can confirm that the information flows faster in the medium of 
telegraph than in the medium of print. The same changes in speed can be 
observed on the interface of other media for example when the amphibian 
returns to the medium of water it suddenly slows down the rate of crossing the 
distance. The polyphibian entering and exiting the various awareness modalities 
is slowing down or speeding up the flow of thinking.  
The time scale differences between the media are not unlike when one wakes up 
from a dream confused by discrepancy between the actual time that passed on 
the alarm clock and the much longer time interval experienced in the dream. This 
operation of scaling time in mental activities can yield bizarre consequences. The 
ambient around the polyphibian is rewired, reconnected, reconfigured – with 
new conditions new meanings emerge, new questions arise, new tendencies 
shape the mental layout. 
In McLuhan’s (1994, p. 7) words: ‘‘... consequences of any medium – that is of any 
extension of ourselves – result from the new scale ...’’  Medium is the extension 
of the animal and as Gibson showed the mutual dependence of animal and its 
medium means that with change of animal’s movement the overall layout 
changes. A monophibian animal observing a polyphibian trespassing will notice 
a disruption in the uniformity, an irregularity in the rational. For the spectator on 
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the firm ground of awaken rationality observing the immersion of the dreamer 
into the fluid medium the time arrow in the fluid is stretched, just like the light 
that is refracted on the sea level makes a stick under sea level appear of distorted 
size and position - the observer on the shore will not be able to grasp the stick 
relying only on visual clues.   
Speed of light wave propagation changes when crossing the interface of air and 
aquatic medium. The fact that monophibians as rational beings strive for constant 
pace and consider modulations in rate of propagation as irrational is clarified by 
McLuhan (1994, p. 15): ‘‘we have confused reason with literacy and rationalism 
with a single technology […] rational […] has […] long meant  ‘uniform’ and 
‘continuous’ and ‘sequential’.’’  The interface is the modulator of propagation of 
form, of information, beyond the rational rate. On the interface everything 
coexists in configuration, the sequential rationalisation fails.  
All natural and artificial technologies meet on the interface. In contact with the 
interface the polyphibian turns into a polyglot instantaneously – reading all the 
meanings in simultaneous configuration rather than in a linear manner. Even the 
most evasive, ephemeral technologies are manifested to be manipulated on the 
interface. The interface is where the changes become explicit, while the change 
that propagates through the medium is implicit, deep below the surface, never 
announced only assumed.  When implicit reaches its peak it manifests explicitly, 
like a projectile hitting a barrier, whether it is a concrete obstruction or an abstract 
difficulty.  
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To illustrate what happens at the moment a technology reaches its peak 
performance McLuhan (1994, p. 12) describes how ‘‘just before an airplane breaks 
the sound barrier, sound waves become visible on the wings of the plane. The 
sudden visibility of sound just as sound ends [...] reveals new and opposite forms 
just as the earlier forms reach their peak performance.’’  We can extend this 
analogy to include the polyphibian artist indifferently involved in transition from 
one medium to the other. Being indifferent to the message of the sound the artist 
is sensible enough to spot the sound barrier – attention of the artist shifts from 
audible to visual. Both modalities are ready to intertwine and coexist, enabling 
the artist to sense where and when the interface will occur.   
The polyphibians do not only spot the novelty on the horizon but innovate on 
their own by overriding the existing medium. With our evolution into 
polyphibian beings on all levels of existence our sensibility to recognise the 
interfaces is being refined. After McLuhan’s guide for Understanding Media we 
need an in depth guide for Understanding Interfaces.i  After Gibson’s fresh 
approach to human perception based on the insight that the animal and the 
medium imply each other, what can we infer if we acknowledge one medium is 
implied in another? If the media generate new media in perpetual innovation, 
                                                 
i for instance see guides like: The Postdigital Membrane: Imagination, Technology and Desire, 
where authors Pepperell and Punt (2000) question the existent digital interface as the final frontier 
and use the organic membrane as a metaphorical platform for coexistence of things in both states:  
interconnected and separated 
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the interfaces are emerging at all occasions all over the material and mental 
landscapes.  
As mentioned, the artist tends to escapes the uniformity of a landscape populated 
by conformist spectators by amplifying features or accelerating the stagnating 
rhythm of the exhausted medium. At the peak performance the artist trespasses 
through the interface – but this barely noticeable barrier does not separate the 
artist from the spectator. They are both deeply involved on the interface, that is, 
the interface has depth, depth of an interval. The interval of delay is where the 
abstract time does not apply, only duration is experienced, Bergsoniani duration 
imbued with creation, with creative act. 
In this interval dichotomies endure, not in sequential causality, but in a 
configuration where past is present. The creative act in duration is not an energy 
consuming activity; it is effortless, spontaneous, like the process of osmosis. It is 
the passage of a dissolved habitual awareness through a selectively permeable 
membrane from a less concentrated to a more concentrated solution, that is, to 
awareness at instantaneous speed, the immediate grasp of coexisting 
oppositions. To be entirely involved in the creative act, the spectator must, as did 
                                                 
i on duration as first defined by Henri Bergson (1910) in his doctoral thesis Time and Free Will: 
An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness   
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the artist, submit to the principle of indifference that feels like a force pulling the 
attention out of the known into the unknown.  
It is Duchamp (1989, p. 139) that finds this phenomenon of creative act 
‘‘comparable to transference from the artist to the spectator in the form of an 
esthetic osmosis taking place through the inert matter.’’  Inert raw matter that 
happens to be where and when the interface occurs is transformed by the artist 
ripping apart the edge of the existent medium. Namely, Duchamp (1989, p. 139) 
continues, ‘‘the creative act takes another aspect when the spectator experiences 
the phenomenon of transmutation: through the change from inert matter into a 
work of art, an actual transubstantiation has taken place.’’   
During trespassing, when contamination of the substances with new ideas takes 
place in transubstantiation under new rules, at the stage when the artist is 
modulating the permeability of the interface in more or less violent rupture of 
existent structure, Duchamp (1989, p. 139) is concerned with the “relation 
between the unexpressed but intended and the unintentionally expressed.” The 
role of the spectator that gets involved in the creative act with delay is to make 
sense of the gap between the intention of the artist and the realization, the 
representation of the trace. The spectator fills the interval between the insight 
into the new and the habits of the old by interpreting, reconfiguring the meaning. 
From the critical stance on the alienation of a substance that suddenly does not 
conform to current conventions, the spectator advances towards a standpoint 
right within the interface. By being diffused through the interval of the permeable 
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membrane the spectator is able to bring the conflicting new condition in direct 
contact with the old context, to conceptually refine the disruption on the 
interface. In this coexistence of otherwise incompatible the spectator delivers the 
verdict on the effort of the artist – the judgement on the effect of the effortless 
trespassing. In the meanwhile the polyphibian, indifferent to the judgement, is 
already exploring the next unknown.   
4.2.2. Artist – curator – spectator 
Silence is the most extreme form of revolt. In Duchamp’s case, 
the revolt has consisted of a patient and laborious attempt to 
forge a world for himself which would conform to his personal 
concepts, a world sufficiently remade so that it would owe 
nothing or very little to human reality […] to create a new world 
confronting the reality of things whose implacable immensity 
forces him to be quiet – to be quiet but not to accept. […] No, 
Duchamp’s silence is neither indifference, nor abandon, nor 
emptiness, but a taut and menacing spring.  [….] In his life as in 
his art and writing, he has never accepted any preordained 
principle or any intangible explanations. (Duchamp, 1989, pp. 4, 
5) 
Michel Sanouillet’s 1958 introduction to The Writings of Marcel Duchamp 
depicts a very subtle but significant side of Duchamp’s character – resistance. 
Accounting for this characteristic, Duchamp’s talk on ‘Creative Act’ in 1957 can 
be related to Deleuze’s talk on ‘Act of Creation’ in 1987. Although the creative act 
for Duchamp is about the transference of information between the artist and the 
spectator, thus a particular manifestation of the not entirely manifested, 
Duchamp notices there is a “missing link.” Deleuze comes from the opposite 
stance, denying any transference of information in art in principle, his only 
251 
 
apparent sympathy to the stance of Duchamp is in acknowledging the act of 
resistance to the artist:    
What relationship is there between the work of art and 
communication? None at all. A work of art is not an instrument 
of communication. A work of art has nothing to do with 
communication. A work of art does not contain the least bit of 
information. In contrast, there is a fundamental affinity between 
a work of art and an act of resistance. It has something to do with 
information and communication as an act of resistance. 
(Deleuze, 2006, p. 322) 
Although Deleuze in his talk did not in any way refer or respond to Duchamp, 
some questions raised by Duchamp are answered when his silence is considered 
as a form of resistance. Even if Duchamp denies to the artist the intention of 
resistance and of silence (the artist according to Duchamp is not aware of not 
expressing herself entirely), the silence is nonetheless present, forming an 
interval between the artist and the spectator. The unexpressed by the artist gets 
expression by participation of the audience in the interval, whether that audience 
forms merely different aspects of the artist’s own personality or different persons. 
The interval is not only observed from another point of view, it is filled in with 
multiple points of being. In this interval the artist and spectator are newborn as 
a polyphibian.  But in close examination of Duchamp’s testimonial there is 
something else that is not mentioned, some ingredient that is absent: 
In the creative act, the artist goes from intention to realization 
through a chain of totally subjective reactions. […] The result of 
this struggle is a difference between the intention and its 
realization, a difference which the artist is not aware of. 
Consequently, in the chain of reactions accompanying the 
creative act, a link is missing. This gap, representing the inability 
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of the artist to express fully his intention, this difference between 
what he intended to realize and did realize, is the personal “art 
coefficient” contained in the work. (Duchamp, 1989, p. 139) 
The artist in transition between monophibic and polyphibic awareness might 
hesitate, turning around as a spectator to its own artwork - traces of trespassing, 
with the monophibic remnants lingering behind its newborn polyphibic 
organism. This hesitation in direct experience, this delay of living the experience, 
is resolved by introduction of the catalytic “missing link” in the chain reaction 
between the artist and the spectator, namely, the curator.  
The curator – catalyst increases the rate of reactions and the spectator within the 
artist is rapidly exposed to polyphibic awareness. The “gap, representing the 
inability of the artist to express fully his intention, this difference between what 
he intended to realize and did realize” is the gap between disciplinary research 
and the transdisciplinary zone. The smaller the “art coefficient” between 
intention and realisation, the more it approaches the unit, the more one is living 
the knowledge. Such “art coefficient” is one of the signatures of 
transdisciplinarity.  
There is no art to be comprehended in its entirety by a monophibic mind. No 
creative act begun by a polyphibian can be completed by a monophibian without 
transmutation of this monophibian into a polyphibian. In his conclusive 
statement, Deleuze (2006, p. 324) paraphrases Paul Klee, which explains 
Duchamp’s preoccupation with posterity:  “There is no work of art that does not 
call on a people who does not yet exist.” The people who does not yet exist is the 
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people in becoming polyphibian, it is the incessantly new born organism of living 
knowledge, the ceaselessly mutating intelligence correcting itself, expanding its 
limits. 
By 1913, Kupka, Duchamp’s fellow student of science and critic 
of Puteaux Cubism, was theorising on the future possibility of 
the direct transfer of thought from the artist to his audience […] 
For Kupka, as for Duchamp, the ideas in the mind of the artist 
had become the essence of a work of art. (Henderson, 2005, p. 67) 
A monophibian indirectly manifesting information to a monophibian was no 
more a preoccupation of early 20th century artists. Kupka, Duchamp and others 
were searching for more direct ways of knowing. In the manner Deleuze does 
not attribute communication of information by repetition and representation 
through extraction and external means to art - art became an introspective 
experiment, an inner exploration of lived experience. An immediate knowledge 
is possible only in the imaginary organism of living knowledge with polyphibic 
organs of knowing.  
If the missing ingredient in Duchamp’s chain reaction is conceived as a curator, 
who facilitates and accelerates the transmutation of a monophibian to a 
polyphibian by inducing the self-organisation of the artist and her audience in 
the organism of living knowledge, then as a curator she must participate in 
multiple transformations at the same time. In this reaction the curator multiplies 
and dissolves the spectator, shifting her from one single fixed viewpoint to 
multiple floating, slightly dispersed points of being. Curator in this sense does 
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not clarify the work of art but as a shifter and shaker introduces noise and chance 
in mutation. 
Curatorial catalysis is not detected by monophibians. It is the invisible mending, 
the multiplicity of stoppages, evident only from the other side of the interface on 
which the curator is operating. The interface, or the membrane, is the organ of 
the curator, the instrument of infradifferentiation. Even if the artist and the 
spectator are the same organism, the curator splits in a precise and complex 
entangled cut, “spectrifing” a monophibic tendency into polyphibianism. As a 
Poincaré cut - the curator’s cut maps the trends in a complex phenomenon of a 
creative act. The invisible mending is appropriating the fabric of reality from 
monophibic point of view to accommodate the polyphibic points of being.  
Curator infradifferentiates between two media, searching for slight incoherence, 
incompatibility as a signature presence of another medium, that the artist 
disrupted in passing through but that the spectator was not aware of.  The 
curatorial cut of precision in the heterogeneous composite of multiple media 
forms its organ as a selectively permeable membrane – the interface that 
accurately articulates the interpenetrating media by separation. This organ is the 
peripheral membrane of the protoplasmic agora, the selectively permeable 
membrane of indifference, that is, of infrathin differentiation. Curator must be 
indifferent to media on either side of the membrane, enabling the spontaneous 
osmosis of the spectator through the membrane. 
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The osmotic pressure that is preventing the osmosis from happening, is 
rendering the curatorial membrane impermeable and thus keeping knowledge 
separated and compartmentalised. Duchamp (1989, p. 138), in his explanation of 
the creative act, mentions the “transference from the artist to the spectator in the 
form of esthetic osmosis taking place through the inert matter.” The artist moves 
through media indifferently, disrupting the interfaces. Catalysed disruption 
reveals the shape of the membrane, it perforates and relaxes the membrane – the 
osmosis happens. One finds such curatorial membrane within oneself through 
introspection – introspectively one finds the catalyst necessary to become 
immediately polyphibic.   
The curatorial mapping is iterative. By infradifferentiating or slightly changing 
the initial conditions, the curator takes the monophibian on a ride, navigating the 
wildest trajectories to a completely unforeseeable results. Curator makes sure 
that she forms an imaginary organism together with both the artist and the 
spectator. Curator is the mutation inducing ingredient. While on the monophibic 
side of the interface the exhibition is fixed with limited points of view, on the 
other side of the interface the ever changing movement of polyphibianism flows 
through protoplasmagora.  
4.2.3. Intervention ASCO2.T AT.LAST 
Duchamp’s creative act is resumed in this thesis through re-enactment of 
readymade intervention under the pseudonym R. Mutt. The theoretical research 
on transdisciplinarity herein takes special interest in “serious artists” and their 
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relationship with scientists, questioning the division of these researchers into two 
separate categories. The current attempts of collaborations between art and 
science, are normally conducted under conditions when these categories are not 
considered obsolete, on the contrary, in some cases they are even glorified into 
“great” institutions. To test the applicability of transdisciplinary principles, as 
laid out in this thesis, the practical research took place as an intervention in one 
of the most acclaimed collaboration projects of the kind.  
R. Mutt submitted a readymade to the call for proposals by the Collide@CERN 
programme. Like Duchamp’s Fountain that served as a test, the proposed 
readymade ASCO2.T tested the readiness of this programme to collide 
institutions of Art and Science at CERN. The account of this intervention is given 
in the following subchapters that were published as two separate articles entitled 
‘The Myth of ASCOT and its rival ASCO2.T: Tech-noetic vs. Techno-logic, Round 
1’ presented at the conference ‘Technoetic Telos: Art Myth and Media’ in 
Kefalonia, 2012, and ‘The uncertainty of ASCOT and the second-order hesitation 
of ASCO2.T within the transdisciplinary buffer zone, Round 2’ presented at the 
conference ‘Tribute to Uncertainty’ in Prague, 2012.   
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4.2.3.1. ASCOT vs. ASCO2.T – round 1 – mythsi  
ABSTRACT 
The following article is a report on inevitable intervention in the current state of 
affairs in well-intended and well-funded projects based on obsolete 
categorization of art and science. After unsatisfactory outcomes, on the 
disappointment of project directors themselves, a productive collaboration 
between artists and scientists is still desperately sought after, without 
considering with subtlety a re-categorization that is already happening. This 
intervention is an ‘in advance reminder’ for foreseeable recognition of the current 
state of affairs, a reminder of the sensibility necessary to recognize, as soon as 
possible, the accelerating rate at which concepts are continuously becoming 
obsolete, and the increasing fluidity of our intellectual and intuitive production.  
EXERCISE IN PROVISIONAL TERMINOLOGY 
pol•y•glot [pol-ee-glot], able to communicate in several languages by bringing 
them into resonance.  
pol•y•phib•i•an [puh-li-fib-ee-uhn], able to coexist coherently, dispersed in 
several media. To be distinguished from “monophibian” – adapted to one and 
                                                 
i as presented (partially abridged) at the Consciousness Reframed conference (Kefalonia, 2012), 
Technoetic Telos: Art Myth and Media and published in (Ljubec, 2012) 
258 
 
only rationally standardized medium – and amphibian (any cold-blooded 
vertebrate of the class Amphibia, comprising frogs and toads, caecilians, newts 
and salamanders), adapted to no more than two media. To be exact, this is not a 
conventionally derived term from geometric cutting and pasting of Indo-
European roots (ambhi, poly, bios), but by folding, twisting and stretching them 
topologically until orientation is lost and mutation emerges – an intergalactic 
fictional root (phibi). Only then is the imaginary discovered: Phibians, the 
fictional species, for instance, the iridescent streamlined humanoids from the 
fantastic Duniverse. The term is to be read in a mosaic mode – with a polyglot’s 
resonating affinity: being a polyphibian is a multiple imaginary existence. That 
is, polyphibian is being (verb) dispersed and at the same time coherent under one 
being (noun). Resonating with amphi- the folding of polyphi- implies: on both 
sides multiplied. Polyphi- results from the tension in amphi-: dichotomies on 
both sides of the membrane resolve their tension within the “infrathin” interval 
of the membrane, and consequently there are multiple connections, multiple 
meanings. Unlike amphibians, which confront the dichotomy and take it from 
both sides, and monophibians, who avoid any confrontation, polyphibic 
awareness emerges within the interface – interfering with the language of 
knowledge in movement. Topologically, the multiplicity of bothsided-nesses in 
the polyphibious turns life (bios) both insideout and outsidein. The animal, 
which is only a feature of its environment, the moving agency within the 
medium, turns on itself. Imagine the animal as a drop of ink dispersed in a fluid 
heterogeneous environment. By mixing the fluid the ink is dispersed. By 
reversing the function of mixture, the drop is coherently reassembled. The 
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coherency of a polyphibian featured through multiple media by definition cannot 
be lost under any topological transformation. 
In the following quotation by Roy Ascott (2003, p. 261) replace the obsolete word 
“artist” with the provisional word “polyphibian”: 
We are creating a culture in which the “artist” becomes a 
complex and widely distributed system, in which both human 
and artificial cognition and perception play their part; an art that 
is emergent from a multiplicity of interactions in data space.  
It will be argued in this article that if an artist can inform the sciences, he or she 
can do so most efficiently in the way this was redefined by Ascott (Ascott, 2003). 
But in order to absorb the redefinition, the above exercise is to be repeated 
subconsciously throughout the text, dissolving the obsoleteness of any concept 
in the fluid language of imagination. 
IMAGINARY SOLUTIONS AND LANGUAGES 
How many languages does nature speak? Art has relatively recently 
disintegrated language borders, and it welcomes all that speaks to it. 
Consequently, the term art has become obsolete. In principle, an artist will never 
discriminate on the basis of what is real and what is imaginary – rather, he or she 
will imagine any reality, explore it, mess around and leave that mess, as it is, in 
the locally conventional reality, to the astonishment of the local mentality. Such 
an artist in the course of his or her artistic career will become a distinguished 
polyglot, and through endless training to survive and thrive in any conceived 
reality, the most devoted artist will evolve into a polyphibian. 
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How many languages does science speak? Judging from the rate of specialization 
in science, one would expect a myriad of original languages to be invented from 
moment to moment. Instead, the scientific rigour in principle demands 
uniformity without loss in translation. In other words, science, in principle, tends 
to abstract itself from all conceivable realities, avoiding anything imaginary. A 
scientist, in principle, is not allowed to imagine or envision reality, but to abstract 
the “real”, to develop the language to prove the realness, to devise only such 
experiments that will be repeatable. A scientist is expected to achieve 
predictability, certainty, security.  
But this is only in principle. To the astonishment of a conventional community 
craving predictability, practicality and prosperity of its species, science has 
relatively recently introduced more uncertainty than in any period before. 
Against all scientific principles, the most seriously devoted scientist will consult 
the imaginary more often than the carefully selected itinerary of proven reality. 
Such a scientist will gather all the bravery of the polyphibian to break into the 
unknown, to listen to and learn from all other languages of nature. Indeed, one 
needs courage to admit that cherished concepts such as certainty and with it all 
practicality of predictability are only products of unimaginative conventionality. 
In spite of the shifts in scientific paradigms, the rigour of science remains the 
promise of prosperity for the human race. With this rigour intact, the term science 
is not to become obsolete as art did. Art was torn, twisted, reversed into anti-art 
and back, dispersing itself in this devastatingly creative process, to be allowed to 
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accept any raw information via any antenna. On the contrary, the rigour of 
science allows the scientist to receive only real and relevant data. By building 
apparatuses of remarkable complexity to filter and fragment reality into 
repeatable abstraction, the visionary ability of the scientist is ever more 
constrained – the visionary is replaced by vast statistical data processing.  
The visionary scientist is urged to escape from the standard scientific framework 
to the scientific “underground”, to the “subconscious” science, to be able to 
imagine what is there to perceive. Without imagination there is no perception of 
the unknown. In the known and conventionalized there is no need to perceive – 
for conventional reality habit suffices. But the unknown will always permeate the 
known. The unknown demands indifference to conventional predictability, and 
involvement in what lies in between. Physicists, for instance, have been 
consulting beyond boundaries of physics for ages; they consulted in the language 
of metaphysics, explaining structures with meta-structures and those again with 
meta-meta-structures and so forth, until an ultimate pseudo meta-science was 
introduced in the book Exploits and Opinions of Dr. Faustroll, Pataphysician by 
Alfred Jarry in 1911. Jarry (Jarry, 1996) unravelled ‘pataphysics as a science of 
imaginary solutions that was subsequently explained to an American audience 
by Roger Shattuck (1960, p. 24):  
In the realm of the particular, every event arises from an infinite 
number of causes. All solutions, therefore, to particular 
problems, all attributions of cause and effect, are based on 
arbitrary choice, another term for scientific imagination. 
‘Pataphysics welcomes all scientific theories (they are getting 
better and better) and treats each one not as a generality but as 
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an attempt, sometimes heroic and sometimes pathetic, to pin 
down one point of view as “real”. The idea of “truth” is the most 
imaginary of all solutions.  
PROTECTORS OF IMAGINATION 
Although widely practised in recent history, prohibiting the imagination, 
censoring the uncertain part of the unknown, was never taken to the extreme, 
never to be established as an absolute rule, not even by the most eager 
conventionalists in power. Consider the nineteenth-century art scene in Paris: as 
a counterbalance to the academically predictable exhibition of artists in Salon de 
Paris, Salon des Refuses had to be established in 1863 for all the artwork refused 
at the official salon due to excess imagination. Such “protection” of the refused 
in a special salon was not entirely honest, and there was ridicule of the outcasts 
on the agenda, but it nonetheless turned out to be extremely beneficial for the 
avant-garde artists. In fact, it is considered that no institution of this period did 
as much for the advance of French art as Société des Artistes Indépendants, which 
was consequently formed in 1884 by Parisian artists – a society that would enable 
exhibits based on the simple principle no jury, no prizes/sans jury, ni recompens.  
Avoiding the jury is possible in principle but is it attainable in practice? Is it 
practical for the impatient audience? Société des Artistes Indépendants reckoned 
it was too early to judge before the exhibition, but at the exhibition the public was 
expected to judge, even encouraged by a predetermined quantifiable system. But 
should the public judge if it does not speak the language (yet)? Every original 
item exposed is speaking of what is yet to be learnt, or absorbed. Art is about the 
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future; it refers to something that will be comprehended only later on; it is 
dragged by the artist into the present – what the public perceives is only a trailer. 
The jury has not mastered the future language – it cannot give its verdict now.  
In the twenty-first century we can easily afford to postpone the judgement for 
posterity – there is virtually unlimited space to exhibit and to store for the future. 
In addition, the foreseen future is reaching us ever faster. But if art is obsolete, 
what exactly are we to exhibit and examine with postponement? A mutation that 
survived the dissolution of art is polyphibians – this species does not comprise 
only ex-artists, but also scientists working with wild imagination undercover, 
carefully disguised in clean white lab coats and hiding the source of their insight 
under neat statistical graphs. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, as before, with Salon des Refuses, the 
refused imaginary approach of a certain kind from a certain crossover species has 
been recognized and the judgement has been suspended. The imaginary is not to 
be entirely refused, not even in the most rigorous sciences. There have been 
attempts to smuggle artists into labs, by the most prominent and well-funded 
foundations, but unfortunately without any subtle understanding of how 
obsolete the category of artist is. As a result, the artist with scarce sensibility to 
instantaneously comprehend the language of science could not communicate 
with scientists on the “underground”, “unconscious” level. As a result, there 
would be no other result but the intimidation of the artist by the grandeur of 
scientific knowledge, which could only result in futile decoration of scientific 
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outcomes and disappointment of the scientist who would remain with no 
guidance. The devoted scientist is polyphibic in origin and needs to meet his or 
her equal – an experienced ex-artist polyphibian with a high degree in polyglot-
ism. 
The latest attempt to protect imagination is the Collide@CERN project, set up in 
2011 by Ars Electronica and CERN for a collision of art and science. But how can 
the director of the project ensure safe conditions for such a collision? As the 
director, Ariane Koek, herself noted: 
[...] arts/science (sometimes called “sciart”) is gaining 
ascendancy in the 21st century as a movement of influence and 
power. [...] Artists are being driven to become scientific, from the 
moment they fill in a funding application predicting their final 
production. I work in arts/science myself. So, you could argue, 
who I am to talk? After all, I have created an artists” residency 
programme at Cern, the world’s largest particle physics 
laboratory and home to the large hadron collider. But it has at its 
heart the wonder of the creative process. It is not a residency 
which is process-driven or defined by an outcome; nor does it 
demand communication about or homage to the science. [...] I 
have deliberately set it up to be a laboratory of the imagination, 
where freeplay can happen. [...] This goes against the trends that 
can be seen in the arts/science aesthetic which has emerged from 
the 20th century [...]  
In the current conditions of art obsoleteness, or, at best, of art defined directly by 
the free market, the “no jury, no prizes” rule appears difficult to apply; therefore, 
the Collide@CERN programme had to comprise a jury that would judge 
beforehand, not only before the artwork was submitted, but most of all before 
the jury could qualify as a polyglot of all the possible languages that would be 
the outcome of the project. Historical events of the nineteenth century have 
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confirmed that such judgemental procedure is not inspiring for setting up “a 
laboratory of the imagination” (Koek, 2011). But history somehow tends to repeat 
itself, and again in the midst of conventional stagnation there is the urge for 
independent intervention. 
Let us therefore return to the establishment of the Society of Independent Artists, 
this time the American version, in 1917. Like Société des Artistes Indépendants, 
the American Society of Independent Artists was based on the principle “no jury, 
no prizes”. The principle always holds in principle, but the director of the society 
took no chances and tested this rule in practice – at the very first exhibition that 
the society would convene. The director was Marcel Duchamp himself and the 
outcome of the test was so disappointing that he immediately resigned.  
PROPOSAL TO BE IMAGINED 
The American Society of Independent Artists announced in January 1917 that it 
would organize annual exhibitions “where artists of all schools can exhibit 
together – certain that whatever they send will be hung” (Camfield, 1991, p. 66). 
This democratic approach was to ensure that the public would be presented with 
the entire spectrum of contemporary imaginary solutions. The first exhibit was 
to take place in April 1917. Just in time for the exhibit, Duchamp has chosen and 
purchased a ready-made object, turned it 90 degrees, signed it “R. Mutt 1917” 
and submitted it to the exhibit. With that act an imaginary Richard Mutt with an 
imaginary address in Philadelphia became the now infamous artist who would 
submit the mysterious readymade.  
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Immediately after the incident of refusal of the readymade by the “non-existent 
jury” and subsequent resignation of the director, the members of the American 
Society of Independent Artists realized their immature decision and in May 1917 
a manifesto defending the case of R. Mutt was published (Anon, 1917, p. 4). R. 
Mutt’s fame never diminished, and one can only imagine how many works of art 
or other works have been attributed to him.  
In the twenty-first century, imbued with tolerance towards new ideas, the power 
of an avant-garde disintegrated, making the reactionary momentum even 
stronger in reinforcing the conventional structures. Comparison of the current 
jurisdiction of Ars Electronica in the Collide@CERN project with the vision for 
Ars Electronica from the late twentieth century is alarming. For instance, consider 
the following proposal from an extensive study by Ascott (2003, p. 285):  
Perhaps one of the more useful metaphors to describe what is 
required is the “datapool”, a term I coined as a consultant for the 
new Ars Electronica Centre in Linz, Austria. The datapool is that 
into which, and within which, data in all its modes flows – 
endlessly transformed through human interaction – and from 
which it emerges, art-in-flux, flowing on into other domains, 
other pools, other tributaries of the data sea. This and other such 
cultural organisms call for new behaviours on the part of the 
viewing public: no longer to observe, stand back, look from a 
distance and judge, but to plunge into the datapool, immerse 
themselves in its fluid changeability, share in its swirling 
transformations, navigate its knowledge bases, dive to its depths 
of meaning. This is to call for new standards in public access to 
art, art not as finite object but as process and system, a fluid, 
moving stream of data configurations, embodied in networks, 
on screens, in material structures, in installations and 
environments, endlessly open to transformation and change. 
The Ars Electronica project is a museum of the twenty-first 
century. But it can also be seen as the college of the future: not 
reactive but anticipatory.  
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To prevent further museum mummifications, any polyphibian with the rented 
pseudonym licence from R. Mutt would translate the challenge of Collide@CERN 
into nothing less than “Can art match the challenge of the Big Bang proportions, 
proposed by science?” “Indeed it can”, R. Mutt decided, after coincidental study 
of CERN technology. If science invented ASCOT – Apparatus with Super 
Conducting Toroids (Norton, 1992, pp. 137-164), art will match it and raise the 
bet with ASCO2.T – Apparatus with Super COnducting Thought Transduction. 
It is a known fact that after ASCOT comes a second T. It was only a matter of time 
before the second-order cyborganic cyclotron ASCO2.T came after the first to 
map the mind in ATLAS detector that is to be upgraded AT.LAST. 
The director of the Collide@CERN project pledged to break the habit and rethink 
the art/science programme (Koek, 2011). The newly established programme 
under conspicuously old rules had to be tested. Are institutions like Ars 
Electronica ready for necessary re-categorizations, to work with ephemeral 
languages that allow for a continuum of creative discussions? To initiate such a 
discussion, R. Mutt with the consent of R. Ascott (documented on paper and in 
video format) submitted the ready-made ASCO2.T to Ars Electronica for CERN: 
I, Ascott, herby consent, to be used by R. Mutt in collaboration 
with con – CERN– ed scientists as Apparatus with Super 
COnducting Thought Transduction: “A – S – C – O – double T” 
for the purpose of synchrotronic exposure of readymade minds 
to raw data. 
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The submission was rejected. Without any reply or notice of rejection, the 
proposal simply vanished from the agenda and therefore the hypothesis of the 
results of the experiment remains consistent with those of 1917: 
Mr Richard Mutt sent in a fountain. Without discussion this 
article disappeared and never was exhibited. (Anon, 1917, p. 4)  
There is no need for collision of artists and scientists. Even though both are 
institutionalized and categorized, with their uncompromised devotion and 
subtle sensitivity they are upgrading themselves into polyphibic beings by 
absorbing the raw data from nature through osmosis. In other words, the 
datapool, for those brave enough to be exposed to raw data, is where the refused 
unknown can be imagined. 
In fact, one can already imagine what the submitted proposal could be about. For 
that purpose, further revelation of the ASCO2.T AT.LAST project is postponed.  
Stay tuned for the second round of this debate. 
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4.2.3.2. ASCOT vs. ASCO2.T – round 2 – uncertaintiesi 
ABSTRACT 
The first round about “The myth of ASCOT and its rival ASCO2.T: tech-noetic 
vs. techno-logic” exposed the hazard in colliding obsolete disciplinary categories 
under outdated procedures. The orthodox jurisdiction of Ars Electronica and 
CERN in Collide@CERN, one of the most prominent ongoing programmes of this 
kind, does not eliminate the risk of missing the target by operating with 
categories of artists and scientists. Art is one of those disciplines with a long 
expired warranty, but with decay on its periphery that is turning into fertile 
forefront territories. Fresh temporary categories are marking and spreading over 
these uncharted territories and sensibly interconnecting with peripheries of other 
disciplines. The ex-artist that is reborn in this peripheral transdisciplinary zone 
can be provisionally categorized as a polyphibian for its features to be carefully 
studied. Like amphibians, a polyphibian can coherently transcend from one 
medium to another, in between and beyond the disciplines. In order to research 
the implications of such “categorical” mutations, a readymade was submitted to 
the organization of Collide@CERN under the licence of R. Mutt. Namely, the 
readymade ASCOTT (Apparatus with Super COnducting Thought 
Transduction) dubbed also ASCO2.T is needed as the second-order upgrade of 
                                                 
i as presented (partially abridged) at the MutaMorphosis conference (Prague, 2012), Tribute to 
Uncertainty,  and published in (Ljubec, 2013) 
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the existing plan for ASCOT (Apparatus with Super COnducting Toroids) 
invented by the scientists for CERN. As is expected from the reputation of R. 
Mutt’s readymades – this submission was ignored and refused in just the same 
quiet manner as his most notorious one. But if society would not provide salons 
for the refused artists (Salon des Refuses) right next to the salons under the 
scrutiny of academically established artists, there would be no mutations and no 
evolution in art. Such mutations of the artist into a “complex and widely 
distributed system” at the dispersing fringes of decomposing art was already 
predicted by R. Ascott. Polyphibians are the species surviving the ripening 
metamorphosis of disciplines by taking refuge in the unexplored 
transdisciplinary buffer zone. This is the only zone where a confrontation of 
ASCOT technology with tech-noetics of ASCO2.T is possible. The refused 
unknown demands not a Salon but the Interval of Suspended Judgement. In the 
sequel to the first round of this debate, the Interval of Suspended Judgement will 
be investigated. 
PROVISIONAL TERMINOLOGY, CONTINUED  
pol• y• phib• i• an [puh-li-fib-ee-uhn] 
a Being able to coexist coherently while dispersed in several media. To be 
distinguished from “monophibian” – adapted to one and only rationally 
standardised medium, and amphibian (any cold-blooded vertebrate of the class 
Amphibia, comprising frogs and toads, caecilians, newts and salamanders) 
adapted to no more than two media. In the evolution from mono- to poly-
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”mediumistic” the rational-self-referential limitations that arose with 
development of sequentially optimized cortex need to be surmounted: push the 
frontal cortex to the background. Bypass the linear wiring. Switch from direct 
current to the alternating current in all directions. Become polyphibic. 
pol• y• phib• i• c [puh-li-fib-ee-k] 
a living multisided knowing of a phenomenon.  Compare to prefixes monophi- 
(on one side), amphi- (on both sides) and polyphi- (on many sides). Add to that 
bios, the life, the Being in Knowing. Polyphibic refers to being a newborn Being 
in front of every experience – the knowing is reborn with each instance. An 
experiment never yields exactly the same output. The outcome can always be 
experienced from a different side. Grasp the multi-sidedness of all appearances 
that the experimental apparatus yields and you grasped the phenomenon with 
the polyphibic awareness. 
tech• no• e• tics [tech-no-e-tiks] 
Technoetics is a convergent field of practice that seeks to explore consciousness 
and connectivity through digital, telematic, chemical or spiritual means, 
embracing both interactive and psychoactive technologies, and the creative use 
of moistmedia. (Ascott, 2008) 
tech• nous [tek-noos, nous]  
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Just like tech-noetics frees the technical in technology from the limitations of 
classical logic, tech-nous, the tech-enhanced-mind frees the mind from the urge 
to deduce and reduce, to equate unequal. The mind is again fully immersed in 
heterogeneity. Contrary to expectations of inoperability in such heterogeneity, 
tech-nous, so enhanced, can operate efficiently. Heterogeneity does not exclude 
communication, computation, etc. it only enlarges the field to accommodate 
dichotomies. Mind, tech-enhanced by any moist medium, is capable of 
polyphibic performance. Instead of human mind imposing its intuitive structure, 
its instinct to generalise for instance, onto the machine, in tech-nous the reversed 
is allowed: the machine is free to corrupt the mind, disrupt the obsolete self-
referential rationality that inevitably leads to technical paradoxes once a 
boundary is crossed. Tech-nous in this sense is not about rational mind imposing 
restrictions on machine but embracing unpredictable side effects of the system, 
bringing them into the resonance, resonating the systemic errors to a different 
order of awareness in tech-nous.  
Example in a sentence: Polyphibians are always concerned for freedom of tech-
nous from sole dependency on self-referential rationality, as is evident from 
Marcel Duchamp’s statement in an interview with Laurence Stephen Gold: 
My work has been an attempt to show that reason is less fruitful 
than we think. We think that we find solutions through this 
function of rational thought but we do not. The mind is much 
freer than this type of thought would indicate. (Molderings, 
2010, p. c6)  
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INTERVAL OF SUSPENDED JUDGEMENT 
11th of October, 2011 – R. Mutt with consent of R. Ascott suggested the upgrade 
of Apparatus with Super COnducting Toroids – ASCOT (Norton, 1992), part of 
design for ATLAS detector at CERN, to the second order Apparatus with Super 
COnducting Thought Transduction – dubbed ASCO2.T. 
Since the upgrade was quietly refused by the jury of “Collide@CERN”, a sort of 
contemporary Salon des Refuses was proposed – an Interval of Suspended 
Judgment where an upgrade could be carried on without prejudices.  
4th of July 2012 – P. Higgs’ boson was officially received with a 5 sigma certainty 
and a standing ovation in an auditorium at CERN. With that glorious event, the 
conCERNed scientists agreed to shut down LHC for upgrade.  
CONCERN FOR (DIS)APPROVAL  
Since the upgrade is now officially on schedule, R. Mutt with the readymade 
assisted applied for approval of the council of Arts@CERN (the organizer of 
Collide@CERN) to implement the second-order cyborganic detector ASCO2.T:  
During the uneasy and uncertain Interval of suspension of acceleration, that 
follows after the relief of high 5 Sigma Confidence Interval in which the 
conCERNed scientists are to upgrade what was once conceived as ASCOT 
detector, R. Mutt is willing to assist in implementing the 2nd order version 
ASCO2.T under strict safety conditions of Interval of Suspended Judgement.  
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This extract was filled in the official form, which is to facilitate the applicant in 
proving to be worthy of official (dis)approval. Namely, as is clear from 
Arts@CERN’s public policy, CERN has appointed a “Honorary Cultural 
Advisory Board for the Arts” to advise on “arts engagement” (Arts@CERN 2012). 
With outdated postulates such as “Great Art for Great Science”, this obsolete 
“Arts” Jury has the jurisdiction to disapprove or disregard “art” projects in the 
name of benefit to fundamental scientific research.  
The only requirement demanded by the applicant to implement such a 
controversial upgrade is that this uncertain procedure is to be performed in the 
buffer zone free from ignorance and prejudices and to allow provisional neo-
logisms, neo-categorizations, to release the cramp in which impedingly 
categorized artists and scientists meet. Due to heavy use of conservatives in 
thinking, to resolve this immobilizing shock that prevents smooth transferral 
between disciplines, more than one round of debate is needed. 
From the first round of debate that was opened after R. Mutt’s submission of 
readymade ASCO2.T was silently refused, it was clear that a new version of Salon 
des Refuses was necessary as a buffer zone that protects the projects from being 
crushed by the Establishment. Such contemporary zone for refused ideas would 
be the Interval of Suspended Judgement, but since this would be no ordinary 
salon, located on this or that avenue, how is one to locate such an interval? To 
locate this judgement-free zone, we need to go deep in the roots of scientific 
uncertainty.  
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S(T)IGMA OF CERTAINTY 
When absolute certainty becomes obsolete, the confidence of a natural scientist 
in comprehending a natural phenomenon is narrowed down to “confidence 
intervals” that can only indicate the reliability of a certain estimate. It was at the 
beginning of the previous century that the confidence in the possibility of 
complete comprehension of nature was profoundly shaken. Not only was nature 
revealed as essentially unpredictable and prevailing uncertainty accepted as a 
fact – some scientist even considered the probabilistic laws as more fundamental 
than deterministic laws. The latter would be the emergent structure of the former. 
In this sense, quantum mechanics was the first physical theory based entirely on 
laws of probability (Bohm, 2003).  
Without going into the details of how absolute certainty became obsolete, let us 
consider how approximations of certainty are conceived and how they are 
valued. It is assumed that the results of a well-devised experiment will follow a 
so-called “normal distribution” – describing a bell-shaped Gaussian curve. That 
is, this assumption holds for experiments with no significant systemic error.  
Equation for the family of Gaussian curves includes a parameter sigma (σ) that is 
used to measure the “standard deviation”. When a theoretical model is tested, 
the results that fall off a few sigma from the peak of the Gaussian curve are not 
significant, or rather are considered inconsistent with the model. 
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The degree of deviance or variance in the model described by parameter sigma 
relates to the width of the bell in the Gaussian curve. As the bell of the curve 
flattens, deviations flourish. With the flattening of the bell, the experimentalist’s 
confidence in the model and experiment itself diminishes.  
PHYSICAL /‘PATAPHYSICAL THRESHOLDi 
Imagine a physical experiment so “badly” constructed that the Gaussian curve 
flattens down entirely – touching the ‘pataphysical floor. What is ‘pataphysical 
about this extreme case of distribution curve is that there is no normal 
distribution where the expected result comes out consistently. Rather, as 
‘pataphysics teaches, there is no such thing as things in general, but only 
exceptions. 
Each result of such an extremely flattened bell curve is exceptionally unique – in 
front of each measurement we are, in the words of Henri Poincaré, as a “newborn 
babe”. At least this is how we would be, Poincaré (1913, pp. 363, 364) claims, if 
we were not driven by the survival instinct, which helps us to equate the unequal, 
to abstract and generalize. Of course without such instinct, he points out, there 
would be no science, not even language; perhaps we would not even survive to 
the day.  
                                                 
i see figure 1 
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Although in response to the fierce challenges to the scientific establishment in the 
early twentieth century, Poincaré admits that science is tailored to human 
opportunism and utilitarianism; science, he claims, is not completely artificial, 
since it is not tailored to an individual human, one single individual scholar 
(Tannery, 1912, pp. 73, 74). Marcel Duchamp, the extreme individualist, takes the 
same challenge concerning the arbitrary scientific standards even further: 
departing from Poincaré’s observation, Duchamp’s mission becomes to be 
newborn in front of every phenomenon, with each experience of it (Molderings, 
2010, p. 7). 
Duchampian newborn experiences in accordance with ‘pataphysics always 
follow the degenerated Gaussian curve – flattened into a line – the threshold 
between physics and ‘pataphysics, which barely touches the floor. The Interval 
of Suspended Judgement could not be more appropriately located than at this 
physics /‘pataphysics threshold that constricts the confidence in results; there is 
no room for judgement, generalization or reduction of heterogeneity in this 
“infrathin” interval. The precise location of the Interval of Suspended Judgement 
can only be imagined and never manifested on a graph, since it is too close, 
infinitely close, but again not entirely close to zero. 
MOSAIC MODE  
Trespassing into the Interval of Suspended Judgement comes with a warning: the 
shock of abrupt transition from conventionalized homogeneity to anarchic 
heterogeneity can be fatal for an unprepared monophibian. A polyphibian, on 
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the other hand, is adapted to such different kinds of encounter with the medium. 
Over that threshold, the medium is not to be ordered, normalized and 
standardized from a fixed viewpoint of the “creator”. The polyphibian adopts 
the emphatic approach – shifting the viewpoint in co-creation.  
In Round 1 of this debate, the obsolete term artist or rather “serious artist” – that 
is according to Marshal McLuhan (1994, p. 18) the only “expert aware of the 
changes in sense perception” – was replaced by the temporary term polyphibian 
(Ljubec 2012: 92). According to McLuhan (1992, p. 5), the artist is “the only person 
in our culture whose whole business has been the retraining and updating of 
sensibility.” What McLuhan (1992, p. 5) describes as artists “constantly making 
‘raids on the inarticulate’” is in fact the polyphibic operating mode within 
heterogeneity.  
In his returning from visual to acoustic tribal space, McLuhan stumbles upon a 
Nobel laureate in medicine, Georg von Békésy, who, while researching the 
auditory space, finds the mosaic as a useful model. McLuhan (1962, p. 43) adopts 
this model:  
The paradox presented by Professor von Békésy is that the two-
dimensional mosaic is, in fact, a multidimensional world of 
inter-structural resonance. It is the three-dimensional world of 
pictorial space that is, indeed, an abstract illusion built on the 
intense separation of the visual from the other senses.  
For McLuhan, the dynamic advantage of mosaic lies in its two-dimensionality as 
opposed to the inert perspective, which McLuhan condemns as three-
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dimensional anguish. Namely, “in extreme contrast to ‘point of view’, which 
assumes a fixed position from which to examine each situation and to assert one’s 
preference”, McLuhan (1992, p. 76) poses the mosaic, which requires “constant 
readjustment to our surroundings.” In other words, McLuhan (1992, p. 63) 
concludes:  
Ground cannot be dealt with conceptually or abstractly: it is 
ceaselessly changing, dynamic, discontinuous and 
heterogeneous, a mosaic of intervals and contours. As von 
Békésy discovered, the appropriate form of awareness is 
acoustic-tactile-kinetic and alive to the stress and coercion that 
each exerts on the other.  
This alive awareness, the living knowledge in mosaic that engages multiple 
senses, “does not demand that objects be dissected to be understood; rather, the 
multiple parts coexist simultaneously. To understand acoustic space, you must 
perceive all of it, not focus on one part” (McLuhan, 1975). McLuhan (1962, p. 71) 
further observes: “the method of the twentieth century is to use not single but 
multiple models for experimental exploration, the technique of the suspended 
judgment.” Suspended judgement provides the delay or distance required – the 
interval in which dichotomies can coexist and interpenetrate. 
IDEA OF FABRICATION 
Fabricating an experiment whose outcome falls over the threshold of normal 
distribution disturbs the fabric of normalized reality. In crossing the threshold 
from generalized to unique, unrepeatable results of an experiment, the 
technology of the experiment succumbs to a radical transformation. The logic in 
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technological apparatus is stretched; the rational and self-referential systems that 
lead to dead-end paradoxes are revived in an expanded mosaic context.  
The upgrade from ASCOT to ASCO2.T reverses the roles of mind and machine. 
It is not the monophibic mind anymore that imposes its intuition onto the 
machine, rather when the machine submerges into the Interval of Suspended 
Judgement the polyphibian suddenly becomes aware of the Being machine. The 
mutual empathy between what was before being and machine is now shared in 
the recognized multi-sidedness of machine. While a monophibian acknowledges 
only the side of the system that its mind conceived, concealing the systemic 
errors, the polyphibian is aware of all other sides and contexts of the system.  
CORRELATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE LOGIC OF THE 
INCLUDED MIDDLE 
The need for a definition of reproducibility in the law of nature 
has […] resulted in the loss of the unique in the scientific 
conceptualization of nature. What we have experienced in 
quantum mechanics is the occurrence of the essentially unique 
where it would least be expected, namely in (“non-lawful”) 
individual observation. (Pauli, 1996, p. 56) 
The loss of unique and individual became evident when physicists crossed the 
threshold of classical physics. The classical logic outside the constricted area 
failed the rational expectations and alternatives to objectivity had to be 
considered. Books like “Causality and Chance in Modern Physics” by David 
Bohm or “From certainty to uncertainty: the story of science and ideas in the 
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twentieth century” by David Peat thoroughly describe the paradigm shift in the 
science of physics, especially the turn to quantum physics.  
The quantum physicist, Basarab Nicolescu, extends the implications of such shift 
in paradigm to the entire spectrum of human endeavour. The shift from classical 
logic to its broadened version – the so-called logic of the included middle – 
introduced by Stéphane Lupasco for the purpose of resolving duality on the 
quantum level – is applied by Nicolescu (2002, p. 28) between and beyond all the 
disciplines. By widening the domain of this upgraded logic to transdisciplinarity, 
Nicolescu reveals the glimpses of the structure in the buffer zone between and 
beyond disciplinary, constrained knowledge.   
Such transdisciplinary buffer zone works like the interval of suspended 
judgement where A is either A or not-A, or both. With proposal from Lupasco to 
include the element that is both A and not-A, as a constituent axiom of logic, the 
principle of complementarity has been addressed in a formal manner. As is 
recounted by David Peat, Niels Bohr formulated the principle of 
complementarity from the wave/particle duality:  
Quantum systems demand the overlapping of several 
complementary descriptions that when taken together appear 
paradoxical and even contradictory. Quantum theory was 
opening the door to a new type of logic about the world. […] 
Rather than creating exhaustive descriptions of the world or 
drawing a single map that corresponds in all its features to the 
external world, science was having to produce a series of maps 
showing different features, maps that never quite overlap. (Peat, 
2002, p. 8) 
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A pile of never quite overlapping maps creates the kind of mosaic conditions 
McLuhan promoted after Georg von Békésy. Complementarity of multi-sided 
appearances on multiple maps constitutes the phenomenon that can be grasped 
simultaneously only by polyphibic awareness. With the principle of 
complementary descriptions of reality, mosaic reading from multiple viewpoints 
becomes a necessity. Georg von Békésy writes:  
When in a field of science a great deal of progress has been made 
and most of the pertinent variables are known, a new problem 
may most readily be handled by trying to fit it into the existing 
framework. When, however, the framework is uncertain and the 
number of the variables is large the mosaic approach is much the 
easier. (Békésy, 1960)  
Other principles were brought forward to cope with unsettling quantum 
conditions. After complementarity, the principle of correlation (Bell, 1987) soon 
followed to indicate the indescribable circumstances in a quantum system when 
it is broken into parts. Namely, parts of the system continue to be correlated even 
when they are separated. Non-local correlation persists after separation as if the 
system is self-aware and aware of all interrogations about it. While monophibic 
separation and fragmentation of reality results in reduction, the polyphibic 
multi-sidedness preserves the shared information between all the facets of 
reality. In the following comparison, David Bohm (2003, p. 1c10) observes the 
role of correlations in separated cuts, facets and sides of reality:  
Compare the structure of the totality of natural law to an object 
with a very large number (in reality infinite) of sides, having 
facets within facets, facets reflecting facets, facets consisting of 
mosaics of facets, etc. To know what the object is, then, we must 
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have a large number of different kinds of views and cross-
sections. Each view or cross-section then contributes to our 
understanding of many aspects of the object. The relationships 
between the views are, however, equally important, for they 
serve to correct the errors which arise as a result of regarding one 
or a limited number of views as a complete representation of the 
whole object; and they also indicate qualitatively new properties 
not apparent in the separate views.  
CO-CREATION BETWEEN THE OBSERVER AND THE OBSERVED  
For the outcome of our experiment to reach the “infrathin” interval with infinite 
sigma, the apparatus must be upgraded to a version freed from influences of 
intuition of continuity and causality. That is, to obtain unequal multi-sided 
apparitions of a phenomenon, that on the normal distribution graph follow the 
curve degenerated into a flat line, in front of every apparition the apparatus must 
be a newborn being.  
Monophibians not only refuse to be reincarnated in front of every event, being 
essentially “monoglots”, they are reluctant to speak a new language in every new 
situation. Niels Bohr was concerned by the fact that we only speak one (the 
everyday) language and we use it to articulate any scientific subject. 
Polyphibians are trained polyglots in order to avoid this additional source of 
transferring instincts from one area to another, namely, universal language is but 
another agency of transferral, of equating the unequal.  
Bohr argued that we cannot assume quantum entities to have intrinsic properties 
such as speed and position, that is, we cannot import properties from human 
scale world into the world of the quantum. We must first be reborn on the 
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quantum level. For Bohr, every act of measurement is an act of interrogating the 
universe, as David Peat (2002, pp. 16, 21) summarizes:  
The answer one receives to this interrogation depends on how 
the question is framed – that is, how the measurement is made. 
Rather than trying to unveil an underlying quantum property, 
the properties we observe are in a certain sense the product of 
the act of measurement itself. […] Bohr […] argued that “the 
procedure of measurement” has ‘an essential influence’ on the 
very definition of the physical variables that are to be measured. 
[…] the answer to a quantum measurement is a form of co-
creation between observer and observed.  
Co-creation involves a polyphibic rebirth in every act of interrogation. Unlike a 
regular experiment, where the monophibian discards every abnormality and 
talks fluently only about the normal distribution of results, the experiment in co-
creation between the observer and the observed yields not only always new 
results, but new language to describe them. The polyphibians are co-creating the 
Interval of Suspended Judgement.  
APPARATUS AND ITS APPARITIONS  
If it is known in advance that the results of the experiment will be unique, never 
to be equated with another outcome, what is to be said of the apparatus? How 
can an apparatus be so upgraded, its degrees of freedom so enhanced, that the 
only thing that is certain is that anything is equally possible? By switching from 
physical to ‘pataphysical apparatus, the systemic errors in a machine are not 
discarded or corrected. The system is allowed to express itself in the full range of 
side effects. The technical in the machine that was received by the open mind 
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within the Interval of Suspended Judgement is reconnected to the mind in tech-
nous. Tech-nous is the first stage of expanding the rational and self-referential 
system that by default ends up in paradoxes, in the very irrational, unpredictable, 
uncomputable behaviour that the system was supposed to escape. To understand 
technology outside the limits of logic is to understand the mutual dependence of 
techne and nous – the influence of what was projected back onto itself without 
ignoring the multiplicity of side effects, without disregarding the multi-sided 
context.  
While ASCOT was devised to aim at a normal distribution with adequately 
shaped bell curve to help physicists to indicate consistently repeated appearance 
of a Higgs boson – a degenerated distribution of irreproducible appearances 
coming from ASCO2.T helps a ‘pataphysicist indicate and comprehend the Higgs 
boson as a multi-sided feature. In a ‘pataphysical experimental setting of 
ASCO2.T, by default none of the results obtained can be identical to any other 
even if, to the conCERNed physicist, the conditions will seem identical in every 
trial. A physicist who would embrace this upgrade and pursue this path must be 
warned before crossing over the threshold into the Interval of Suspended 
Judgement. For these reasons, a distant early warning (DEW) was sent to the 
“Arts” council through the application for conCERNed approval, describing the 
procedure:  
Take a human (ready) made apparatus and modulate the 
systemic error to a degree where the human instinct to equate 
unequal, the intuition present in all humans to generalize and 
abstract is disabled. Then each measurement will be unique – the 
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probability of single exceptional event to be detected more than 
once will be infinitely small. From such nonlinear flaw-full 
apparatus results a relatively abnormal linear distribution of 
detected apparitions. With consistency in deviations – each 
apparition is infinitely nonstandard – comes a certainty that all 
appearances have the same probability to occur and every 
apparition is just as significant as any other. The certainty in a 
phenomenon consisting of singular appearances arises with 
emergence of a virtual line – a linear condensation forming 
multiplicity from incommensurable singularities. The certainty 
arises as self-recognition of apparatus in the phenomenon – or 
self-reference of detected feature in all incomparable detections, 
in the complementarity of contradiction.  
Every polyphibian is aware – and we are talking here of 
multisided, that is, polyphibic awareness – that a phenomenon 
is composed of multiplicity of unique appearances. The 
readymade assisted apparatus – ASCO2.T – is the only kind that 
is ready for detecting bosons from multiple floating viewpoints. 
While the monophibic standard scientific approach relies on 
repeating detection of one and the same appearance, that is, a 
biased one-sided detection from fixed point of view, to insure 
certainty, the tech-noetic innovation by polyphibians relies on 
unrepeatable multiplicity of exceptional appearances. Only if the 
multisided appearances are to be grasped simultaneously (in 
mosaic superposition) by tech-nous (a polyphibically enhanced 
mind) can a holistic glimpse of the phenomena (the feature of the 
field) be revealed. Since there is no such thing as things in 
general and to avoid any tautology in repeating one and the 
same result of detection ASCO2.T will be activated within fuzzy 
limits of a personal “confidence interval.”  
CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THREE STANDARD STOPPAGES  
With the forthcoming centennial of three standard stoppages, Duchamp’s Idea of 
the Fabrication is to be updated, expanded from stops, stoppages and invisible 
mending to invisible reconstruction of the fabric – a co-creation, a correlational 
fabrication – not from one side only, as is customary for technique of invisible 
mending, but from multiple sides. 
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the original idea from 1913/1914 (Duchamp, 1989, p. 22)  
– If a straight horizontal thread one meter long falls from a height 
of one meter straight on to a horizontal plane distorting itself as 
it pleases and creates a new shape of the measure of length. –   
– 3 patterns obtained in more or less similar conditions: 
considered in their relation to one another they are an 
approximate reconstruction of the measure of length.  
the updated Idea for 2013/2014 
If canvas fabric is collided with a burning cigarette the invisible 
mending is to be done from multiple sides. – 3 apparitions 
obtained in more or less similar conditions: considered in their 
relation to one another they are an approximate co-fabrication of 
a phenomenon under interrogation.   
What one notices immediately is that the original idea starts with the straight line 
– the shortest distance in Euclidean geometry and ends up in non-Euclidean 
geometry. The manifestation of the updated idea seems reversed: we start with 
utterly, almost inconceivably non-linear apparatus and end up in the most 
dreaded linear interval – the terror zone of experimental physics. That is, instead 
of ending up on a nice normal curve, we drop flat on a line. One needs to bear in 
mind this threshold line – a kind of DEW line, infinitely close to zero, that only a 
polyphibian is able to locate precisely in imagination and trespass with precision 
– this line is nothing but full of infinite deviation. 
In experiments devised by monophibians, the apparatus bursts the fabric of 
reality, colliding particles with colossal amounts of energy. When the hole is 
burnt into the fabric, the monophibians invisibly mend the fabric – their mending 
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perfectly matches their model of reality. On one side only, that is. On the other 
side, of course, the mending is revealed. A physicist ignores the existence of 
another side, while a ‘pataphysicist gladly displays the wrong side, if there is 
interest for it.  
The readymade ASCO2.T therefore operates by invisible mending. In a cosy 
armchair, it takes on the old habit – it lights a cigar, takes a canvas painted 
Prussian blue and carelessly burns it, colliding particles with the fabric of reality. 
It then takes a needle and mends the trajectories of colliding particles – the three 
stoppages are the fabricated paths. So far all so monophibic. Then with a 
polyphibic twist, the mending is revealed from multiple sides – all appearances 
are available to a polyphibian that is able to grasp them in wholeness. 
To explain once more in obsolete terms: the role of the “artist” in “science” is to 
prevent that supposedly “unavoidable” tautology of measurement apparatus, so 
devised to measure those very properties we invented through inventing the 
apparatus. An “artistic” measurement reveals all possible aspects. Reproducible 
outcomes are nothing but foci on one aspect, one and the same apparition of a 
phenomenon – a phenomenon that in this fixed focused way is never to be 
revealed entirely.  
On the contrary, in the Interval of Suspended Judgement, this is precisely what 
happens: the apparatus measures each unique appearance of the phenomena – 
by repeating the experiment over and over, the outcome is never the same. This 
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is only possible if the apparatus is tech-noetic, where the systemic errors are 
embraced and driven into resonance with the nous of the participating observer. 
The update to three standard stoppages is an invitation to “artists” turned 
polyphibians to disturb and breathe life into an extremely important debate on 
chance and causality that was initiated a century ago and still remains an 
unpleasant taboo even in fundamental science. What better way to do this than 
to excavate this “anart” fossil a century later – in 1913 the idea of fabrication was 
triggered and stopped at the same time. Books upon books were written – but 
the three standard stoppages still speak more than ever was said of scientific 
standards. 
4.2.4. Interval of Suspended Judgement 
The creative act is therefore to continue in the safety of the Interval of Suspended 
Judgement, a transdisciplinary buffer zone between the disciplines in which a 
mindless monophibian must be notified to mind the gap, the gap in which the 
rules change, incessantly. Polyphibic awareness is required to sense the gap 
spontaneously. Such gaps are filled with transdisciplinary silencei, as Nicolescu 
(2002) observes. There is no indirect communication in the gap, only immediate 
transduction between the artist and the spectator. 
                                                 
i see chapter 2.2. for more on the role of silence in transdisciplinarity  
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Where precisely is a gap located, depends on the circumstances under which one 
approaches the gap with polyphibic awareness. To locate a gap the approach 
must be unconventional, that is, counter-conventional. The attention of the 
polyphibian redistributes in order to counter the tendencies of any encountered 
convention. The polyphibian plays along all types of reasoning and cuts in at the 
intersection. When the interval is registered the polyphibian suspends all the 
judgement within it. To keep the interval sterile from germs of judgement, the 
incision must be clean-cut, infrathin.  
A simple example is given in this thesis of locating a gap in the specific 
circumstances of Collide@CERN program that was to confront art and science. 
Unlike the institutional role of the jury that doesn’t mind the gap, the approach 
of the curator within a creative act is not to judge, not to inhibit, but to act as a 
catalyst. Participation in the creative act described in previous subchapters 
follows the ‘pataphysical tendencies, discovered in the artwork of the anartist 
Marcel Duchamp, in order to meet with tendencies of conCERNedi physicists. 
Unlike the discriminating jury, the curator infradifferentiates the two confronted 
tendencies of intellectual reasoning, occupying both points of being 
simultaneously, until it is impossible to prevent an explosion of laughter that 
results in a gap, in a clearly demarcated threshold.  
                                                 
i term coined by Roy Ascott (conversation with the author) 
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The threshold is thus to be approached from both the direction of physics, science 
generalizing observed phenomena into laws as general as possible, and the 
direction of ‘pataphysics, science of the exceptional and the unique, whereby 
even generalisation is an exception. To be noted is that the tendencies to judge 
and to generalise are closely related. As mentioned beforei, Poincaré observed 
that it is our survival instinct that enables us to equate the unequal, in short, to 
generalise, to abstract and consequently to tailor the science by the measures of 
human opportunism and utilitarianism, while Pauli revealedii that only a special 
branch of physics - the quantum physics - has appreciated the idea of the search 
for exceptions in spite of the strong drive for generalisation. 
Within the specific context of arts confronting the science of CERN, the location 
of the Interval of Suspended Judgement was therefore to be determined by 
following the standard procedures of physical experiments at CERN, carrying 
them out to the very extreme periphery so that physics could meet the conditions 
of ‘pataphysics. The attainment of the greatest scientific discovery at CERN in 
2012 was judged by the scientific community within the so-called “confidence 
interval” of the “six sigma certainty” which is, as usually, plotted by physicists 
on the graph of normal distribution – the Gaussian curve.  
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.3.2.  
ii ibid. 
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A well behaved physical experiment aims for consistent reproducibility of results 
accumulating at the peak of a well-shaped Gaussian curve. The parameter sigmai 
in the equation of the curve determines the shape of the curveii, for instance the 
curves plotted for sigmas of low values have high peaks. The exceptions that fall 
far from the peak are discarded by physicists but treasured by ‘pataphysicists. If 
one searches beyond physics, beyond the science of the general, one aims at 
experiments that yield exceptions and nothing but exceptions. Compared to 
physics, what is the shape of a Gaussian curve for a well-conceived ‘pataphysical 
experiment? In other words, what is the required ‘pataphysical value for sigma? 
A ‘pataphysicist sends the parameter sigma in the equation of the Gaussian curve 
to infinity to obtain a hilariously flat curveiii. To interpret this extremely straight 
curve imagine a physical experiment so “badly” constructed that the outcomes 
are never repeated and spread, flattening down the normal distribution curve 
completely, touching the ‘pataphysical floor. Each result of such ‘pataphysical 
experiment is exceptionally unique. No generalisation - no judgement! The 
threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics marked by this infinitely flat curve, 
infinitely close to zero, demarcates where the science of the general stops, 
suspends the judgement, and explores in new directions, diverges and deviates.  
                                                 
i see figure 1 for the equation of the Gaussian curve 
ii see figure 1 for the low values of parameter sigma  
iii see figure 1 for the dotted line that represents the Gaussian curve with parameter 𝜎 →  ∞ 
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Figure 1: Interval of Suspended Judgement 
Locating the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics – the Interval of Suspended Judgement - on the 
graph of normal distribution at the infinite value of parameter sigma (indicated by a dotted line). 
CERN has opened a dialogue with arts by establishing the Arts@CERN to ensure 
a suitable selection of “Great Art for Great Science.” Artists are now welcome to 
pass their proposals through the selectively permeable filter of Arts@CERN jury 
which either disapproves with the proposed project or issues an official 
document of approval. The proposal submitted to the jury in October 2012 was 
to consider the exciting new discovery of the threshold between physics and 
‘pataphysics as a temporary suspension of their habits of judgement. By 
broadening the horizons with all the implications of this stimulating discovery, 
the hope was to broaden the range of acceptance of exceptional Art proposals to 
Science. 
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4.2.5. The Box of 1914  
The Box of 1914 is Duchamp’s first collection of notes that serves as his first 
announcement of his largest artwork - the Large Glass, and yet the notes 
themselves already acquire the status of an artwork.  One of the main sources of 
inspiration for Duchamp’s notes was, according to Henderson (2005, p. 72), the 
publication of Leonardo da Vinci’s manuscripts by Charles Ravaisson-Mollie at 
the end of the 19th century when the general interest in this artist-scientist was on 
the rise. The impression of the great polymath on Duchamp was such that he 
tried to experience the intricate intertwining of artistic and scientific tendencies 
himself. Taking example from Leonardo’s notes Duchamp acquired a scientific 
style of notation for his art. 
When Duchamp looked to Leonardo, he was most interested in 
artist’s notebooks, which demonstrated his intellect and 
established the recording of ideas in notes as a legitimate form 
of artistic production. (Henderson, 2005, p. 188) 
Henderson (2005, p. 73) observes many similarities in Duchamp’s and 
Leonardo’s writings, among them the discontinuity. Just as there is a lack of 
sequence in Leonardo’s text, so does Duchamp disregard the linear continuity: 
“Duchamp ensured the absence of any clear sequence among his notes by 
recording them on separated pieces of paper” Henderson (2005, p. 73). In spite 
of, or even because of, no preferred sequential order Henderson (2005, p. 74) is 
convinced the assortment was significant for Duchamp: 
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Although previous scholars have never treated the Box of 1914 
notes as a coherent group, Duchamp would certainly have 
selected those notes carefully: they were to function as an 
announcement of what was to come in the Large Glass at the 
same time they declared his commitment to random ordering of 
chance.  
The notes therefore were more than a humorous application of a pseudoscientific 
language: “If a straight horizontal thread ...” or “Given that ..., if I suppose ...,” 
that Henderson (2005, p. 75) highlights as typical language of a geometrical proof. 
Duchamp was applying scientific approach to non-scientific domains, expanding 
the territories of science: “I propose to strain the laws of physics” (Roberts, 1968, 
p. 62).  Henderson goes at great length to report all known areas of science and 
technology that Duchamp tampered with. 
Duchamp’s interest in Leonardo was not a retrospective one: he 
was not simply concerned with earlier ideas that bore 
Leonardo’s imprimatur. Instead he sought to act as the new 
Leonardo, responding actively to contemporary science and 
technology as Leonardo has done in Renaissance. (Henderson, 
2005, p. 72) 
Although Duchamp’s response was foremost humorous, his engaging with the 
latest ideas in science originated from genuine curiosity producing comical side 
effects that served as a subtle critical approach to rigidity of methods and to 
habitual minds. Duchamp was challenging the limits of disciplinary and even 
interdisciplinary research by taking an instrument successfully used and reused 
in one discipline and applying it in an unconventional manner to a problem set 
outside that discipline. The comical element in these experiments uncovered the 
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scope of the tool or the method, opening up new ways for transcending 
disciplinarity.   
To participate in the Large Glass one needs to consult the notes. The Large Glass 
is a projection of a higher order – a higher dimensional organism of living 
knowledge onto the ordinary knowledge apparatus of lower dimensions. Large 
Glass is to be lived by a polyphibian. In contact with the monophibian the glass 
shatters. Only the dead knowledge archived in a box of notes can be safely and 
arbitrarily dissected by the monophibian. While the transdisciplinary polyphibic 
wasp-bride self-organises in a higher dimensional beehive, the monophibian is 
left with the disciplinary “cemetery of uniformsi,” and a scattered assemblage of 
notes, inducing laughter with every attempt to order them meaningfully.  
One of the notes in the Box of 1914, entitled the Idea of the Fabrication, introduces 
Duchamp’s experiment with chance, or what Duchamp (1989, p. 33) terms 
“canned chance” – the 3 standard stoppages.  By annotating this experiment in 
the Box of 1914 Duchamp announces a fierce but humorous deviation from 
conventional standards, measuring systems, and geometries that are to shape the 
Large Glass. The conventional straight unit of length becomes just as arbitrary as 
any curved unit of length – the arbitrator here is chance aided by gravity. In the 
most comprehensive research of 3 standard stoppages, Herbert Molderings 
                                                 
i cemetery of uniforms was Duchamp’s term for uniforms of different professions depicted in 
Large Glass  
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(2010, p. 836) reveals the growing relationship between gravity and “aesthetics 
of chance” through various episodes, in one of them: 
In the exhibition Le Surréalisme en 1947 at the Galerie Maeght in 
Paris, Duchamp related the figure of the juggler of the center of 
gravity directly to the 3 Standard Stoppages. It had been Breton’s 
idea to erect an “altar” to twelve mythical figures of modernism, 
including the soigneour de gravité, which existed only as a 
sketch, not having been realised in the Large Glass. (Molderings, 
2010, p. 836) 
The Idea of the Fabrication that was realised and conserved as “canned chance,” 
to be reused as a standard, whenever inappropriate, became an offering to a 
never realised mythical figure – Juggler- Handler-Tender of Gravity.  This figure 
that was exceptionally allowed to cross the threshold and enter the domain of the 
Bride was, according to Molderings (2010, pp. 829-835), invented by Duchamp as 
“a reaction to the crisis of language that had seized theoretical physics at the turn 
of the century, when the new insights into the subatomic structure of matter had 
begun to erode the terminology of classical mechanics and physicists were still 
not clear about the language needed to describe energetic processes in a 
subatomic context.”  
To demonstrate the perplexity among the greatest scientists facing the paradigm 
shifts in physics, Molderings quotes Poincaré (1913, p. 310) pondering on the 
consequences of questioning the validity of Lavoisier’s principle of the 
conservation of mass: “the center of gravity of an isolated system moves in a 
straight line; but if there is no longer a constant mass, there is no longer a center 
of gravity, we no longer know even what this is.” The scientific hesitation in 
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regards to notion of mass and gravity culminated in a monumental experiment 
in 2012 at CERN, confirming the existence of Higgs boson – the juggler in the 
Higgs field, responsible for mass, and yet only tangentially related to the problem 
of gravity. It is within this context that, for the purposes of this thesis, the Box of 
1914 was reopened and the Creative Act resumed.  
4.2.6. The Box of 2014  
The box of 2014i documents participation in Duchamp’s creative act, first 
announced in 1914 within a box. In accordance with the theory and practice 
outlined in the current chapter, this subchapter examines Duchampian 
“participation in a creative act” and “readymade intervention” from curatorial 
points of being. The Box of 2014 is not focusing merely on the traces of 
trespassing, but by establishing precisely the location of the threshold that is to 
be trespassed, it curates the conditions for further trespassers, setting up a 
catalytic reaction for potential participants in Duchamp’s creative act. 
Namely, contrary to the tendency of blurring the borderline between art and 
science in art-science collaborations, the line where the notes from the Box of 2014 
are to be catalytically curated must be clearly conceived. Curatorial reaction 
against generalisations that could lead to institutionalisation and unnecessary 
categorisation of “art-science collisions,” as previously examined in the 
                                                 
i see also appendix B  
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Collide@CERN programme, requires a specific, exceptional context – in the 
present case – the context of pataphysical exceptions.  
Observing the nature by co-creating it, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN 
represents the most glorious advancement in the “non-retinal art,” established 
by Duchamp a century ago through application of comical correctives to the 
instruments of observation. Particle accelerators and detectors break with 
tradition of instruments from microscopes to telescopes that are indulging the 
retina: no particle is to be directly detected by a retina – particle trajectories are 
only post-festum reconstructed for amusement of the retinal audience. 
Participation in a creative act of nature by creating particles through collisions 
introduces a ‘pataphysical component into particle physics that should not be 
overlooked. For this reason physics was differentiated from ‘pataphysics 
following the mathematics that determines the s(t)igma of certainty for detection 
of the most wanted particle responsible for mass. Mathematically satisfying both 
physics (science of the general) and ‘pataphysics (science of exceptions), the 
threshold between them was established by sending the parameter sigma in the 
equation for the standard distribution curve to infinity. i 
                                                 
i see chapter 4.2.4. and figure 1 for the equation and the graph of normal distribution at various 
values for parameter sigma 
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In such exact experimental setting, Duchamp’s ‘pataphysical equations, such as 
“arrhe is to art as shitte is to shit,”i inevitably mutate, for instance, into “arrhe is 
to art as stigma of certainty is to sigma.” Namely, Duchamp’s notes, as was 
shown in the previous subchapter, become legitimisedii artworks in their own 
right, an indispensable constituent of his creative act, and as such, are prone to 
participatory evolution. Accurately curating the environment for Duchamp’s 
notes in 2014 would therefore imply a variety of mutations.  
Setting up the Box of 2014 hence consists in remapping Duchamp’s notes from 
1914 onwards, that are constituting, rather than merely complementing the Large 
Glass, into the context of the Large Hadron Collider, laying between the Jura 
mountain range, which Duchamp surmounted on the ‘Jura-Paris Road,’ and the 
lake Geneva with the waterfall Forestay, which Duchamp photographed for his 
last work ‘Given: 1st the waterfall, 2nd the illuminating gas.’ Duchampian 
dynamics of liquids and gases suddenly provides ‘pataphysical mechanics to 
“strain the laws of physics” (Roberts, 1968, p. 62) on another scale: from 
oscillating density, subsidised symmetry and reintegration of friction that runs 
the Batchelor Apparatus to the domain of the Bride and its ironic causality, where 
                                                 
i see the Box of 1914 (Duchamp, 1989, p. 24), for more algebraic comparisons see the Green Box 
(Duchamp, 1989, p. 28) 
ii see Henderson (2005, p. 188) for the role and importance of notes as art form 
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demultiplication of the target becomes the sculpture of skill and the collision is 
the “raison d’être of the picture.”i 
With or without the historical fact that Duchamp’s ‘pataphysical expeditions 
enfold the territory, now dominated, at least underground, by CERN physical 
experiments, the catalytic reaction triggered by remapping the ‘pataphysics of 
the Large Glass onto the Large Hadron Collider results into new readings, new 
interpretations, and new kinds of participation. For instance, a 1914 note, “the 
Idea of the Fabrication” for a standard unit of length is rewrittenii by Duchamp 
in 1934 as if executed under jurisdiction of the “Ministry of gravity” abiding by 
the “Regime of Coincidence,” forming “canned chance.”iii In the Box of 2014 a 
note on “the Idea of the Postproduction” is issued.iv  
The 3 Standard Stoppages produced according to the Idea of the Fabrication are 
reused as “canned chance” within other works of Duchamp, including the Large 
Glass. In the Idea of the Postproduction the 3 Standard Stoppages are 
reconsidered in the context of the Large Hadron Collider, where the threshold 
between repeatable and consistently unrepeatable results of the experiment is 
established. As suggested, the postproduction consists in plotting a normal 
distribution graph for the 3 Standard Stoppages by sending the parameter sigma 
                                                 
i see Duchamp (1989) for modified principles of physics explained through various notes 
ii see the Box of 1914 (Duchamp, 1989, p. 22) and the Green Box (Duchamp, 1989, p. 26) 
iii see the Green Box (Duchamp, 1989, p. 26) 
iv see appendix B for both the note “Idea of the Fabrication” and the “Idea of the Postproduction” 
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to infinity. The possibility of “infra-thin” separation between the 3 “identicals”i 
is therefore recovered in the Interval of Suspended Judgement. 
The ATLAS detector of the Large Hadron Collider was derived from the design 
of the apparatus under the acronym ASCOT. According to the Regime of 
Coincidences it was no coincidence that there was a readymade cyborganic 
apparatus available under the acronym ASCOTT. Without hesitation Roy Ascott 
was anonymously submitted (under the pseudonym of R. Mutt) as a readymade 
to upgrade ASCOT for ATLAS with another “T” into ASCOTT, or rather, 
ASCO2.T AT.LAST. Despite the apparent detection of the particle responsible for 
mass in 2012, at the ATLAS detector, the questions in the all-too-modern theory 
of gravity were not answered.  The Ministry of Gravity hence continues the quest 
with all hopes invested in ASCO2.T AT.LAST.  
The Altar for Duchamp’s Juggler-Handler-Tender of the Center of Gravityii 
constructed on Breton’s demand as one of the altars to mythical figures of 
modernism is now dedicated, on request of the Ministry of Gravity, to this very 
ASCO2.T AT.LAST.  Just as the Juggler of the Center of Gravity was conceived 
in a note but never realised in the Large Glass, only to become a mythical figure 
of modernism, so does the ASCO2.T AT.LAST, quietly rejected by CERN and 
                                                 
i see appendix A for notes on “infra-thin” and “identicals” 
ii the altar is part of the exhibition Le Surréalisme in 1947, Paris in honour to the mythical figures of 
modernism 
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never realised in the Large Hadron Collider, become the mythical figure of 
polyphibianism.  
Duchamp’s (or rather R. Mutt’s) original Fountain was lost, but the myth of the 
Fountain persisted, omnipresent through his oeuvre, all the way to the last 
artwork where it appears in the form of the Waterfall, in particular, the waterfall 
Forestay by the lake Geneva, from where a different kind of overview can be 
obtained of CERN, just across the lake. In the same manner, the myth of ASCO2.T 
persists. As a myth, it is never actualised, but maintains its virtual component. 
Within the Box of 2014, in particular, the myth of ASCO2.T AT.LAST exists inside 
the virtual planet Earth – the Google Earthi.  
The myth-preserving environment of Google Earth readily lends itself to 
collecting Duchamp’s notes. With complete aesthetic indifference the notes can 
be supplied to the virtual territory in a predetermined form at the chosen 
coordinates, with accompanying links “To here” and “From here.” There are 
myriad of ways in which to curate the Box of 2014 in a virtual planet, free from 
constrains gravity, where Duchamp (1983) would find the “liberty of 
indifference” that is offered by the principle of “anti?gravity,” following a “centre 
of distraction,” rather than attraction.     
                                                 
i see also appendix B for instruction on curating the Box of 2014 through Google Earth  
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Besides 1st, the waterfall, and 2nd, the illuminating gas, only the meta-meta note, 
or simply the ‘pata note is given on curating the exhibition of notes. Otherwise 
the curator of the Box of 2014 has complete liberty of indifference to navigate the 
street view of the virtual Large Hadron Collider, annotating any suspicious 
events from leaking gas in the tunnels, to deserted bicycles and other kinds of 
chariots within the Batchelor Apparatus. The intervention in the virtual ATLAS 
Control Room ensures that the video of ASCO2.T AT.LAST is transmitted at all 
times. The spectator is invited to complete the existent physical apparatus, 
intermittently interrupted with ‘pataphysical notes, through infinite imaginary 
solutions. By curating the notes the curator thus exposes the mind of the spectator 
to the raw data at the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics.  
Every version of the Box of 2014 constitutes a unique encounter between the 
physicist and the ‘pataphysicist, furthermore inviting artists and scientists of any 
discipline to experience their encounters as something more specific and 
exceptional than the general assessment of a blurred borderline between art and 
science. The Box of 2014 is therefore, above all, an invitation to the artists to 
recognise the interface between the media, or in particular between the 
disciplines, and to halt at the infrathin interval, in order to delve into where the 
limitations of the scientists occur, and to help extend these limitations of science 
“a little,” just as Duchamp (Roberts, 1968, p. 62) was aiming “to strain the laws 
of physics, just a little.” 
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4.2.7. Retinal and non-retinal detectors: medium glassi 
The instructions inscribed in French on a strip of metal glued across Marcel 
Duchamp’s work, also known as Small Glass, translate into English as follows: 
‘To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with One Eye, Close to, for 
Almost an Hour.’ In exploration of the implications of such strenuous procedure 
the original instructions will be expanded upon: ‘To Be Looked at (from Multiple 
Sides) with more than One I, Close to and Even Closer, for Almost an Instant’ - 
an invitation to exercise the polyphibic awareness of multiplicity of appearances, 
the ability to look at a phenomenon not only from one or the other side but from 
multiple sides, in its multiple potential apparitions.  
The original title ‘To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass)…’ already 
persuades the spectator to switch the sides and go behind the image, but as 
curious spectators we are also tempted to speculate beyond it being a mere 
image, beyond the frame that binds it to be an image. Such speculation unravels 
its potential power when used as an instrument – an instrument that Duchamp 
(1989, p. 140) would invite us to engage with, to interact with in a “creative act” 
that “is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact 
with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications.” 
                                                 
i as presented at the 13th Consciousness Reframed Conference: Behind the Image and Beyond, 
Cairo 2013 and published in conference proceedings (Ljubec, 2014) 
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The small glass made contact with the external world in 1918, when it was 
hanged naked - frameless on a balcony in Buenos Aires. Duchamp (1989, p. 139) 
further explains participation in a “creative act” as a matter of “transference from 
the artist to the spectator in the form of an esthetic osmosis, taking place through 
the inert matter.” In the case of the Small Glass the inert matter is glass with all 
its optical elements, an unframed, unlimited, selectively permeable membrane, 
receiving attention not unlike an antenna.  
In the same text on “creative act” Duchamp (1989, p. 138) refers to the artist as “a 
mediumistic being who from the labyrinth beyond time and space, seeks his way 
out to a clearing.” In an evolving transdisciplinary context Duchamp’s 
“mediumistic being” was grown into an imaginary solution to release the 
disciplinary confinements. To navigate the zone in between and beyond 
disciplines the mutual dependence between the “mediumistic being” and the 
medium it interacts with - creates in - had to be re-examined (Ljubec, 2011, p. 
165). By analogy with amphibians who are able to survive and thrive in two 
media like water and air a “mediumistic being” that is able to trespass multiple 
media was redefined and reborn into a polyphibian.   
Let us use Duchamp’s Small Glass in a creative act, not as an image to be looked 
at, but as an instrument to look for polyphibians, a detector for polyphibic 
awareness. We already know how a monophibian with a monocle would look 
upon a small glass – aiming right at the magnifying glass in the middle. An 
amphibian would approach small glass as an interface – maintaining overview 
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of both sides. How about a polyphibian? How would one detect with an 
apparatus, as puzzling as the Small Glass, such an enigmatic creature as a 
polyphibian? Before we participate in the creative act let us briefly review the 
main constitutive elements of this detectori at hand: 
- The magnifying lens; 
- The zone plate: a set of rings around the magnifying lens which alternate 
between opaque and transparent. Unlike the lens, a zone plate is a device 
that relies on diffraction instead of refraction or reflection to focus light or 
other wavelike phenomena. Diffraction happens when a wave encounters 
an obstacle – such as the opaque ring on the zone plate. By adjusting the 
space between the zones constructive interference can be achieved from 
diffracted light. 
- The cross-eyed scissors: only partly visible in the Small Glass but fit 
entirely on the Large Glass alluding to Leonardo da Vinci’s X-shaped 
diagram of cross-eyed vision that studies binocular disparity (the 
difference in image location of an object seen by each eye, resulting from 
the distance between the eyes). 
- The optical witness eye-chart: used to diagnose astigmatism, blurred 
vision caused by a refractive error of the eye that prevents convergence of 
parallel rays of light on a single focal point on the retina.  
                                                 
i see (Henderson, 2005) for more on technical details 
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- The pyramid; 
- The obelisk.i   
                                                 
i This talk was presented in Egyptian landscape of pyramids, obelisks and sphinxes. 
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Figure 2: Small Glass, unframed 
Marcel Duchamp, To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with One Eye, Close to, for Almost 
an Hour, 1918, oil paint, mirror silver, lead wire and magnifying lens on glass, Museum of Modern Art, 
New York, bequest of Katherine S. Dreier. Photograph of the work unframed taken in Buenos Aires in 
1918–1919. Yale University Art Gallery, Société Anonyme Collection.  
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Figure 3: Small Glass, framed 
Photograph of Marcel Duchamp’s To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with One Eye, Close 
to, for Almost an Hour, 1918. Photographer John Schiff. Photo credit: Yale University Art Gallery. 
Museum of Modern Art, from Katherine S. Dreier’s private collection. 
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SMALL GLASS TO BE ENGAGED IN CREATIVE ACT 
1918. On a balcony in Buenos Aires: 
oil paint,  
mirror silver,  
lead wire,  
magnifying lens on glass – small glass in relation to Large Glass.  
 
Strip of metal with French inscription:  
À regarder (l’autre côté du verre) d’un oeil, de près, pendant presque une heure.  
 
Two holes in top two corners: the small glass hangs from two threads.  
It hangs in space without a frame, without borders.  
The two threads are the only visible connection to a variable context.  
Hanging there invisible, transparent, 
yet heterogeneously transparent, impenetrable to homogeneous mind. 
 
Its optical elements readjust the geometry of space it is hanging in.  
Vice versa the space could readjust the optical elements:  
spatial translation could crack the transparency;  
vibrations of space in transportation are a possibility to be actualized in glass: 
small or Large, cracking is its potential. 
 
While fresh with potential it is free to hang out in the open air,  
interfering with electromagnetism of an open field,  
detecting the passing wave fronts of visible light, or invisible … 
  
Becoming actualized by the crack – 
one of the many possible cracked configurations is manifested:  
the manifestation abruptly arrests an open system.  
 
A small glass self-actualized is  
312 
 
to be enclosed in a frame 
to be displayed in an enclosed space 
to be looked at.   
   
Is it a joke on monophibians? A monophibian enters a bar:  
to be looked at (from the other side of the glass) with one eye, close to, for almost 
an hour.  
‘I just tell them not to do it because there is nothing to look at but exhaustion’. 
Duchampi.   
Exhaustion of one eye, of mono I.  
Monotony of empty infinite depth in perspective,  
only one viewpoint allowed, from one side, wrong side, even: 
the lens inflates infinity, turns it upside down. 
 
Retinal fatigue:  
small glass as apparatus open to all the possible configurations -  
once framed and enclosed in a sealed system serves as a satirical retinal art. 
 
A precisely located pyramid of stripes suddenly bursts in laughter of moiré 
patterns.  
 
To see it from the other side, from both sides at once: 
that is to become a cut – amphibian cut: 
place your eyes above and below water surface,  
split your eyes open. 
 
Ground yourself by floating in the midst: 
                                                 
i as quoted in (Siegel, 1969) 
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know the frivolous air and firm ground but know also the underwater.  
Protrude in either way but keep attention on the surface.  
 
Amphibious pair of eyes are caught in the cut:   
looking close to, even closer;  
until the pair of eyes are in the plane of the lens, 
until the lens is on the line in between the eyes; 
in the extreme zone of indifference for ambivalent amphibian. 
 
The joke is on you - binocular disparity -  
Duchampian humour sticks in the scissors of a cross-eyed vision alla da Vinci. 
Don’t miscalculate the depth – your world is infrathin.  
The second eye is here only to help you hallucinate depth.  
 
A monophibian never comes as close -  
it observes on a distance, behind the glass. 
Do not freeze your gaze towards infinity. 
Add infinity to your reasoning and it vanishes in the vanishing point. 
 
If a monophibian looks at the small glass … 
it finds itself alone in vertigo. 
 
Balance yourself with another I. 
 
If an amphibian gets involved in the cut of the small glass and survives … 
it animates the surface, it renders the interface alive.  
 
Make the interface a selectively permeable membrane;  
semi transparent, semi opaque, reflect, refract, diffract. 
a zone plate for braiding light  
a zone plate for breeding life 
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Keep multiplying the foci:  
multiple focal points - viewpoints floating out of focus. 
Multiply into life: 
once alive - use the third eye and diffract the I. 
Disperse oneself. 
 
If a polyphibian is detected by the small glass … 
how would one know its presence?  
 
Through the Optical Witness? 
The witness of polyphibic awareness: 
the eye chart perceives a polyphibian as an astigmatic blur: poly- foci! 
Another comic relief?  
 
Duchamp is waiting on the other side. 
 
A polyphibian is always present  
in every cut, slim slice, infrathin interface 
in multiplicity of appearances 
with multiple Is.  
 
When a polyphibic eye closes  
it turns inward  
to open towards other directions, other sides. 
 
Detectors and Witnesses in small glass  
witnesses and detectors in Large Glass:  
iridescent interference between thin layers of heterogeneous transparency 
brought together close to and even closer  
for a polyphibic awareness to arise for almost an instant -  
delay in glass collapses into simultaneous presence.  
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Imagining polyphibianism: reaffirming research 
thesis  
To cross the gap between disciplinary and transdisciplinary research the gap 
between theory and practice of transdisciplinary needs to be addressed. While, 
with every major discovery on a periphery of a scientific discipline, trespassing 
into transdisciplinary zone occurs sporadically and spontaneously, there is in 
general no access granted or guaranteed for intentional trespassing. Crossing the 
borders of disciplinary research therefore mostly results in exchange among 
disciplines that might inflate the area of each involved discipline or further 
fragment the disciplinary apparatus into additional compartments. Such cross-
disciplinary projects are nonetheless executed within a specific disciplinary 
domain, rather than in the transdisciplinary zone in between and beyond 
disciplines.  
The problems preventing the open structure of knowledge, as proposed in 
Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, to manifest in practice, are not to be solved by 
yet another auxiliary structure, a firm framework or a fixed methodology 
functioning as a bridge over such ineffable gap between theory and practice. 
Instead this thesis envisions a movement rather than a structure - polyphibianism 
- an evolutionary movement of an imaginary organism of living knowledge.  
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Polyphibianism is thus imagined as a possible transition from closed structure of 
disciplinary research to open structure of transdisciplinarity. As an imaginary 
solution to problems that occur in this transition, its aim is to better understand 
the given problematic, to offer a fertile foundation to elaborate on experiencing a 
different kind of knowledge, where the observer and the observed are not 
separated but mutually dependent, forming a self-aware organism of 
transdisciplinary knowledge, rather than accumulating knowledge, extracted 
and externalised within disciplinary research.  
This thesis hence foresees a possible transdisciplinary research environment 
indigenous to disciplinary researcher where intellect evolves by correcting itself 
and becoming self-aware. The intellectual instruments mutate into organs of 
knowing and self-organise into an organism of living knowledge. Various 
principles of correction, innovation, invention, and mutation of potential organs 
of knowing are examined in an attempt to confront the concerns of disciplinary 
researchers engaging in transdisciplinary practice. Moreover, an example of 
effective practice is studied where an artist trespasses the borders of art and 
invades the zone in between the sciences by setting up a creative act for the 
spectators to participate in. 
Participating in a creative act becomes the experimental setting for this thesis in 
which the missing link between the artist and the spectator is searched for. The 
role of this link, conventionally attributed to the curator, in the context of 
transdisciplinarity, is to become the catalyst, accelerating the transition and 
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transmutation of both artist and spectator into the organism of living knowledge. 
The proposal of this thesis for internal introspective participation in 
transdisciplinary way of knowing, that resists external representation, is 
therefore reaffirmed through experimental practice.   
This thesis does not limit itself to a specialised readership, it is hoped that any 
researcher constrained by her or his disciplinary domain will find in it inspiration 
and the way to search beyond the disciplinary borders. And yet, for the purpose 
of spreading such encouragement the primary intended readership would be the 
curators of artwork that moves freely in between and beyond institutionalised 
knowledge. The curator in this case is the proto-polyphibian, inviting others into 
the movement of polyphibianism, inviting them to participate in each other’s 
creative acts. Triggering such catalytic reaction is the crucial step in further 
evolution of the imaginary organism of living knowledge and the main 
motivation for writing this thesis. 
5.2. Inventing polyphibic organs: resolving research 
questions  
The study sought to overcome the problems in transition from disciplinary to 
transdisciplinary research, from theory of transdisciplinarity to significant 
engagement in practice. To address this transitional problematics the main issues 
inhibiting transdisciplinary practice had to be identified. The intention of 
questions formulated in this study is not only to seek a theoretical answer but to 
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respond directly to practice. For this reason the research undertook more than a 
theoretical inquiry, attempting to test the proposed imaginary solutions with 
practical interventions and participation in creative acts. The questions are 
restated here in the sequence of entering the transdisciplinary zone from 
concerns whether or not to consider transdisciplinarity as a research option in the 
first place, to progressively more specific suggestions on practicing 
transdisciplinarity. These imaginary solutions are of provisional nature in a field 
that evades a firm framework. Limitations of the current research and 
suggestions for a future research are listed at the end of this chapter.  
UNEASE OF UNKNOWN  
The proof that transdisciplinary zone is not an empty set was already provided 
by Basarab Nicolescu (2002). This thesis resumes the pursuits of Nicolescu’s 
manifesto by studying what about this unknown, unexplored, but far from 
uninhabited territory causes anxiety in disciplinary researchers: anxiety of 
transition from closed disciplinary to open transdisciplinary  structure, anxiety 
of disorientation in absence of firm and fixed methodology, anxiety of archaic, 
abstruse, mystic or esoteric knowledge, anxiety of reintegrating the observer and 
the observed, of admitting interdependency, of establishing a dynamic 
relationship of mutually interchangeable roles. To prevent these preconceived 
notions, derived from obsolete categorisation of knowledge production, from 
impeding evolution of transdisciplinary practice, this thesis has demonstrated 
through exemplary study cases that transdisciplinary zone is neither void nor 
319 
 
vague. Furthermore, it is by imagining what transdisciplinarity might evolve into 
that this thesis attempts to alleviate the unease in front of the unknown.  
PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION INTO PRACTICE  
Once it has been intentionally decided that transdisciplinarity is to be practiced, 
transition into the transdisciplinary zone poses challenges both on the level of the 
individual disciplinary researcher transmuting into a polyphibian, and on the 
level of collective institutionalised research, where the apparatus of customary 
knowledge production is obstructing such transmutation. Without fundamental 
adaptation to a ceaselessly changing transdisciplinary environment through 
evolutionary mutations of organs of knowing, practicing transdisciplinarity is 
bound to remain superficial or be substituted with its surrogate 
interdisciplinarity or multidisciplinarity.   
Insufficient immersion into transdisciplinary zone is often the case in 
collaboration of such disparate institutions as are art and science. In many such 
attempts the lack of transmutation is evident from the fact that the involved artist 
and scientist do not experience or engage into a different kind of knowing.  
Rather, confronted with seemingly incompatible methodologies, a mutual and 
silent consensus is reached, that one discipline should become subordinate to the 
other, for instance, that art at service of science is to be further limited to 
illustrative, demonstrative set of tools. Such practice not only reduces 
transdisciplinarity to a cross-disciplinary exchanges of instruments, but 
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furthermore reinforces the impenetrability of institutions built around 
disciplines.  
A pretence of collaboration reinforces the disciplinary apparatus and increases 
the anxiety between disciplinary cultures. This thesis proposes to attack this 
problem by participation of members of various institutions in a creative act 
where each participant “experiences the phenomenon of transmutation” 
(Duchamp, 1989, p. 139). Transmutation into a polyphibian takes place first and 
foremost on the individual level. It was shown throughout this thesis how with 
polyphibic awareness all the problems of transdisciplinarity, as perceived from 
monophibic standpoint, can be avoided: the problems of resisting representation, 
of preservation, of extraction and abstraction of knowledge, the problems of 
reliance on habits of human sense organs and inability to invent new organs of 
knowing, and other problems of communication of the incommunicable, of 
mediation of what can only be known immediately, etc.   
This thesis proposes imaginary solution, but to be able to imagine solutions first 
the existing faculties of intellect must be studied through which the intellect can 
expand. The faculty of laughing is examined in efficiency as a comical corrective 
and the faculty of dreaming for enhancing imagination.  Polyphibianism follows 
the ‘pataphysical science that expands intellect from a faculty focused on 
generalisation to a faculty that is able to receive the multiplicity of exceptions 
through laughter. The rigidity of disciplined intellect can be broken by laughter 
on several orders. The monophibic laughter is elastic, it temporarily relaxes the 
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reasoning but soon after lets the monophibian to return to the approximately the 
same state. The laughter that transforms the monophibian into polyphibian on 
the other hand is plastic, it burst a laughing individual into multiplicity of points 
of being - the newborn polyphibian is not to return to the previous state.  
PROBLEM OF PRACTICING PRECISION 
Once transmutation is in process the tactics of a newborn polyphibian need to be 
developed. Transdisciplinary practice requires new organs of knowing. While 
disciplinary knowledge is increasing in quantity, losing ability to adapt even to 
increasingly complex conditions that it creates itself, transdisciplinary 
knowledge grows by differentiation in kind, differentiating in quality.  In the 
same manner values of disciplinary research, such as precision, are measured in 
quantity, whereas transdisciplinarity, for instance, treats precision as quality. The 
faulty accusation from the side of disciplinary institution would be in this case 
that transdisciplinarity lacks in precision. This thesis is an attempt to demonstrate 
the contrary. 
As is shown in this thesis, the anticipation of chaos, the discovery of chance 
within deterministic systems, left the scientists without adequate tools for 
precisely determining some systems’ behaviour. Suddenly, no matter how 
precisely one sets up the system, if the system is sensitive to initial condition, 
quantifiable prediction becomes impossible and irrelevant. Poincaré crossed the 
borders of a discipline that was obsessed with quantities as the only valuable 
measure of prediction, and imagined a different kind of prediction – a qualitative 
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analysis of the future behaviour of the system that would evaluate the system in 
the state space of all its possible evolution trajectories. Poincaré’s invention of a 
different organ of knowing dynamic systems is taken as an example in which 
precision gains new meaning.  
Part of the practice based research performed for the purposes of this thesis was 
an attempt to examine the changing notion of precision within the 
transdisciplinary practice. Locating the Interval of Suspended Judgement for the 
specific context of crossing institutions of art and science, of state of the art 
physics and ‘pataphysics, the precision procedures of both physics and 
‘pataphysics were followed to the extreme, where they intersect – only there the 
interval could be located with infinite mathematical precision.  A search for the 
interval of suspended judgement is context dependent – it depends on the 
disciplines involved. Some disciplines are not straightforward to cut – their 
domains of influence meander into other disciplines. To find a discipline-free 
zone – the transdisciplinary zone - the infrathin incision might have to be quite 
convoluted. 
This thesis finds the model of transdisciplinarity in Bergson’s writing on laughter 
and dreams – both faculties are active at the periphery of intellect. While laughter 
was shown to correct the rigid quantitative precision based on measurement and 
congruence, dreams were shown as a turbulent heterogeneous overly saturated 
environment where at first sight precision cannot be achieved. But Bergson (1914, 
p. 50) explained: “Abundance, in the domain of the mind, does not mean effort. 
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What requires an effort is the precision of adjustment.” Transdisciplinarity trains 
the precision of fine-tuning towards infinitely intricate new details appearing in 
a dream-like flow of knowledge that is not to be compared quantitatively from a 
single point of view, but experienced qualitatively in plurality of incomparable 
points of being.   
DICHOTOMIES, TRICHOTOMIES, POLYCHOTOMIES 
Many kinds of contradictions were addressed in this study, such as simultaneous 
practicing of indifference and involvement, or contrasting comparisons that 
proved the same point: a dichotomy formed between opposing statements of 
McLuhan and Bergson on the visual and the intellectual aiming at the same 
conclusion, a trichotomy between whether Duchamp supported Poincaré or 
Bergson, none of them, or both, in their dispute, etc. By resolving these tensions 
between seemingly irreconcilable terms from a fixed viewpoint, but imaginable 
as complementary if experienced from different points of being, this thesis 
introduces a proto-practice of transdisciplinarity, making the first steps towards 
imagining new organs for new ways of knowing. The entire organism of living 
knowledge is created from such tensions as, for instance, being incessantly 
newborn while concurrently growing old, etc.  
Disciplinary knowledge is in principle foreseeable – from one theorem 
consequences can be derived, inferred by reasoning, that as complicated as it may 
be, it is simply following the predetermined methodology of a discipline. 
Transdisciplinary knowing is uncertain because it cannot be dissected without 
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knowing it first, but to know it one must first dissect it. Transdisciplinarity, 
growing knowledge by differentiation into multiple points of being, is hence 
unforeseeable – it comes into existence with spontaneous differentiation rather 
than being preconceived. As Bergson (2005, p. 9) affirms: “To predict it would 
have been to produce it before it was produced.” The tension of polychotomy is 
not to be fragmented arbitrarily or uniformly, as is customary in most 
disciplinary departments, but with precise transdisciplinary incision from which 
the organism of knowledge may grow and be lived from many points of being.  
5.3. Awakening polyphibic awareness: reassessing 
research approach  
APPROACH OF A SERIOUS ARTIST 
Why approach the problematic of transdisciplinary practice stated above from a 
stance of a particularly challenging collaboration between disciplines as distant 
and disparate as that of art and science? Namely, categories of art and science are 
generalised and universalised to the extent that they are on the verge of becoming 
obsolete. Moreover, the diversity within both categories is such that instead of 
forming coherent cultures, artistic and scientific multiplicity of ephemeral 
subcultures overshadows the discussion of the “two cultures” (Snow, 2012). With 
this ambiguity taken into account, it is of no surprise that collaborations between 
artist and scientist, spontaneous or intentional, have not been formalised into a 
validated methodology. And yet, the fact that these collaborations rest on sheer 
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empirical evidences and accounts of experiences confirms existence of attempts 
at transdisciplinary practice unrestrained by theory.   
What is commonly referred to as artistic approach can also be classified as 
unclassifiable, that is, not belonging to any discipline – not satisfying the 
requirements of disciplinary research and the rigour of disciplinary knowledge 
production. Therefore art is, in a sense, already expelled by the discipline, 
Duchamp only makes that more obvious by escalating terms from artist to 
anartist, leading inevitably to anarchist. Art, from all disciplinary endeavours, is 
the most transdisciplinary by default, that is, it operates beyond disciplines, and 
for this reason it is arguably the most suitable foundation for evolution of 
transdisciplinarity. Art of course returns to disciplinary knowledge production 
with every manifestation and yet it was artists, like Duchamp, introducing the 
non-retinal art, training themselves in true transdisciplinary manner, in order to 
resist representation.   
This thesis focuses on Duchamp’s practice of transdisciplinary trespassing, as a 
study case, his becoming a “pseudo-scientist,” or just “pseudo all in all.” 
(Tomkins, 1965, pp. 36, 37). Pseudo attitude in research never quite reaches the 
disciplinary level of representation, the pseudo-disciplinarian always keeps one 
foot in the transdisciplinary torrent. An artist becoming a pseudo-scientist 
remains in the process of crossing the gap between art and science for that crucial 
extended period of time. This gap between art and science is argued in this thesis 
as one of most promising entryways into the transdisciplinary zone.   
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Many of the above mentioned impediments in transdisciplinary practice were 
circumvented by examining the cultural impact of scientific and technological 
revolutions that lead to McLuhan’s theory of media, where McLuhan exposes 
artists as the most sensitive explorers of advancements in science and technology. 
Serious artists, as McLuhan enhances their important role in society, are 
researchers with special sensitivity to changes in rate of sensing, sensible to those 
changes in altered mode and rate of perception that uncover otherwise 
imperceptible fluctuations in the media environment. Serious artists are willing 
to experiment with the media outside the rules and methods that were set up for 
it, outside the range of its predetermined applicability, thus revealing the true 
scope of a new medium and mutual dependence between the medium and its 
inventor.  
The model of the serious artist involved in the progress of science and technology 
is not a model of accessing such accelerating knowledge production by learning 
it from external sources, but by living it in real time, experiencing the change as 
the wave-front approaches. Such spontaneous engagement in new knowledge as 
it grows already transcends the disciplinary approach to knowledge. Serious 
artist is therefore considered in this thesis as a suitable transdisciplinarian proto-
species. McLuhan’s “way of the serious artist” evolves in this thesis in the “way 
of the polyphibian”. Following Duchamp’s invitation, the research in this thesis 
practices the participation in creative act as a possible attempt to reach the 
transdisciplinary zone, to bridge art and science with a movement, rather than a 
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structure, and in the particular case of art science collision - to locate the threshold 
between physics and ‘pataphysics. 
TANGENTIALLY ‘PATAPHYSICAL  
Why is the approach to transdisciplinarity in this thesis tangentially 
‘pataphysical?  That the author of the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity is 
allegedly well acquainted with ‘pataphysical literature might well be a 
coincidence, and yet, when examined closely, the comical corrective that 
‘pataphysics practices on physics and the science of the general, in general, is in 
essence transdisciplinary, it is going beyond the limitations of the disciplinary 
production of laws, or rather reduction of “exceptional” data in the process of 
generalization. Polyphibianism therefore tangentially touches ‘pataphysics in its 
ambitious scope to recognise and study the unique – polyphibianism offers the 
imaginary solution to grow organs of knowing the unique.  
‘Pataphysically serious humour, expanding the limits of intellect, is not simply a 
useful trigger for trespassing the disciplinary borders – polyphibianism embraces 
all the “logics” of laughter and other modes of ‘pataphysical “reasoning” and 
production of imaginary solutions. Since polyphibianism, as transdisciplinary 
movement, resists representation, it can be at most referred to by being touched 
by ‘pataphysics – a description of polyphibianism can therefore at best be 
tangentially ‘pataphysical. Just as pataphysics redefines finances to phynances in 
order to describe the self-aware geometry of polyphibianism, fractal was 
redefined into phractal.  
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As much as from disciplinary monophibic standpoint ‘pataphysics might lack in 
rigour, precision or consistency, it has been confirmed in polyphibic context of 
practicing precision that meta-meta- or rather ‘pata- description of 
polyphibianism is one of the more satisfactory options in representing 
polyphibianism to monophibians. Only in this manner a formula for 
transdisciplinarity can be discerned. Like recursive equations generating fractals, 
phractals are recursive transdisciplinary formulas that in order to live the 
knowledge need to re-new, re-create knowledge in continuity of change. Living 
knowledge is ceaselessly evolving: evolution of living knowledge = growing old 
+ being newborn = keeping past alive + being indifferent to the past. Phractal 
growth is bending the rules – expanding within by enfolding exceptions to the 
rules. The ceaselessly evolving phractal structure is consistently porous and 
selectively permeable. 
INTROSPECTIVE PARTICIPATION  
Why does the approach to transdisciplinarity in this thesis rely on introspection? 
The evolution of transdisciplinarity, as imagined in this thesis, is an evolution of 
a growing organism of living knowledge. In contrast to externalised disciplinary 
knowledge this organism knows itself internally through ceaselessly mutating 
organs of knowing. The access to transdisciplinarity is therefore through internal 
experience of knowing or, in other words, it is accessible introspectively.  
Introspection enables that crucial, critical and even comical corrective to habits 
of thought that externalise and separate the observer from the observed.  
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Reviewing the documented introspection of the three study cases – the writings 
and annotations by polymath or mathematical physicist Poincaré, metaphysicist 
Bergson and ‘pataphysicist Duchamp - it becomes clear that introspection 
dissolves all boundaries between scientists, artists and philosophers. Their tools 
only differ in appearance, in fact, the differences appear only in tools they use to 
externalise the internal knowing. When deeply involved in profound discoveries 
their procedures do not differ in method – every great invention comes from the 
same source. This unseen, ungraspable method that was examined for the thesis, 
confirms the hypothesis of obsoleteness of categorisation into arts and sciences, 
or any other category in knowledge production and reproduction, knowledge 
classification, administration, illustration, explanation, education, 
communication, distribution or the like. 
Poincaré’s introspection focuses on aesthetic sensibility in scientific discovery, 
Duchamp’s notes are serious but humorous pseudo-scientific and anartistic 
speculations, while Bergson’s introspection merges both the indifference in 
humour and the imaginative involvement in a dream. The method of indifference 
trained with the faculty of laughter is shown to open up access beyond 
disciplinary research internally – introspectively. Introspection can therefore be 
practiced through dreams and imagination – together with comical corrective the 
“reasoning” in dreams forms the logic of transdisciplinarity. Duchamp sets up a 
creative act by experimentally exaggerating Poincaré’s ideas and complementing 
them with Bergsonist / anti-Bergsonist dichotomies. By participating in this 
creative act, as Duchamp invites his spectators to do, an attempt of 
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transdisciplinary practice is made, examining how to experience knowledge at 
the threshold between disciplines.  
5.4. Limitations of research: resistance to representation  
Transdisciplinarity is complementary to disciplinarity. Trespassing into 
transdisciplinary zone is not a one way trip. The trespasser regains her role as a 
disciplinary researcher. In this thesis the movement of polyphibianism 
metabolises into two kinds of knowledge – catabolism returns and reintegrates 
the transmuted substance into transdisciplinary organism of living knowledge, 
while anabolism extracts the non-living knowledge for disciplinary post-
production. The feedback loop between transdisciplinary and disciplinary 
research encounters the problem of resistance to representation in 
transdisciplinarity. 
The problem lies on the border that divides representation oriented research and 
non-representational research. The process of disciplinary research must be 
visualisable, it is tailored for visually dominated culture. Results of research are 
to be superimposed, measured against each other, evaluated and judged. On the 
contrary, transdisciplinarity offers the Interval of Suspended Judgement. 
Nothing is to be communicated, everything is immediately known and 
immediately changes. The tendencies of transdisciplinarity and disciplinarity 
oppose each other – the instruments of visualisation and the organs of knowing 
the invisible are of a different kind. Research of transdisciplinarity within a 
disciplinary context that presupposes categorisation and requires 
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diagrammatical schemas of transdisciplinary apparatus is severely limited and 
can be fatal for the practice of transdisciplinarity – the message of 
transdisciplinarity does not come across because transdisciplinarity is not about 
communication. There are no orders given by the organism of living knowledge 
to adapt to changes, rather, organs of knowing self-re-organise with each 
mutation.  
How to overcome these limits is perhaps a note for the subchapter on future 
research. The author of this thesis is aware of the limitations of any description. 
Even though the chosen terminology of “life,” “organs,” “organism,” “self-
organisation,” etc., is used to turn the reader’s focus away from apparatuses of 
knowledge production, the use of metaphors does not evade categorisation. To 
escape such limitations imposed by descriptions, the intellect is invited to 
disassemble the boundaries through comical corrective. For this purpose the 
organism of living knowledge in this thesis remains vaguely defined, with loose 
borders, but most of all, it is defined in an equation of constant change, growth, 
or, in Bergson’s  (2005, p. 10) words: “to exist is to change, to change is to mature, 
to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.”   
The term polyphibian is a provisional, transitory category, not intended for a 
species but for differentiation into all possible species – imaginary solutions for 
not yet imagined problems and for reimagining falsely stated problems. 
Polyphibianism is thus evolutionary movement of adaptability in imaginary 
solutions. Once this equation is not only grasped but practiced in imagination the 
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category can be dismissed, it becomes obsolete. The limitations of this research 
are therefore to be overcome by each replacement of an obsolete category with a 
new one, by changing and mutating the definition and by cracking up in 
laughter.  
5.5. Future research: further evolution     
The thesis opens up many interstitial areas for future engagement in 
transdisciplinary niches. By participating in a particular creative act only one 
specific Interval of Suspended Judgement was established on a precisely located 
threshold, inviting the reader to search for other intervals by joining in, or setting 
up other creative acts. In a true transdisciplinary manner this invitation comes 
with no method offered – the interval must be reinvented from scratch, the sense 
organs must mutate to a different search sensibility. Likewise there are no labels 
prepared for reuse – with each project that is to disregard obsolete categories new 
provisional terminology should be conceived, preferably for single use.   
For transdisciplinary projects initiated by an artist the thesis proposes to consider 
the role of a curator as a catalyst in the creative act. Further studies are needed to 
reconfigure curatorship in a mutating art environment - how to ensure curatorial 
sensitivity for recognising the tendencies of a disciplinary trespasser, how to 
develop curatorial skills to guide a polyphibic transmutation. Moreover, a lack 
of expertise in reconsidering the traditional form of exhibitions can be 
irreversibly damaging with growing economic dependency of art projects on 
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administrative apparatus that forces the artist to manifest externally, to exhibit in 
public spaces - to be publicised within monophibic format restrictions.  
Since the administrative apparatus measures quantity, demand for high quota of 
artistic export leads inevitably to overproduction of artistic artefacts.  On the 
other hand, the apparatus, lacking in sense of humour and malfunctioning as a 
comical corrective, demonstrates the utmost tolerance over quality of art projects. 
Tolerance of the existing art formats discourages adaptation to changes and the 
traditional environment for exhibiting the art prevails. Further research into the 
role of comical correctives and other critical faculties is crucial not to lose the 
evolutionary trajectory of art from a century ago when artists as Kupka were 
“theorising on the future possibility of the direct transfer of thought from the 
artist to his audience,” (Henderson, 2005, p. 67). With advancements in science 
and technology opportunities unavailable to Kupka present themselves to new 
generations of serious artists.   
Even though polyphibianism is inspired by such visions of “direct transfer” and 
immediate knowing, it is not the aim of this thesis to convince the reader that 
there is no need for representation or preservation of living transdisciplinary 
knowledge in a suspension state for future generations. Posterity preoccupied 
many serious artists working on frontiers, producing futuristic work that was 
ahead of their time that could not have been immediately translated to 
monophibic society, oriented towards the past. As Klee noticed: “there is no work 
of art that does not call on a people who does not yet exist,” Deleuze (2006, p. 
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324). Duchamp likewise carefully assembles the material manifestations of his 
transdisciplinary processes in form of postponement: Large Glass becomes a 
delay in glass, the boxes of notes, or the box in a valise, are equally a form of 
archival suspension, inviting the “people who does/did not yet exist” to 
participate in his creative act.  
Just as research in this thesis demonstrated the importance of precise incision 
between disciplines, further research must be undertaken on how to accurately 
interrupt a transdisciplinary flow.  The movement of polyphibianism and the 
snapshots of monophibic fixed viewpoint perspective must synchronise. Under 
the influence of transdisciplinary polyphibianism, monophibic faculty of 
disciplinary archiving of knowledge in suspension, is to evolve in discrete leaps. 
The problem of representation for spatially and visually dominated monophibic 
culture must not be underestimated: from the loss due to reduction of intricate 
fractal / phractal dimensional polyphibianism to simple integer dimensions, to 
the loss due to reducing the multiple points of being to a single fixed viewpoint. 
Imaginary solutions are needed for resolving the dichotomies and polychotomies 
of curatorship in mediating the immediate transdisciplinary practice. 
With technological advancement impacting the variables of human environment 
the landscape of the intellect is changing. Just as human species is gradually 
resigning from conquering its habitat, and reconsidering itself in an 
interdependent relationship with it, our relation with the environment of 
intellectual knowledge production must be rethought correspondingly.  The 
335 
 
complex dynamics between the animating agent and the ambient needs to be 
taken into account. The use of original sense organs is being reduced and 
replaced by other instruments of knowing the environment – some of them 
pervading the human life to the extent of becoming new organs of knowing. If 
human beings are to be aware of organs implanted on them by their own 
technological inventions, they must be always prepared to develop their own 
imaginary organs independently, to counter and resist the current, if necessary.  
By practicing transdisciplinarity the anxiety of the archaic way of knowing 
dissolves. Transdisciplinarity merges the new technologies with the ancient on 
equal grounds, notwithstanding the humour – the comical corrective is applied 
in all directions. Just as McLuhan recognised the artists at the forefront of 
technological advances, so do other civilisations recognise their polyphibians. 
The purpose of this thesis is thus to find the polyphibians at the forefront of 
disciplinary culture and evolve an indigenous environment for disciplinary 
trespassers. Through this environment the access is open to all potential ways of 
knowing and the proposal made in this thesis is to further research them 
introspectively. Polyphibianism, in this sense, is integrative and emphatic to all 
modes of knowing, just as transdisciplinarity does not exclude the disciplinary 
research. 
Bergson, without allowing himself to go too far, nonetheless encourages 
introspective speculation, beyond boundaries of disciplinary research, in the 
interval of suspended judgement: “I stop upon the threshold of the mystery. To 
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explore the most secret depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just 
called the subsoil of consciousness, that will be the principal task of psychology 
in the century which is opening. I do not doubt that wonderful discoveries await 
it there, as important perhaps as have been in the preceding centuries the 
discoveries of the physical and natural sciences. That at least is the promise which 
I make for it, that is the wish that in closing I have for it,” (Bergson, 1914, p. 56). 
The proto-polyphibic skills introduced in the early 20th century by Bergson 
Poincaré, Duchamp, and others, and carefully curated for posterity, are to be 
trained as survival tactics in the changing intellectual landscape of the 21st 
century.  
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Appendix A: temporary terminology 
ART/ANART/ANTIART 
While antiart counters art, anart protests by complete indifference to art. 
If [Marcel Duchamp] used the term “an-art” to refer to the results 
of his search beyond art and anti-art, then he undoubtedly did 
so by analogy with the term “an-archy.” […] Art, Duchamp was 
convinced, could be practiced only as a radically individual, 
esoteric activity (Molderings, 2010, pp. 2496-502).  
In 1965, when interviewed by Don Morrison of the Minneapolis 
Star about the Readymades, Duchamp said “I don’t like the 
word ‘anti’. They are an-art or non-art.” Quoted in Duchamp, 
“Ephemerides,” 18 October [1965]. Cf. also Drot, Jeu d’echecs 
avec Marcel Duchamp. (Molderings, 2010, pp. 4166-72) 
CREATIVE ACT 
Marcel Duchamp, Creative Act, Houston, April 1957 
This phenomenon is comparable to transference from the artist 
to the spectator in the form of an esthetic osmosis taking place 
through the inert matter […] In the creative act, the artist goes 
from intention to realization through a chain of totally subjective 
reactions. […] The result of this struggle is a difference between 
the intention and its realization, a difference which the artist is 
not aware of. Consequently, in the chain of reactions 
accompanying the creative act, a link is missing. This gap, 
representing the inability of the artist to express fully his 
intention, this difference between what he intended to realize 
and did realize, is the personal “art coefficient” contained in the 
work. […] the creative act takes another aspect when the 
spectator experiences the phenomenon of transmutation: 
through the change from inert matter into a work of art, an actual 
transubstantiation has taken place […] the creative act is not 
performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in 
contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting 
its inner qualification and thus adds his contribution to the 
creative act.” (Duchamp, 1983, pp. 139, 140) 
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INDIFFERENCE  
Marcel Duchamp, Apropos of “Readymades,” New York, October 1961 
A point which I want very much to establish is that the choice of 
these “readymades” was never dictated by esthetic delectation. 
This choice was based on a reaction of visual indifference with 
at the same time a total absence of good or bad taste … in fact a 
complete anesthesia. (Duchamp, 1989, p. 141) 
INFRADIFFERENTIATION  
Infradifferentiation is a transdisciplinary differentiation with infrathin precision.  
INFRATHIN  
Infrathin is what separates the science of the general from science of exceptions:  
when the smoke of the tobacco smells also of the mouth from 
which it comes, the 3 smells marry by infra thin (Duchamp, 1983) 
just touching. While trying to place 1 plane surface precisely on 
another plane surface you pass through some infra thin 
moments -- (Duchamp, 1983) 
Infra-thin separation 2 forms cast in the same mold (?) differ 
from each other by an infra thin separative amount -- (Duchamp, 
1983) 
All “identicals” as identical as they may be, (and the more 
identical they are) move toward this infra thin separative 
difference. (Duchamp, 1983) 
Two men are not an example of identicality and to the contrary 
move away from a determinable infra thin difference – but there 
exists the crude conception of the déjà vu which leads from 
generic grouping (2 trees, 2 boats) to the most identical 
“castings.” It would be better to try to go into the infra thin 
interval which separates 2 “identicals,” than to conveniently 
accept the verbal generalization which makes 2 twins look like 2 
drops of water. (Duchamp, 1983) 
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INSTINCT  
Instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing 
organized instruments; (Bergson, 2005, p. 155) 
INTELLECT 
Intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using 
unorganized instruments. (Bergson, 2005, p. 155) 
 
INTERVAL OF SUSPENDED JUDGEMENT  
a transdisciplinary buffer zone between the disciplines in which a mindless 
monophibian must be notified to mind the gap, the gap in which the rules 
change, incessantly. Polyphibic awareness is required to sense the gap 
spontaneously. There are gaps between art and science, between physics and 
‘pataphysics, etc. Such gaps are filled with transdisciplinary silence (Nicolescu, 
2002). There is no indirect communication in the gap, only immediate 
transduction between the artist and the spectator. Where precisely is a gap 
located, depends on the circumstances under which one approaches the gap with 
polyphibic awareness. To locate a gap the approach must be unconventional, that 
is, counter-conventional. The attention of the polyphibian redistributes in order 
to counter the tendencies of any encountered convention. The polyphibian plays 
along all types of reasoning and cuts in at the intersection. When the interval is 
registered the polyphibian suspends all the judgement within it. To keep the 
interval sterile from germs of judgement the incision must be clean-cut, infrathin.  
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INTUITION 
An absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the rest 
has to do with analysis. We call intuition here the sympathy by 
which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to 
coincide with what there is unique and consequently 
inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation 
which reduces the object to elements already known, that is 
common to that object and to others. (Bergson, 1992, p. 161) 
 
ORGANISM OF LIVING KNOWLEDGE  
polyphibian 
ORGANS OF KNOWING 
polyphibic organs 
OSMOSIS 
spontaneous net movement of solvent molecules through a partially permeable 
membrane into a region of higher solute concentration, in the direction that tends 
to equalize the solute concentrations on the two sides 
OSMOTIC PRESSURE  
defined as the pressure required to maintain an equilibrium, with no net 
movement of solvent 
PHRACTAL 
Just as ‘pataphysics corrects finances into phynances (Jarry, 1994, p. 58) – 
polyphibianism corrects fractals into phractals […] exaggerating the mathematics 
to the extreme where mathematical systems become self-aware organisms, where 
fractals self-organise in living phractals […] pseudo-recursive transdisciplinary 
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formulas that are bending the rules and enfolding exceptions within the pores, to 
live the knowledge in a continuity of change […] a phractal divides fractals to 
generate new beings […] if fractals exist in uniform time, can phractals 
restructure homogeneous time in heterogeneous duration? […] The ceaselessly 
evolving phractal structure is consistently porous and selectively permeable. […] 
Phractals are infinite monster fractals awaken into self-awareness, unceasingly 
creating and inventing new individuals out of their own individuality in a 
continuity of change that is self-organising into consciousness. Phractals, as well 
as their cousins fractals, access from any present moment the entire past, but 
unlike fractals, phractals derive from all possible memory a fresh flow of memory 
that was not dried out yet into a set of replicating recursive formulas. Phractals 
do not remain affine to one species but invent and create new species not unlike 
evolution. If fractal is self-affine species-bounded family-tree of minor variation, 
phractal is the trans–species evolution. […] Phractal is intellect transcending 
itself. It starts with a few simple rational steps that are iterated. In this iteration it 
becomes self-aware and starts laughing. Iterative equations are self-corrective 
humour. One shouldn’t comprehend Phractals intellectually. One should only 
have intuition of Phractals.  
POINT OF BEING  
In the continuous tradition of renaissance culture knowledge production relies 
on viewpoints taken, but with the inevitable and irreversible changes in 
conditions brought about by the rise of omnipresent electronic culture Derrick de 
Kerckhove (1997, p. 187) notes the turn from the point-of-view to the point-of-
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being: “My point-of-being is not exclusive but inclusive; it is not a perspective 
vision that frames reality, but rather, is a place defined by the precision and 
complexity of my connections with the world.”  
’PATAPHYSICS  
The following is the definition by Alfred Jarry, from his book Exploits and 
Opinions of Doctor Faustrol, Pataphysician, first published posthumously in 1911: 
An epiphenomenon is that which is superinduced upon a 
phenomenon. Pataphysics, whose etymological spelling should 
be επι (μετα τα ϕυσικα) and actual orthography ’pataphysics, 
preceded by an apostrophe so as to avoid a simple pun, is the 
science of that which is superinduced upon metaphysics, 
whether within or beyond the latter’s limitations, extending as 
far beyond metaphysics as the latter extends beyond physics. Ex: 
an epiphenomenon being often accidental, pataphysics will be, 
above all, the science of the particular, despite the common 
opinion that the only science is that of the general. Pataphysics 
will examine the laws governing exceptions, and will explain the 
universe supplementary to this one; or, less ambitiously, will 
describe a universe which can be - and perhaps should be - 
envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws that 
are supposed to have been discovered in the traditional universe 
are also correlations of exceptions, albeit more frequent ones, but 
in any case accidental data which, reduced to the status of 
unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the virtue of 
originality. DEFINITION. Pataphysics is the science of 
imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes the 
properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their 
lineaments.  (Jarry, 1996, pp. 21, 22) 
POLYPHIBIAN 
a Being able to coexist coherently while dispersed in several 
media. To be distinguished from “monophibian” – adapted to 
one and only rationally standardised medium, and amphibian 
(any cold-blooded vertebrate of the class Amphibia, comprising 
frogs and toads, caecilians, newts and salamanders) adapted to 
no more than two media. In the evolution from mono- to poly-
”mediumistic” the rational-self-referential limitations that arose 
with development of sequentially optimized cortex need to be 
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surmounted: push the frontal cortex to the background. Bypass 
the linear wiring. Switch from direct current to the alternating 
current in all directions. Become polyphibic. (Ljubec, 2013, p. 
150) 
POLYPHIBIC 
a living multisided knowing of a phenomenon.  Compare to 
prefixes monophi- (on one side), amphi- (on both sides) and 
polyphi- (on many sides). Add to that bios, the life, the Being in 
Knowing. Polyphibic refers to being a newborn Being in front of 
every experience – the knowing is reborn with each instance. An 
experiment never yields exactly the same output. The outcome 
can always be experienced from a different side. Grasp the multi-
sidedness of all appearances that the experimental apparatus 
yields and you grasped the phenomenon with the polyphibic 
awareness. (Ljubec, 2013, p. 150) 
POLYPHIBIANISM 
evolutionary movement of imaginary organism of living knowledge 
POLYPHIBIOLOGICS 
logics of polyphibianism 
PROTOPLASMAGORA  
Whereas Phantasmagoria (from Ancient Greek phantasma - “ghost,” agoreuein, 
“to speak publicly”), refers to a publicly experienced varying and shifting scenes 
of phantasms, of subtly interchanging real and imagined visuals,  
Protoplasmagora is privately, introspectively accessible public space for 
emphatic exchange of thought torrents among polyphibians. […] Polyphibian, as 
a transdisciplinary organism, moves through the transdisciplinary zone - 
protoplasmagora: an agora of all polyphibic organisms – the entire evolutionary 
past of polyphibianism. […] Just as the figure needs the ground or the animal 
cannot exist without environment, so does the polyphibian require a 
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protoplasmic medium.  Polyphibianism as a movement cannot be suitably 
defined without a background - the polyphibian explores the transdisciplinary 
territory. If protoplasm is considered to be the primordial living substance then 
protoplasmagora is the primordial generator of living knowledge. […] 
Polyphibian is the living knowledge incarnated – it has all the impetus needed to 
reorganise itself wherever there is the fertile territory. It is this mutual 
dependence with its environment that defines the polyphibian. To comprehend 
the living knowledge it needs to be non-arbitrarily dissected in two agents – each 
of them alternating between active and passive role or in other words: assuming 
in turn the role of agent or ambient. […] The interdependence here is not simply 
complementary, one is not merely the opposite of the other, but rather a 
heterogeneous amalgam of one and the other. A clear cut separation of a 
polyphibian and protoplasmagora into a homogeneous agent and ambient 
would be artificial and restrictive, just as a division between the observer and the 
observed prevents certain problems to be resolved.  To start the evolution of these 
terms either agency could be defined by both: [polyphibian = polyphibian + 
protoplasmagora] and [protoplasmagora = protoplasmagora + polyphibian]. 
Protoplasmagora is therefore as much auxiliary to a polyphibian as is 
polyphibian auxiliary to protoplasmagora, both are organisms at the service of 
each other. In simple terms, the protoplasm, as a proto-living substance, already 
differentiates its metabolism into anabolic processes that internalise the material 
input, transforming the material into organism’s own vital substance, thus the 
material becomes alive, and catabolic processes that externalise the input into a 
lifeless substance output, serving the organism as a prosthesis. In the same 
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manner one might imagine an organism of knowledge metabolising its material 
into living internalised substance and external lifeless substance that can be worn 
as prosthetic apparatus until it becomes obsolete and is simply cut off, as hair or 
nails, and archived. Polyphibians, regarded as a product of anabolism within the 
protoplasmic transdisciplinary metabolism, are intricately integrated and 
internalised by protoplasmagora. By-products of catabolism, on the other hand, 
are monophibic, mechanical and lifeless, and therefore externalised, expelled to 
the periphery, where they are subject to comical corrective, as discussed before . 
Although monophibians lose touch with living knowledge and, at best, simulate 
it with crude approximations, they can be born again into the living knowledge 
if digested by protoplasmagora. Laughter facilitates metabolism of living 
knowledge through contractions and relaxations of a constipated reasoning – the 
spasms of a comical corrective. Nonetheless laughter does not simplify 
metabolism – the products of a metabolic equation that operates on 
monophibians are complex, retaining both monophibic and polyphibic 
components. Upon entering the transdisciplinary territory one is consumed by 
this territory – one’s energy dissipates and is redistributed in both disciplinary 
and transdisciplinary research. 
TECHNOETICS 
a convergent field of practice that seeks to explore consciousness 
and connectivity through digital, telematic, chemical or spiritual 
means, embracing both interactive and psychoactive 
technologies, and the creative use of moistmedia. (Ascott, 2008) 
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TECHNOUS 
Just like tech-noetics frees the technical in technology from the limitations of 
classical logic, tech-nous, the tech-enhanced-mind frees the mind from the urge 
to deduce and reduce, to equate unequal. The mind is again fully immersed in 
heterogeneity. Contrary to expectations of inoperability in such heterogeneity, 
tech-nous, so enhanced, can operate efficiently. Heterogeneity does not exclude 
communication, computation, etc. it only enlarges the field to accommodate 
dichotomies. Mind, tech-enhanced by any moist medium, is capable of 
polyphibic performance. Instead of human mind imposing its intuitive structure, 
its instinct to generalise for instance, onto the machine, in tech-nous the reversed 
is allowed: the machine is free to corrupt the mind, disrupt the obsolete self-
referential rationality that inevitably leads to technical paradoxes once a 
boundary is crossed. Tech-nous in this sense is not about rational mind imposing 
restrictions on machine but embracing unpredictable side effects of the system, 
bringing them into the resonance, resonating the systemic errors to a different 
order of awareness in tech-nous. (Ljubec, 2013, p. 150) 
 
  
347 
 
Appendix B: curating a box of notes 
This appendix provides a few instructions and examples to potential curators of 
the Box of 2014, beginning with the meta-meta note, or simply, the ‘pata note, on 
how to assemble Duchamp’s notes from the Box of 1914 onwards. Every note is 
to be saved, preserved or “chance-canned” in the Google Earth application and 
viewed from a certain eye altitude and at certain coordinates that point precisely 
to where the cursor disappears during the print screen. It is highly 
recommended, to use the readymade Google Earth style, fonts, icons, tags, links 
(including the commonly used link tags “To here,” “From here,” that 
conveniently point to and from each note), with utmost aesthetics indifference. 
Google Earth enables links to both textual and graphic material from Duchamp’s 
original notes, preserving it intact or participating in it by slight distortion, a 
glitch that is necessary to map the context of the Large Glass on the virtual 
territory of the Large Hadron Collider. Upon R. Mutt’s video intervention with 
R. Ascott’s consent, streamed on monitors and from projectors on the walls of the 
ATLAS Control Room, the virtual world is allowed to go out of control. For 
further immersion of the participator, the Google Street View of the ATLAS 
Control Room can be projected within a room curated for this purpose. For 
instance, the spectator can navigate through the intervention sites from the mock 
up ATLAS control panel. It is also recommended to clutter the virtual 
intervention sites with 3D readymade models, such as The Fountain. 
Furthermore, within the same room, the Google Earth formatted notes can be cut 
out of the virtual, extracted out of the projection of the interactive environment 
and extruded as prints, pictures or paintings,i invisibly suspended in the actual 
air, as well as suspended from virtual interaction. The participator is thus 
trapped “infrathin” at the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics, where 
the parameter sigma touches infinity and trespassing becomes inevitable. The 
following template and further examples of deviation from Duchamp’s original 
notes demonstrate a possible interference between the Google Street View data 
representation and location-dependent participation in Duchamp’s creative act.  
 
                                                 
i “use ‘delay’ instead of picture or painting […] a way of succeeding in no longer thinking that 
the thing in question is a picture – to make a delay of it in the most general way” (Duchamp, 1989, 
p. 26) 
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__°__’__”N 
__°__’__” E 
elev __ m 
eye alt __ m 
 
Titre en français, Title in English 
 
note 
 
To here  
From here  
 
© 2014 Google 
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Imagery Date: MM/YYYY 
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46°14’07.59”N  
6°03’20.34”E 
elev 440m 
eye alt 442m 
 
ATLAS Salle de Contrôle, Atlas Control Room  
Meta Meta Note = ‘Pata Note 
 
make a note on making a note  
for recursive intervention  
 
Mirrorical Return 
the virtual component of the ASCO2.T AT.LAST myth 
intervenes within the virtual ATLAS control room: 
use the satellite image of the control room  
projected within the virtual globe - 
project it in on the walls of another room,   
non-locally connected to, at last.  
furnish that causally disconnected room retinally - 
with con-cern-like clusters of monitors monitoring 
and projectors projecting for the retina; 
then display the virtual ATLAS control room  
on the monitors of the anonymous room. 
now reiterate intervention non-retinally: 
apply the liberty of indifference  
by retinal deferment and delay in glass - 
replace the coordinates  
on the map of the ATLAS control room   
with the coordinates of the replacement room:  
??°??'??"N  ??°??'??"E  
Imagery Date: ??/2014  
 
To here  ATLAS control room  
From here  non local control AT.LAST  
 
© 2014 Google 
Report a problem 
Tour Guide 
Imagery Date:3/2012 
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49°57’20.22”N  
0°35’02.51”E 
elev -1m 
eye alt 703.65km 
 
L'idée de la fabrication. The idea of the fabrication.    
 
– If a straight horizontal thread one meter long falls from a height of one meter onto a 
horizontal plane distorting itself as it pleases and creates a new shape of the measure 
of length. – 
– 3 examples obtained in more or less similar conditions: considered in their relation to 
one another they are an approximate reconstitution of the unit of length. 
 The 3 standard stoppages are the meter diminished. 
 
L'idée de postproduction. The idea of post-production. 
3 standard Stops =  
canned chance – 
1914. 
 
 
plot a standard distribution graph  
for the 3 standard stoppages:  
send sigma to infinity – 
2014. 
 
 
lim
𝜎→∞
(
1
𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒
−
(𝑥−𝑥0)
2
2𝜎2 ) 
 
To here generalization, standardization 
From here infra-thin separation  
 
Image Landsat 
Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO 
Image IBCAO 
La route Jura-Paris. The Jura Paris Road. 
Tour Guide 
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46°14’10.03”N  
6°03’23.03”E 
elev 480m 
eye alt 444m 
 
Peinture de précision, et beauté d'indifférence. 
Painting of precision, and  beauty of indifference. 
To here ASCOT - painting of precision 
 
From here ASCO2.T - painting of precision, and beauty of indifference 
The possible,  
implying the becoming -  
the passage from one to the other takes place in the infra-thin. 
 
The figuration of a possible. 
(not as the opposite of impossible 
nor as related to probable 
nor as subordinated to likely) 
the possible is only  
a physical “caustic”  
[vitriol type] 
burning up  
all aesthetics  
or callistics 
 
© 2014 Google 
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46°14’05.75”N  
6°03’19.26”E 
elev 471m 
eye alt 444m 
 
This collision is the raison d’être of the picture. 
Pictorial Translation –  
The 5 nudes, one the chief, will have to lose,  
in the picture, the character of multiplicity.  
They must be a machine of 5 hearts,  
an immobile machine of 5 hearts  
The chief, in this machine,  
could be indicated in the centre and at the top. 
The machine of 5 hearts will have to give birth to the headlight.  
This headlight will be the child-God.  
He will be the divine blossoming of this machine mother. 
He will have to be radiant with glory.  
And the graphic means to obtain this machine child,   
will find their expression in the use of an endless screw.   
(accessories of this endless screw, serving to unite  
this headlight child God, to his machine-mother. 5 nudes 
To here  
on one side,  
the 5 nudes, one the chief,  
 
From here  
on another side,  
are the two terms of the collision.  
 
This collision is  
the raison d’être of the picture. 
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46°14’09.26”N  
6°03’20.33”E 
elev 442m 
eye alt 447m 
 
L'apprenti dans une collision. The apprentice in a collision.  
To here = From here 
 
Apprenticed collision is a - 
    “sculpture” of skill.  
 
With maximum skill,  
this projection would be reduced to a point (the target). 
With ordinary skill  
this projection will be a demultiplication of the target.  
to have the apprentice in the Sun 
 
avoir l'apprenti dans le soleil  
à voir: l'empreinte qui dans le sol est  
 
given to sight: the imprint which is in the ground 
 
From figure  
To in(-fra-thin-)separable figure-ground 
 
The figure obtained is the visible flattening (a stop on the way) of the demultiplied body. 
 
© 2014 Google 
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46°14’09.58”N  
6°03’22.41”E 
elev 495m 
eye alt 444m 
 
Èlectricité en large, Electricity Breadthwise 
  
The only possible utilisation  
of electricity “in the arts.” 
 
To here  
there is no discontinuity between the bach.machine and the Bride.  
But 
From here  
the connections will be.  
electrical. and will thus express the stripping:  
an alternating process.  
Short circuit if necessary - 
© 2014 Google 
Report a problem 
Tour Guide 
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